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the following quotation from Nancy Adler (2002):
A cultural orientation describes the attitudes of most people most of the time,
never of all the people all of the time
This statement intrigued me. Behavior and attitude are apparently not something
generic but are driven by many factors, culture being one. At the same time, in my
daily work I increasingly observed the tendency to try to manage organizational
behavior through rules, codes and other more formal control mechanisms. The book
before you reflects my explorations through the world of culture and behavior, and
the interaction between the two. This endeavor gave me a couple of quite intense and
very interesting and insightful years – years in which I was given the opportunity to
meet a lot of inspiring people, read many interesting papers and books, and learn to
deal with many challenges along the way, big and small, professional and personal.
Furthermore, it provided a fruitful ground for me to apply my knowledge in this area
of culture and behavior in my professional. In other words, this PhD study enriched
my personal, academic, and professional development tremendously.
There are many people to thank for this. First of all, I have become greatly
indebted to my intellectual mentors: Jaap van Manen, Slawomir Magala, and Reggy
Hooghiemstra. The first time I met Jaap was for an interview for my Master thesis. I
came out the room badly injured while it took Jaap only the first half an hour or so to
diligently explain why and how I was looking at the research matter from all the
wrong perspectives. Only later did I come to realize that that interview was the start of
an enriching and inspiring “apprenticeship”. Enriching in the sense that I always came
out of the room with more ideas than the questions I had entered with. And inspiring
because, one way or another, these many ideas turned out most of the time to be not
too bad at all and guide the way. Jaap, of course, already knew this, but it oftentimes
took me just a little longer to work out. Jaap has been, and still is, a great teacher to
me in many ways. I am greatly indebted to Slawomir for providing so many rich
perspectives on a world that intrigued me so much, but of which, as it turned out, I
knew so little of: the world of cross-cultural management and competence. Slawomir
gave me the opportunity to put two worlds together and has continuously put his trust
and support in the good outcome, while having a sharp eye for my professional
context. Most importantly, Slawomir was able to give meaning to many of the
conceptual matters we discussed. Reggy has been my scientific conscience, beacon and
sounding board throughout the study. I am greatly indebted to him for his
unconditional support and guidance and for sharing so much of his knowledge, apart
from his moral support that was so needed from time to time. This thesis would not
have been where it is now without Reggy.
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Furthermore, I am grateful to many academic colleagues from other universities and
research institutes. I especially want to thank Sjo Soeters for his guidance at certain
moments throughout this study.
Writing this thesis has been possible only with the unconditional support and
welcome distractions of the home front, family and friends. It is an honor for me that
Bertrand Kleizen and Emiel de Bruin will accompany me to the scaffold on 9
December. I especially want to thank my brother, Jeroen, for reading the draft of this
thesis in full and providing very helpful comments. And, last but of course by no
means least, I want to thank Chantal, not only for suggesting the initial subject of this
thesis, but also for here “motivational” words when I lost momentum or needed them so
badly. I thank Chantal especially for putting up with me during all these moments when
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The complexity of human behavior challenges our explanatory powers. Yet, in this
day and age we desperately try to understand, manage and control the behavior of our
corporate citizens through rules, codes, systems, and procedures alike. With every
crisis or corporate failure (e.g., Enron, Madoff, etc.) there is a tendency to impose
additional rules and control structures that are supposed to prevent such crises from
happening again. Only recently we seem to realize that such measures are largely
ineffective in assuring expected behaviors, because professionals are not as rational in
their behavior as such rules and structures presume.1 Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 61) go
even further: they trace the “credit crunch” back to inadmissible behaviors triggered
by “primal” drivers and limitations of individual behavior, unleashed by a lack of
institutional supervision.
This thesis adds to this new insight. This study is an illustration that true
behavior of people cannot simply be controlled by (more) rules and structures.
Instead, the effective application of rules (i.e., people behaving in a manner consistent
with the expected behaviors reflected through those rules) is heavily dependent on
people’s personal and subjective interpretation of such rules. Their interpretation is
driven by many psychological, cultural, contextual, and environmental factors (e.g.,
Parsons and Shils 1951; Ajzen 1991; Elster 2007) – among which are cross-national
cultural differences. I add to this insight by studying the behavior of professionals in a
highly regulated profession that has recently lost its self-regulation as a consequence
of not meeting its stakeholders’ expectations, despite the existence of an extensive and
ever-increasing set of rules and standards: the international assurance profession. I
study their behavior in relation to one of the more influential behavioral drivers:
cross-national cultural differences, the very effect that the assurance profession is
trying to prevent through its globally consistent set of rules and standards (e.g., the
International Standards on Auditing, hereinafter: ISAs).2 Such cross-national cultural
differences are expected to lead to cross-border differences in the professional
behavior of auditors (e.g., Barret et al. 2005; Leung et al. 2005; Arnold et al. 2009).
This is the more relevant given the role of the assurance profession in the ongoing
globalization and its quest for the highest possible audit quality across the globe.
1 See for example the recent statements of the G20, OECD, Larousière, and the Turner review, which all
point to behavior and culture among the root causes of the credit crunch and financial crisis and call for
periodic behavior and culture assessments (G20 2 April 2009; Larosière 25 February 2009; Turner 2009;
OECD June 2009). The Turner review, for example, illustrates: “Individual behavior is not entirely
rational” (Turner 2009: 41), further pointing to Tversky and Kahnemann’s theory of bounded rationality
(1974).
2 The mission of the IFAC (the International Federation of Accountants), among others, is “strengthen
the worldwide accountancy profession (…) by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality
professional standards” and “promoting the provision of high-quality services by all members of the
worldwide accountancy profession” (IFAC 2009b: 4-5).
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In other words, the focus of this thesis is the influence of cross-national cultural
differences in the context of the professional behavior of auditors. The objective of
this study is to gain a more profound, in-depth, and empirically grounded analysis and
understanding of the globalization and functioning of multinational audits and the
effectiveness of international standards and firm-wide systems of control within an
international setting. Through that, a second objective of this thesis is to illustrate that
the consistent and effective application of rules, standards, and guidelines depends
significantly on the personal and subjective interpretations of the professionals
applying those standards.
In § 1.1, firstly, I illustrate the significance of studying actual behavior (and that
of auditors in particular) and comparing it to the accepted rules and norms, foremost
in relation to the general understanding of the behavior of professionals. In § 1.2 I set
out why cross-national differences are expected to lead to personal and subjective
interpretation of rules and standards and consequently drive differences in
professional behavior across borders. The research questions, strategy, and objective
of this thesis are detailed in § 1.3.
1.1 Professional behavior: auditors providing a deeper understanding
Financial crises, such as the Enron, Ahold, Madoff, and the current financial crisis,
show over and over again that behavior and personal motives, such as greed, pride,
ego and a need for status and recognition, are among the root causes of such crises. In
line with Akerlof and Shiller mentioned above, the Turner Review (2009: 41) points to
individual behavior not being entirely rational as one of the fundamental theoretical
causes of the current financial crisis.3 Obama, in his speech at the first “anniversary”
of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, warns that the times of reckless behavior are
over.4 Theorists have already pointed to bounded rationality and personalized
interpretations of reality affecting decision-making processes (e.g., Cyert and March
1963; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Hambrick and Mason 1984). But only recently
has the corporate world come to fully realize that most managers are ignorant of the
essence of behavior in, for example, the effective operation of management control
and risk management systems. “There is a recognition that the quality of corporate
3 The Turner review, analyzing the origins of the financial crisis, illustrates: “There are insights from
behavioral economic, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, which reveal that people often do not make
decisions in the rational front of brain way assumed in neoclassical economics, but make decisions which
are rooted in the instinctive part of the brain, and which at the collective level are bound to produce herd
effects and thus irrational momentum swings” (Turner 2009: 41).
4 In his speech of 14 September 2009, on the first anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, US
president Barack Obama called for the corporate world to start behaving responsibly, now they have
proven not to have learnt their lesson yet: “Instead of learning the lessons of Lehman and the crisis from
which we're still recovering, they're choosing to ignore those lessons. I'm convinced they do so not just at
their own peril, but at our nation's. So I want everybody here to hear my words: We will not go back to
the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess that was at the heart of this crisis, where too many
were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses. Those on Wall Street cannot
resume taking risks without regard for consequences”.
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governance ultimately depends on actual behavior, not [normatively designed]
process” (FRC 2009: 3).5
Ignoring the “people side” leads to “paper tigers” of formally implemented
control systems. Their implementation has cost millions in investments and they are
often a heavy burden on the companies’ growth and innovation power, but in practice
remain ineffective because they are not engrained in and supported by the individuals
subject to these measures (e.g., Anderson 2009: 29). In their paper “Financial
Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation” of 17 June 2009, the Obama Administration,
in response, calls for robust supervision and regulation that takes people’s behavior
into account as one of their five key objectives. These objectives further include
increased accountability and assurance on companies’ behavioral traits, such as
“transparency, simplicity, fairness, and access” (USA 17 June 2009: 3, 15). But the
Turner Review (2009: 80-81), at the same time, warns “to be realistic about the extent
to which policies can ensure sensible risk assessment and behavior (…) which may be
driven more by broad behavioral and cultural factors”, which are not easily accounted
for in the language of politics and governance.
In other words, behavior is crucial, yet is hard to comprehend and predict. A
deeper understanding thereof is needed. The behavior of assurance professionals is
interesting in this perspective because they find themselves among the gatekeepers
(Coffee Jr. 2006) who were not able to detect (also their own) “bad”, oftentimes
greedy behavior of managers. Lessons from fraud-related cases investigated by US’
Securities and Exchange Commission show that the top 3 audit deficiencies are
directly related to an auditor’s behavior, such as not exercising due professional care
and not applying professional skepticism (Beasley et al. 2001). The profession recently
lost its self-regulation, which to a certain extent can be traced back to behavioral and
cultural aspects of accounting organizations that foster a culture that values revenue
generation over quality service (e.g., Wyatt 2004; Jenkins et al. 2008). Jenkins et al.
(2008: 46) conclude by noting that “[t]he recent spate of corporate scandals at
companies such as Enron and WorldCom has focused debate on the significant
changes in business models and cultures within the profession and in public
accounting firms specifically”. Also, after the recent Lehman Brothers’ downfall,
auditors had to take some criticism for failing to question and challenge improper
behavior: “Investors would like to think that auditors consider not just the letter of
the rules but their spirit, too” (Economist 20 March 2010).
Secondly, auditors are among those that were ineffective in addressing the
behavioral side in the design and corporate implementations of many legislative
5 For example, central theme in almost all the responses to the financial crisis of international government
authorities and many national regulatory institutions (such as those of the US, the UK, and the
Netherlands) is a focus on human behavior in general and the behavioral side of governance, risk, and
compliance in particular. These responses include the G20’s “Global Plan for Recovery and Reform” of 2
April 2009, the OECD’s findings on “Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis” of June 2009, the
European Commissions “Larosière” report of 25 February 2009, the Obama Administration’s report
“Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation” of 17 June 2009, the UK’s “Turner” report of 18
March 2009 and revised “Combined Code” of July 2009), and the Dutch report on “Naar Herstel van
Vertrouwen” [To Recovery of Trust] of the Maas Committee 2009.
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responses or measures, including their own professional standards. As Wyatt notes
(2004: 52): “We should have learned by now that standards containing arbitrary rules
that attempt to circumvent aberrant behavior really act to encourage that very
behavior”. Others point out that such standards only worsened the issue.6 It is
understandable, and in line with social sentiments, that the call for considering (drivers
of) behavior in “reshaping” the auditing profession, next to or rather than just
increasing regulation or bureaucratic procedures, gets louder every day (e.g., Bazerman
et al. 2002; Kida 2006; Jamal 2008; Jenkins et al. 2008).7
Thirdly, understanding the behavioral aspects of auditors is relevant in relation to
the quality of audits of financial statements.8 The technical audit quality may be at
acceptable levels, which claim does not go undisputed (e.g., Humphrey 2008)9, but
may have declined in the 1990s (Francis 2004: 345). Others point to the “other”
problem in public accounting that has not (yet) been fixed: deviant workplace
behavior (e.g., Jelinek and Jelinek 2008: 223). In his analysis of the audit profession’s
role in the current financial crisis, Sikka concludes that “the events raise [age-old]
questions about the value of company audits, auditor independence and quality of
work, economic incentives for good audits and the knowledge base of auditors”
(2009b: 6-7).
Fourth, auditors are among the representatives of knowledge intensive
professions, whose performance and effectiveness are largely dependent on their own
behavior. When the technical quality or the value of a service or commodity provided
is difficult to assess10, as is the case in auditing (e.g., Alvesson 2004: 72), the perception
or image of who or which firm is offering it becomes vital (e.g., Mozier 1992;
6 DeFond and Francis (2005: 5) state that “academic research suggests that many of the ‘solutions’
embodied in SOX are not only unlikely to solve the profession’s alleged problems; they may well have
serious unintended negative consequences”, pointing, among other things, to a number of behavioral
aspects being ignored, such as auditors’ cognitive biases and heuristics.
7 As Wyatt concludes (2004: 51): “[The auditors’] role was to protect investors and creditors from being
misled by financial statements that embraced unacceptable accounting and inadequate disclosure [but] no
piece of legislation is likely to solve the behavioral changes that have evolved within the auditing firms
over the past 30 years”.
8 Quick et al. (2008) summarize auditing literature on technical audit quality, while referring to
DeAngelo’s (1981b: 186) classical definition (“the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor
both discover (a) breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report that breach”) as “the ability of
the auditor to detect material misstatements in the financial statements (competence) and his/her
willingness to issue an appropriate audit report based on the audit findings (independence)”.
9 Humphrey critiques Francis’ claim by comparing the auditor with a soccer referee (2008: 173): “[A]
problem for Francis in trying to argue that audit quality may be at a “socially desirable level” is that
auditors seem to get it wrong when it matters most. Cited work (…) reveals that 70 percent of bankrupt
companies were preceded by a clean audit report (false negatives), while six out of seven going concern
reports issued are for companies that do not go bankrupt. Would a soccer referee, for instance, be able to
convince sports commentators that he refereed well the vast majority of the matches over a season, even
though on the times that the ball went in the penalty area he happened to give penalties for tackles which
(six out of seven times) were not fouls and failed to give penalties (on 70 percent of the occasions) when
fouls were really committed in the penalty area?”.
10 In general, as well as in auditing, three forms of performance or quality are distinguished: technical
quality, service of functional quality, and perceived quality (or corporate image) (e.g., Ghebremichael
2006).
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Lowendahl 1997; Greenwood et al. 2005). Illustrative is the significant importance of
the brand name to an audit firm.11 As service providers, auditors are the “face of their
firm”. Very similar to many other professions, it is through their behavior that
auditors’ reflect the profession’s and firm’s core values, and that performance can be
perceived to be valuable and worthy of a higher fee next year by their clients, their
clients’ stakeholders, and the society at large.
By looking at the professional behavior of auditors, this thesis aims to add to the
general awareness and understanding of behavioral aspects of professionals’ decision-
making. Studying the behavior of auditors is relevant in this respect because
understanding of professionals’ behavior provides a “window” to how people behave
in the corporate work environment. With today’s management and employees
claiming to be “true professionals” (e.g., Economist 6 June 2009; Khurana 2008;
Anderson 2009) and companies increasingly becoming “knowledge intensive firms”,
“professionals” play an increasingly essential role (e.g., Alvesson 2004; Greenwood et
al. 2005). In other words, understanding of the behavioral framework of professionals
adds to the effectiveness of corporate managers and “gatekeepers” such as non-
executive boards, (internal and external) auditors, and business controllers, in
managing and controlling their “most important asset”: the behavior of their people.
1.2 Cross-national cultural differences: driving subjective interpretation
and personalized behavior
The significance and impact of globalization can be seen in the global reach of, for
example, the credit crunch. As the G20 have stated in their “Global Plan for Recovery
and Reform” of 2 April 2009 (second point):
We face the greatest challenge to the world economy in modern times; a crisis
which has deepened since we last met, which affects the lives of women, men, and
children in every country, and which all countries must join together to resolve. A
global crisis requires a global solution.
Hofstede, in his speech during the 2009 opening of the academic year at the
University of Groningen, argued that in retrospect we could have expected the current
financial crisis just by looking at the national cultural values, specifically those of the
US. Another example of how nearby, yet pervasive international and cultural
differences can be, is the difference of banks’ solidity between the US and Canada –
neighboring countries – which is associated with different risk appetites (Economist
16 May 2009). Regulators call for consistency of standards and rules (e.g., Larosière 25
February 2009: 13).
11 That large accounting organizations are highly sensitive to image and perceived quality is illustrated by
the collapse of Arthur Andersen after the Enron affair in 2002. On the level of the profession, the
current level of public (dis)trust illustrates that the image of the profession as a whole is also an important
element of perceived audit quality. See § 2.5.6.1.
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Cross-national cultural differences lead to misperceptions, miscommunication,
misinterpretation, and misevaluation (e.g., Adler 2002: 142), for example in the
interpretation and application of rules and standards. House et al. remark (2004: 179):
“Practices, policies, and procedures that work quite effectively in one culture may
dramatically fail or produce counterproductive behavior in another culture”. The
national cultures between the people interpreting and implementing these standards
differ – hence, the local implementation will differ. Understanding the global or
international dynamics of behavior is of the greatest essence for the effective
operation of globally endorsed standards, guidelines and regulations.
International accounting organizations (generally referred to as the Big 4 audit
firms)12, as many other (professional service) firms, operate internationally and, alike
business in general, are thus significantly affected by these global dynamics and cross-
national (cultural) differences. The Big 4 audit firms offer worldwide coverage of
assurance services to their clients and apply international auditing standards. They are
the biggest audit firms and generally comprise a so-called “global network of affiliated
firms” (e.g., Schilder et al. 2002; Hayes et al. 2005; Humphrey et al. 2009). With the
ongoing globalization, one of the challenges faced by international accounting
organizations is to provide assurance services at the highest possible level of audit
quality throughout the world (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2008).13 “The big accounting firms
each operate with about seven to eight hundred offices across the world. These firms
are concerned to ensure consistency across offices, particularly in relation to (…)
audits” (Barret et al. 2005: 3). However, as “global firms” they are confronted with
numerous cross-national differences affecting the behavior of their professionals and
the audit process designed to attain that level of audit quality. Many professional,
organizational or environmental aspects that affect the audit process differ across
national borders and, hence, are expected to impact auditors’ professional behavior
across national borders.14 For an international accounting organization with a global
12 The Big 4 audit firms operated under the brand names of Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and
PricewaterhouseCoopers, each with global revenues of USD 13 to 17 billion and 100,000 to 150,000
employees. “The firms are organized as networks of member bodies, each of which is a separate and
independent legal entity under the global firm. Despite this legal structure, they are to an increasing extent
acting more and more like one entity – forcing members of the firm to closely follow the policies of the
global firm” (Humphrey et al. 2009).
13 As Jim Lee, Global Chief Auditor of PricewaterhouseCoopers, one of the Big 4 international
accounting organizations, illustrates (2008: 35): “Investors and other capital market participants want to
know that quality of audits is the same everywhere so that they can rely on the information to inform
their decisions. (…) A single set of global auditing standards is critical to provide investors and lenders
with consistently high quality financial information to make investing and lending decisions across capital
markets”. One of the attributes, Lee continues, would be to have understandable and clear auditing
standards that support consistent application and performance.
14 For example, several scholars point to environmental, institutional or structural differences, such as
differences in the reputation, maturity, and perception of the auditing profession, national audit
regulations and standards, accounting practices and systems, litigiousness of the audit environment,
education systems and training, political systems, language, economic wealth and the level of capital
markets, the level of corruption, and legal and tax systems (e.g., Ferris et al. 1980; Hussein et al. 1986;
Gray 1988; Cohen et al. 1992; Doupnik and Salter 1995; Wood 1996; Yamamura et al. 1996; Wingate
1997; Saudagaran and Diga 1999; Nobes and Parker 2000; Kimbro 2002; Schilder et al. 2002; Radebaugh
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strategy, the impact of cross-national cultural differences upon actual behavior of its
professionals in any specific national context is extremely important (e.g., Adler 2002:
135). Prior research shows that cross-national cultural differences impact the behavior
of auditing professionals indirectly and disrupt attempts to provide so-called “seamless
services” or at least make it fragile (Cooper et al. 1998; Mennicken 2008). The auditing
profession is impacted by cultural differences reflected, for example, in accounting
systems (e.g., Gray 1988; Chanchani and MacGregor 1999)15 and accounting practices
such as earnings management (e.g., Doupnik 2008; Han et al. 2010), in the standard-
setting process (e.g., Bloom and Naciri 1989; MacArthur 1999) and harmonization of
standards (e.g., Needles 1989; Beresford 1990; Agacer and Doupnik 1991; Wood
1996; Farrel and Cobbin 2001; Ding et al. 2005; Choi and Meek 2008), in risks of
material misstatement in an auditor’s clients’ financial statements (e.g., Chan et al.
2003)16, in audit clients’ organizational design and internal control systems (e.g.,
Harrison et al. 1994; Chow et al. 1999), in the level of corruption in a country (e.g.,
Kimbro 2002), or in auditor clients’ intentional tax evasion or non-compliance (e.g.,
Tsakumis et al. 2007).
1.3 The focus of this study: the impact of culture on behavior
The focus of this study is the direct effect of cross-national cultural differences
influencing the auditors’ behavior. For example, Barret et al. show that, despite the
International Standards on Auditing of the IFAC:
et al. 2006; Choi and Wong 2007; Choi and Meek 2008). An illustrative example is the study of Thorne et
al. (2003) who find that differences in moral reasoning between auditors from Canada and the United
States were explained by the regulatory and litigiousness of the environment.
15 Gray defined the differences in accounting values as follows (Gray 1988: 8):
 “Professionalism versus Statutory Control: A preference for the exercise of individual professional
judgment and the maintenance of professional self-regulation as opposed to compliance with
prescriptive legal requirements and statutory control;
 Uniformity versus Flexibility: A preference for the enforcement of uniform accounting practices
between companies and for the consistent use of such practices over time as opposed to flexibility
in accordance with the perceived circumstances of individual companies;
 Conservatism versus Optimism: A preference for a cautious approach to measurement so as to cope
with the uncertainty of future events as opposed to a more optimistic, laissez-faire, risk-taking
approach; and
 Secrecy versus Transparency: A preference for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of
information about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management and
financing as opposed to a more transparent, open, and publicly accountable approach”.
Doupnik and Salter (1995) expanded on Gray’s model by developing an explanatory model for the
development of national accounting systems through interrelationships between the external
environment, institutional structure (e.g., legal system, educational system, and professional
organizations), culture and accounting.
16 Chan et al. (2003) have shown that differences in Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions of Power
Distance and Individualism explain differences in the risk of material misstatements in the financial
statements of the companies embedded in these cultures (mainly through those companies’ accounting
and internal control systems).
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auditors exercise considerable discretion in response to local relationships and risks
[linking] the local and the global in a dialectical manner [and affecting] the ways in
which auditors conceive of themselves as professionals, of who is the client and
how they identify with the globality of their own firm (Barret et al. 2005: 1, 4).
They illustrate that auditors are sensitive and proud of some local audit specificities
and apply “local appropriation” to many standards and processes within an audit firm;
measures that are implemented to mitigate the impact of national culture on
professional work behavior. Where one auditor is completely ignorant of any cultural
differences which could impact auditing17, others see huge cultural challenges standing
in the way of a standardized and universal global audit.18 As these ISA’s have been
written from a pre-dominantly Western perspective, and, hence, are culture-bound
and often culture-blind19, it cannot just be simply assumed that auditors around the
world will interpret and apply the standards consistently. In other words, auditors’
professional behavior is driven to a large extent by the auditor’s local environment and
culture. This leads to differences in the interpretation and application of auditing and
ethical standards.
Prior research does point out that the international auditing standards are culture-
bound and culture-blind. For example, Arnold et al. (2009) have illustrated that “even
though auditing standards may be the same or harmonized (…) there can be
significant differences in the application of these standards across countries by each
country’s culture” (2009: 58), e.g., in the application of materiality standards,
interpretation of independence, or principles of confidentiality. Others claim that
“culture is more likely to be the default” (Leung et al. 2005: 369) when these standards
are ambiguous or multi-interpretable. This is moreover relevant as it is the IFAC itself
that recently called to embrace issues in spirit rather than in letter (IFAC 29 March
2009), setting the already principles-based standards open for multiple interpretation.
As Cohen et al. note in their 1993 landmark paper, referring to IFAC’s quest for
consistent worldwide application of the Code of Ethics, “that the firms’ top
17 As one auditor, who was interviewed as part of this study, questions: “What do you mean with cultural
differences? We have Sarbanes-Oxley and the ISAs so everybody should know what to do”.
18 As another auditor, who was interviewed as part of this study, states: “I’m very negative on the capabilities of
[country X] to adapt to the global standards. The structure of how people operate here creates a generation which embeds
behaviors that do not preserve a proper, Western value set of integrity and checks and balances”.
19 The ISA’s are culture-bound because they are deeply rooted in the Western cultural values (as they find
their source in the local standards of the dominant, Western member-countries) and culture-blind
because they do not take the cultural differences into account in the interpretation and application of the
standards. “The development of theories (including auditing theory) and their subsequent transportation
to non-Western cultures (…) are based on the assumption that the key concepts underpinning the various
theories are value-free and neutral. [For example], the concept of external auditors’ independence is based
on the assumption that there are no consistent perceptual differences among people from various
cultures relying on the concept. (…) [S]uch assumptions are reflections of ‘culture blindness’” (Patel and
Psaros 2000: 319). However, the ISA’s are not alone in this; most of what we know about corporate
governance, management, strategy, and business is based on literature of a predominant Western
perspective (US mainly) (e.g., Boyacigiller and Adler 1991). The Western values, however, will not per
definition and by themselves determine the nature of the world that emerges in the coming decades of
globalization (with, for example, the emerging BRIC economies gaining power).
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management and the profession’s standard setters are unlikely to be fully sensitive to
international and cultural differences [and that] audit firms need more information on
the nature and extent of international ethical diversity in order to adequately control
for such differences” (Cohen et al. 1993: 3). Hence, for global audit firms, the impact
of cross-national cultural differences is not merely “nice to know” but imperative for
survival, let alone success.
It is for these reasons that auditing research calls for an international perspective
to better understand what it means to be an auditing professional in different
countries or institutional sites (e.g., DeFond and Francis 2005: 8; Humphrey 2008:
185). Some significant efforts have been made to study cross-national differences in
auditors’ professional behavior (with or without cross-national cultural differences as
explanatory variable). Nevertheless, the number of studies on cross-national
differences in auditors’ behavior is still relatively limited, especially studies that have
included cross-national cultural differences as explanatory variable (e.g., Patel 2004). In
addition, a number of critical notes on the robustness of these studies can be placed in
general, such as the use of culture as a “catch all” black box, a dominance of the use
of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, or the inclusion of only a limited number of
cultures in a study (e.g., Cohen et al. 1996; Harrison and McKinnon 1999; Patel et al.
2002; Patel 2004). Prior research covers cross-national differences in auditors’
professional behavior, but mostly without cross-national cultural differences as
explanatory variable. Researchers call for a comprehensive study on cultural influences
in auditing and in the specific context of the differences studied.20
1.4 Research questions, strategy, and objectives
In the light of the above arguments, one might expect that cross-national cultural
differences belong to the most significant behavioral drivers leading to the differences
in the personal and subjective interpretation and application of rules and standards
internationally. However, although we already have a relatively robust understanding
of the individual components of auditors’ professional behavior (Chapter 2) and
cross-national cultural differences in general (e.g., Hofstede 2001; House et al. 2004),
much is yet unknown about the interaction between the two within an auditing
context: the impact of cross-national cultural differences on auditors’ professional behavior. In other
words, the current academic understanding of the impact of cross-national cultural
differences on the professional behavior of auditors is far from complete. Therefore,
central to this thesis is the following question:
20 As Patel et al. (2002: 4) note, summarizing Harrison and McKinnon (1999): “We acknowledge the
progress that the use of this taxonomy [of cultural dimensions] has enabled in cross-cultural accounting
research, [we] also call for future research to go beyond the taxonomy itself and to draw on the broader
and richer descriptions of culture available in the historical, sociological and social commentary literatures
about the countries under examination. Such an approach also allows identification of which of the
dimensions in the taxonomy may be core (more important), and which peripheral (less important) in their
impact on perceptions and behavior”.
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Is auditors’ professional behavior affected by cross-national cultural
differences, and, if so, how?
Against this background, the following research questions were developed:
 What is professional behavior in general and that of auditors in particular, what
drives professional behavior, and how does culture play a role in this context?
 What are cross-national cultural differences and how do these affect behavior in
general?
 How do auditors’ professional behaviors differ across national borders?
 How can cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behavior be
explained by cross-national cultural differences?
Answering the first two research questions results in an overview of auditors’
professional behavior in Chapter 2 and an overview of the cross-national cultural
dimensions’ known theory in Chapter 3.
Given the general lack of understanding of cross-cultural behavior of auditors, a
multi-sourced, multi-method21, “two-loop” empirical research strategy is followed to
answer the third and fourth research questions, as follows:
 Loop One: In the first empirical “loop”, a grounded theory approach is taken to
explore which auditors’ behaviors differ cross-nationally and how these
differences are expected to be explained by cross-national (cultural) differences.
Based on open-structured interviews with 35 internationally experienced senior
auditors, complemented by observational notes taken by the author and literature
review of the current academic understanding of cross-national (cultural)
differences in auditors’ professional behavior, propositions are formulated as part
of a grounded theory on how cross-national cultural differences are expected to
impact the professional behavior of auditors internationally. The results are
presented in Chapter 4.
 Loop Two: In the second empirical “loop”, the grounded theory propositions of
“Loop One” are partly validated through rank order analysis of 5 behavioral
factors measured through 1,070 audit engagement questionnaires of 29 countries
from an annual process performance improvement project of an international
accounting organization. The details ad results are presented in Chapter 5.
Based on this research strategy, the central question of this thesis is answered in the
concluding chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6). This concluding chapter also includes
recommendations and directions for future research.
21 Leung and Van de Vijver advocate that cross-cultural research is “most convincing when supported by
diverse evidence based on a sound theoretical basis, multiple sources of data, different research methods,
and explicit refutation of alternative interpretations” (Leung and VandeVijver 2008: 145).
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By researching the effect of cross-national cultural differences on the
professional behavior of auditors in a direct, empirically grounded fashion, the
objective of this thesis is twofold:
 To gain a more profound, in-depth, and empirically grounded analysis and
understanding of the globalization and functioning of multinational audits and the
effectiveness of international standards and firm-wide systems of control within a
cross-cultural setting (and provide recommendations and directions for future
research accordingly);
 To illustrate that the consistent and effective application of rules, standards, and
guidelines is significantly dependent on the personal and subjective interpretation
of the professionals applying such standards.
Gaining direct access to the views of auditors through interviews and observations
and to empirical data directly from the audit practice (i.e., the questionnaire results)
provides unique and valuable sources for this study. As Jenkins at al. (2008: 49) note:
“Relatively little empirical evidence exists about cultures within firms [because there
are not so many] researchers who are able to negotiate access to firm personnel” (also
see Needles 1989: 1). Being based on grounded theory and a validation in part thereof,
this study is the first to explore the cross-national differences impacting the auditing
profession in general and auditors’ professional behavior in particular in a
comprehensive and empirically grounded and contextualized fashion.
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2. Auditors’ Professional Behavior – A Conceptual
Framework
2.1 Introduction
The assurance profession finds its fundamental behavioral principles in an extensive
and stringent set of rules and standards. Nevertheless, the collapse of Arthur
Andersen as a consequence of the Enron debacle and other financial fiascos have
raised questions about the integrity of the accounting profession (e.g., Wyatt 2004;
Sikka 2009b). Apparently, it is not clear what the profession actually means with these
core behavioral principles. These principles are furthermore subject to a “continuing
changing equilibrium” of stakeholders’ and the society’s expectations of the behavior
of assurance professionals (e.g., Neale 1996).22 Given the relevance of behavior in
general and to the assurance profession in particular (see § 1.1), the research question
central in this chapter is:
 What is professional behavior in general and that of auditors in particular, what
drives professional behavior, and how does culture play a role in this context?
For these research questions, a literature review approach is taken resulting in an
overview23 of auditors’ professional behavior. This also forms the theoretical
foundation for the empirical phase of this study.
To answer these questions, in § 2.2, I cover the fundamental theories on
professional behavior in general and provide a definition of professional behavior for
purposes of this study. The assurance profession is introduced in § 2.3, including its
espoused values and behavioral research history. In § 2.4, the actual professional
22 A subtlety in the social norm is the “continuing changing equilibrium” of stakeholders’ and
environment’s expectations of professional ethical behavior (Neale 1996: 220): “Professional misconduct
is inevitable, given the [changing equilibrium], in which [societal] stresses give rise to the possibility that
particular actions which may have been regarded as acceptable at one time need not always be seen in
that light; professional conduct can become misconduct, and the reverse process is also possible”. Magala
argues this to be one of the essences of culture (Magala 2009: 4): “Such and many other forms of
recycling, re-branding and repackaging of values and ideas never stop, since this is what our culture is
mostly about”. Neale concludes: “This process of disequilibrium and change leads to altered views of
professional behavior” (1996: 219). The Enron-Andersen case and the loss of self-regulation induced
such equilibrium changes.
23 As with every overview or model, there are a number of inherent limitations to a conceptual
framework. In this case; (a) I have focused my analysis on the behavior of a specific group, being formally
recognized and employed professional auditors; (b) presenting the complexities of the “black box” of
professional’s behavior in a more practical framework (which includes categorizations) and making things
look clear-cut and simple “may mislead at best” (Alvesson 2002: 47) and may result in oversimplified reality
and a loss of theoretical interpretative power; (c) one needs to be very careful to assume causal relationships
between certain behaviors, the factors driving those behaviors and the outcome of the behaviors (being
performance or action). This one-dimensional framework cannot reflect the complexity of multifactorial
causality or multiple interactions among the constructs.
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behaviors of auditors are illustrated as they are covered in this study. In § 2.5, I
present a high-level conceptual framework for the systematic explanation of the
professional behavior of auditors to put the potential effect of national culture on
behavior to context and perspective. This theoretical overview is completed with a
conclusion in § 2.6.
2.2 What is professional behavior?
To the best of my knowledge, there is no universally acknowledged or accepted
definition of what professional behavior is. The first question to be answered, then, is
what is actually meant by professional behavior. One might start by looking it up in
the dictionary: “People’s or animals’ behavior is the way that they behave” (Collins
Cobuild Dictionary). The definition of “behave” brings something of “action” into
play: “The way that you behave is the way that you do and say things, and the things
you do and say.” Also, management literature stresses “action” as a central aspect of
behavior, for example:
 Behavior is human action which is oriented to the attainment of ends or goals or
other anticipated states of affairs, takes place in situations, is normatively
regulated, and involves expenditure of energy or efforts or “motivation” (Parsons
and Shils 1951: 53).
 Behavior is any form of human action (Adler 2002: 18).
 Behavior is words and deeds (Hofstede 2001: 2).
 Behavior is action that is shaped by the desires (motivations), beliefs and
opportunities of the agent (Elster 2007: 40, 163).
 Behavior is determined both by the cultural predisposition (the perceptions,
thoughts, and feelings that are patterned) and by the situational contingencies that
arise from the immediate external environment (Schein 2004: 19).
Looking at some fundamental theories of professional behavior in contemporary
social sciences, one notices that these cover the inputs (e.g., desires and motivations,
situational contingencies), an estimated intentionality (oriented to a certain value or
outcome), the “mechanisms” by which behavior is shaped (e.g., the influence of the
immediate environment, expenditure of efforts) and the outputs of behavior (e.g.,
action and deeds, attainment of end goals). For example, Parsons and Shils (1951)
defined three levels of the “systems of orientation” that guide people’s actions and
behaviors in their “General Theory of Action”:
 The personality system defines actions of an individual based on need-
dispositions or personal motivation. Depending on the object being wanted or
not and the value attached to it, “energy” will be allocated among specific goals
and objects, i.e., motivation thus being the energy to be put in certain action and
behavior.
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 The social system defines the interaction process between two or more actors, in
which the actors’ own “system of orientation” is interdependent with the other
actors’ orientations, needs, motivations, and norms. In this social interaction,
“role expectation” is a factor directing the behavior; people behave within the role other
actors in that society expect of each person in that society to play to maintain that society.
 The cultural system describes the organization of the values, norms, and symbols
which guide the choices made by actors and which limit the types of interaction
that may occur among actors. These choices are guided by preferred choice
alternatives or programming – a pattern of five choice-alternatives covered in
Chapter 3 such as affectivity, self-orientation, and achievement).
Behavior, in Freud’s reasoning, is driven by personality traits and guided (or
“repressed”) by boundary systems of the socially acceptable. In the “Freudian theory
of the unconscious” (later termed as psychoanalysis), a dynamic explanation was
developed to reflect the ongoing “interaction” between the “id”, “ego”, and “super-
ego” within a single individual’s personality. To quote Magala’s review of Freud’s
theory (2009: 54):
Individual personality developed between those two powerful masters [the
authentic desire of the “id” and the symbolic internalized “controller” of one’s
behavior, the “super-ego”] fighting for their share in determining behavior;
unconscious desires propel the individual towards sexual fulfillment [and other true
desires], internalized norms repress these desires in order to channel behavior into
patterns acceptable to society. “Ego” deals with both, giving us a feeling of
becoming ourselves, of acquiring a unique identity (…) Without internalized
repression collaboration with others would be difficult. Without unconscious
drives, there would be no emotional flavor and creativity in social life.
A more concrete framework that adds considerably to the understanding of
professional behavior is Ajzen’s “Theory of Planned Behavior” (1988, 1991). In this
conceptual behavioral framework, the central idea is that behavioral achievement
depends jointly on motivation (intention) and ability (behavioral control).24 The theory of
planned behavior postulates three conceptually independent determinants of intention
which are considered a function of salient beliefs relevant to the behavior:
24 Intentions would be expected to influence performance to the extent that the person has behavioral
control, and performance should increase with behavioral control to the extent that the person is
motivated to try. Intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they
are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert,
in order to perform the behavior. As a general rule, the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the
more likely should be its performance. A behavioral intention can find expression in behavior only if the
behavior in question is under strong-willed (volitional) control, i.e., if the person can decide at will to
perform or not perform the behavior. The performance of most intended behaviors depends at least to
some degree on such non-motivational factors as availability of requisite opportunities and resources
(e.g., time, money, skills, and cooperation of others). Collectively, these factors represent people’s actual
control over the behavior (based on Ajzen 1991).
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 Behavioral beliefs: The attitude toward the behavior refers to the degree to which
a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in
question. Closely related to the expectancy-value model (referred to later), in this
fashion, people learn to favor behaviors which they believe have largely desirable consequences
and they form unfavorable attitudes toward behaviors that people associate with
mostly undesirable consequences.
 Normative beliefs: The subjective norm, a social factor that refers to the perceived
social pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior. Normative beliefs are concerned
with the likelihood that important “referent” individuals or groups approve or
disapprove of performing a given behavior.
 Control beliefs: The degree of perceived behavioral control which refers to
people’s perception of the ease or difficulty of performing the behavior of interest.25 This
dimension is considered to be of greater psychological interest than actual control.
The strength of one’s behavioral intention is driven by someone’s behavioral belief
and regulated by someone’s normative belief. Perceived behavioral control, together
with this behavioral intention, can be used directly to predict behavioral achievement.
But it should be noted that behavioral achievement is expected to vary across
behaviors and situations (context specific).26 Buchan (2005), in his study of ethical
decision-making, extended Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior by distinguishing
personal, social and organizational factors influencing ethical intentions of auditing
professionals.27
The aspect of personalized interpretation driving behavior is also seen in the “upper
echelon theory”, following the behavioral theory of the firm (e.g., Cyert and March
25 Importantly, perceived behavioral control differs greatly from Rotter’s (1966) concept of perceived
locus of control (see § 2.4.4 in this thesis). Whereas locus of control is a generalized expectancy that
remains stable across situations and forms of action, perceived behavioral control can, and usually does,
vary across situations and actions. Thus, a person may believe that, in general, her outcomes are
determined by her own behavior (internal locus of control); yet at the same time she may also believe that
her chances of becoming a commercial airplane pilot are very slim (low perceived behavioral control)
(Ajzen 1991).
26 Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior, an extension of the theory of reasoned action of Ajzen and
Fishbein, was born out of the notion that behavior cannot be predicted based on the general behavioral
traits or attitudes, but that these behaviors must be analyzed within the specific context in which these
behaviors are conducted: “Much has been made of the fact that general dispositions tend to be poor
predictors of behavior in specific situations. (…) The failure of such general attitudes to predict specific
behaviors directed at the target of the attitude has produced calls for abandoning the attitude concept.
(…) In a similar fashion, the low empirical relations between general personality traits and behavior in
specific situations has led theorists to claim that the trait concept, defined as a broad behavior disposition,
is untenable. (…) One proposed remedy for the poor predictive validity of attitudes and traits is the
aggregation of specific behaviors across occasions, situations, and forms of action. The idea behind the
principle of aggregation is the assumption that any single sample of behavior reflects not only the
influence of a relevant general disposition, but also the influence of various other factors unique to the
particular occasion, situation, and action being observed [which] (…) represents a more valid measure of
the underlying behavioral disposition than any single behavior” (Ajzen 1991: 180).
27 He has found partial support for the applicability of the theory in predicting ethical intentions of public
accounting professionals.
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1963).28 One of the moderating factors in an executive’s behavior would be an
executive’s personalized discretion in his/her interactions with the organization and the
external environment, constrained by a host of conventions and norms (Hambrick
2007). The actual decisions will reflect their personal background and disposition;
hence, the psychological and cognitive traits and societal values. Also more at the
organizational level, it is noted, for example by Schein (2004), that the behavior of
people in organizations is predominantly determined based on the messages they think
to receive about what is really valued in the organization.
Following these different definitions and theories of behavior, the definition of
professional behavior used in this study is based on the notion that professional
behavior is:
 driven by one’s human nature and personal needs, motivations, ethics, and
psychological cognitions and limitations;
 guided and controlled by internalized values and beliefs that are shaped by
personalized interpretations of national, professional, and organizational cultures,
conventions, and norms;
 conditioned by the external constraints and situational contingencies from
discretional interactions with external actors and the profession’s immediate
business environment;
 leading to “actions”, being the actual professional behaviors visible to the outside
world, and a certain “end result” or performance.
2.3 The behavior of assurance professionals
2.3.1 The assurance profession
The fundamental principles and raison d’être of the assurance profession29 can be found
in the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Watts and
Zimmerman 1983); the separation of control (a small group of management) and
ownership (an oftentimes diffuse group of shareholders). Given the assumed self-
serving behavior of management, the shareholders cannot always assume the reliability
28 In the upper echelon theory, it is explicitly considered that “executives act on their personalized
interpretations [and that] these personalized construals are a function of the executives experiences,
values and personalities” (Hambrick 2007: 334), which would comprise an executive’s demographic
characteristics and background (including national culture) as an indicator of an executive’s frame of
reference. Such personalized interpretations are culture specific, as Carpenter et al. (2004) argue when
they question the universality of the “top management team” construct in the “upper echelon theory”.
National culture would be part of the environmental contextual factors in Carpenter et al’s adapted model
of executive behavior.
29 The terms assurance and audit are used interchangeably, as in the audit profession and the assurance
profession and in auditors and assurance providers. The term assurance reflects the more developed and
wider profession (see § 2.3.1) compared to the more traditional and commonly used term of auditing and
accounting.
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of the financial reporting by management30 (one of the main governance mechanisms
to bridge the information asymmetry). On the other hand, they do not have the
resources, access and organization to verify the accuracy thereof themselves. The audit
profession finds its origin in the verification of such management’s assertions in the
financial reporting to the shareholders and other stakeholders – an independent
external audit of the financial statements (e.g., Schilder et al. 2002).31 Capital markets
are the modern center court of the agency theory. Its efficiency depends, among other
things, on the availability of reliable (non-)financial information about the condition of
the firms whose stock is publicly traded. “The credibility added to a [company’s]
financial statements by the “clean” audit opinion is the central reason for an audit
firm’s existence” (Wyatt 2004: 49).32
International accounting firms are among “the most commonly recognized
professional businesses” (Alvesson 2004: 32). As Larson more generally states (1977:
X):
Professions are occupations with special power and prestige. Society grants these
rewards because professions have special competence in esoteric bodies of
knowledge linked to central needs and values of the social system, and because
professions are devoted to the service of the public, above and beyond material
incentives.33
The assurance profession meets the traditional characteristics for being a profession
that emerge from various scholars (e.g., Sorensen and Sorensen 1974; Burns and Haga
30 The auditing profession in the Netherlands, for example, is considered to have originated out of the
Pincoffs affair of 1879. In that year, the Dutch society was confronted with a large fraud, the so-called
Pincoffs affair. When Pincoffs’ African Trade Company suddenly became bankrupt, the trade activities
were found to be highly speculative while the balance sheet turned out to be completely false. As a
consequence, his partner, who was a famous banker, lost a considerable amount of money for that time
period. This disaster induced several accountants in the 1880s to establish themselves as independent
auditors, which in turn led to the first institution for accountancy as a body of professionals, the
Netherlands Institute of Accountants in 1895 (based on, e.g., Blokdijk et al. 1995: 23-24).
31 Auditing may be characterized as a process of assuring the validity of an assertion vis-à-vis specified
criteria and reporting the findings to interested parties. Financial statement auditing is the most common
form. The assertions to be audited concern economic transactions into which an organization has
entered, the criteria used are generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Ultimately, if the auditor
concludes that the assertions in the financial statements are in accordance with GAAP, he or she issues a
report communicating that message. Otherwise, the auditor requires an adjustment to the assertion or
would issues a report indicating that the financial statements depart from GAAP (based on Solomon and
Shields 1995).
32 “Investors depend upon the integrity of the auditing profession. In its absence, capital markets would
lack a vital base of trust” (The Economist 20 November 2004).
33 Larson defines professionalization as (1977: XVI): “The process by which producers of special services
seek to constitute and control a market for their expertise. (…) An attempt to translate one order of
scarce recourses – special knowledge and skills – into another – social and economic rewards. (…) It
must be specific enough to impact distinctiveness to the professional “commodity”; it must be formalized
or codified enough to allow standardization of the “product” – which means, ultimately, standardization
of the producers. And yet it must not be so clearly codified that is does not allow a principle of exclusion
to operate: where everyone can claim to be an expert, there is no expertise”.
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1977; Larson 1977; Alvesson 2004; Barley and Kunda 2004; Almer et al. 2005),
although the modern profession is more and more a business case.34
The development of the auditing profession is characterized by large changes in
the organizational structures of international accounting firms, which have grown
from sole practitioners to multinational professional service firms35, currently known
as the Big 4 auditing firms. The Big 4 audit firms operated under the brand names of
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, each with global
revenues of USD 13 to 17 billion and 100,000 to 150,000 employees. In 1970, there
were eight such firms but a series of mergers in 1989 created the ‘‘Big 6”, the 1998
merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand reduced this to the ‘‘Big 5” and
the 2002 collapse of Arthur Andersen has left the ‘‘Big 4”. “The firms are organized as
networks of member bodies, each of which is a separate and independent legal entity
under the global firm. Despite this legal structure, they are to an increasing extent
acting more and more like one entity – forcing members of the firm to closely follow
the policies of the global firm” (Humphrey et al. 2009).
The global demand for professional assurance, tax, and management advisory
services by large and often multinational clients is the primary driver for the
international growth strategies of the assurance firms. Some emphasize the
importance of the rise of these Big 4 audit firms to the world economy and the global
capital markets (Sharma 1997: 758; Greenwood et al. 2005: 662). Others, on the
contrary, emphasize that these organizational forms are among the root causes of the
demise of professional values in favor of commercial preferences.36
34 Alvesson, for example, notes that professions’ self-descriptions seem to come from public relations
departments of the professional bodies, emphasizing themes such as the profession’s vital role to society,
affective neutrality, and altruistic service to clients. But actually that “[s]elf-interest and efforts to attain
social closure (excluding other people from the right to certain jobs or tasks) are crucial for professions.
Professionalization is very much about politics and the struggle for status, power, and material reward”
(2004: 34).
35 Suddaby, Greenwood and Wilderom (2008: 989) paint a clear picture of the unique character of the
international accounting firms as professional service firms: “The uniqueness of professional service
firms (PSFs) has been well established. Accounting, law, engineering, and management consulting firms
are known to differ significantly from both traditional manufacturing and service organizations in their
organizational and managerial arrangements. Their performance depends heavily on the reputation and
status of their workforce. They utilize unique employment practices and leadership behaviors, and
typically have unusual structures. They are subject to exhortations from external professional bodies and
are expected to balance pressures of commercial success with professional integrity. Many professional
service firms are governed as partnerships, which, though not unique to these organizations, is highly
unusual elsewhere and carries unusually high risks of litigation. These distinctive and differentiating
features occur because of unique challenges that arise from the PSFs central focus upon intellectual
capital and expert knowledge and the delivery of intangible, customized services through highly trained
professionals. The crucial role that professional service firms play in the global economy is also well
established. (…) International accounting firms rank among the worlds’ largest organizations, both in
measures of size and revenue”.
36 Brint (1994, quoted in Suddaby et al. 2009: 411), for example, argues that while the number of
professionals in society is rapidly increasing, the assumed gap in value preferences between professionals
and commercial businesspersons is decreasing. He observes that the historical value set of professionals
as ‘‘social trustees” is being replaced by a value set of ‘‘professional expertise”. While the former value set
characterizes professional work as a “calling” imbued with obligations of public duty, the more current
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Next to the more general professional autonomy and professional status, the
typical characteristic of the assurance profession is the sensitive balance between an
“intimate” client relationship, personal incentives, accountability towards a wide
variety of third parties (as in the agency theory), and explicit professional requirements
of objectivity and independence. Furthermore, auditors have extensive access to
proprietary, strategic, product, and financial client information, and consequently are
subject to confidentiality requirements (e.g., Almer et al. 2005).
The codification and standardization of the assurance profession is primary done
through the International Federation of Accountants, the IFAC.37 The IFAC, through
its independent standard-setting boards, and in conjunction with the international
regulatory community, sets, among others, international auditing and assurance
standards and a code of ethics for professional accountants. The International
Standards on Auditing (ISAs) are currently used by more than 100 jurisdictions
around the world. These standards are so-called “principles-based” which means that
the nature of the international standards is such that it required auditors to exercise
professional judgment in applying them. The overall objectives for the auditor are:
to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are
free from material misstatements, whether due to fraud or error, thereby enabling
the auditor to express an opinion on whether the financial statements are prepared
in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework
(ISA 200.11, emphasis added).38
The audit production process is based on the audit risk model 39 (e.g., Eilifsen et al.
2001; Knechel 2001, 2007) and an effective and efficient mix of appropriate audit
steps (e.g., Schilder et al. 2002; Quick et al. 2008)40.
value set views professional work in technocratic terms based on the market value of their knowledge and
expertise. Modern professionals ‘‘only rarely remark on the ‘social importance’ of their work”.
37 The IFAC is the global organization for the accountancy profession. IFAC comprises 157 member
bodies and associates in 122 countries. Through them, the IFAC represents approximately 2.5 million
accountants in public practice, education, government service, industry, and commerce.
38 This objective holds two fundamental principles of the audit profession: reasonable assurance and
materiality. “Reasonable assurance” means that, although it is considered a high level of assurance, it is
not an absolute level of assurance. An inherent, but low risk remains that the wrong audit opinion is
issued due to inherent limitations of an audit “which result in most of the audit evidence (…) being
persuasive rather than conclusive. Reducing the risk of not detecting all material misstatements to zero to
obtain absolute assurance that the financial statements are free of all material misstatements is rarely
attainable or cost beneficial” (Quick et al. 2008: 3). By “in all material respects” the profession refers to
the inherent limitation to audit in the smallest detail, which also would not be cost-benefit efficient.
Therefore, an auditor applies a “bottom” amount in performing an audit, meaning that misstatements
below that bottom amount may well not be identified and corrected (i.e., the financial statements could
still comprise errors, but not higher than the “materiality”).
39 The audit risk model is designed to minimize the risk of reaching the wrong conclusion based on the
work performed and, consequently, not issuing the appropriate audit opinion. This “audit risk” has been
conceptualized as a function of inherent risks, control risks, and detection risks.
40 The typical audit (production) process comprises audit planning, risk assessments, audit procedures,
and evaluation of audit evidence (Quick et al. 2008). There is no standard set of audit procedures and the
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Since the origin of the audit profession, an “expectation gap” exists between the
stakeholders’ perceptions of audit quality and the actual audit process and reporting,
which, among others, has been central in Limperg’s theory of rational expectations.41
This has been a much debated and studied phenomenon (e.g., Porter 1993; Epstein
and Geiger 1994; McEnroe and Martens 2001) wherein it has been shown that a wide
variety of expectations exists which the profession hardly can meet (if, at all).
Anderson, in his OECD report on corporate governance in response to the financial
crisis, is among the most recent that are skeptical about the audit profession’s ability
to close this expectation gap (Anderson 2009: 20):
The model has struggled over the course of the twentieth century to keep up to
date with stakeholder perceptions. For example, audit is not expected to identify all
frauds, and yet there is still a perception in some comparatively sophisticated
quarters that it should do so. (…) [I]t would seem that the gap between what the
users of the accounts (politicians, the public, the economic system) believe they
can read into the accounts, and what the auditors mean when they opine, continues
to grow. A “clean” or unqualified audit report is seen as a general badge of health
for the organization, and yet in reality the audit is addressing a diminishing
proportion of the risks that an organization faces. (…) Neither the financial
statements, nor the audit address many of the forward looking risk issues that are
of interest to stakeholders today. In particular they do not address the sustainability
of the business model, nor do they look in any depth at systematic risks in an
industry or economy as a whole.
Anderson continues to say that this perception issue is exacerbated “by the
comparative rarity of issuing a qualified audit report, which in itself has the potential
to be the final demonstration of frailty that could bring a [company] down” (2009: 21).
He advocates the exploration of a much more gradated approach to audit reports
“which could signal more subtle differences between banks without catastrophically
undermining the [company] in question”. But Anderson also acknowledges the
litigiousness of the (audit) environment, hampering any innovative spirit that may
already exist.
Central in the innovation efforts of the audit profession is the “assurance
framework” (the International Framework of Assurance Engagements). There is a
trend towards increasing the pallet of assurance services.42 Continuous professional
efforts to build-out the “assurance framework” are an example of efforts to bring in
additional work within the exclusive boundaries of the audit profession. More recent
auditor has to determine the most effective and efficient mix of audit procedures. The audit process has
been broken down into as much as 332 individual audit tasks (Abdolmohammadi 1999).
41 Limperg’s theory states that “the auditor should act in such a way that he/she does not disappoint the
expectations, while, on the other hand, he/she should not arouse greater expectation in his/her auditor’s
report than his/her examination justifies” (Blokdijk et al. 1995: 23-24).
42 “Assurance services are professional services for the use by decision makers, designed to enhance the
credibility of information that is the responsibility of another party by evaluating that information against
suitable criteria” (Hayes et al. 2005: 468).
The Behavior of Assurance Professionals – A Cross-cultural Perspective
22
examples are non-financial assurance services on environmental and sustainability
reports and behavioral assurance services such as governance and culture assessments
(the latter receiving support from governmental institutions such as the G20 and
OECD, which identified a need for increased internal and external assurance). The
expanding scope of assurance services may, however, “involve many different user
groups and different types of reports providing different levels of assurance”
(Trotman 2005). This poses a challenge to the appropriate communication of the
oftentimes limited assurance provided (see, for example, Hasan et al. 2003). A
limitation in practice is that users tend to gain comfort from the brand name of the
audit firm providing assurance, rather than that they themselves establish which level
of assurance is actually provided. Knowing this, an audit firm’s reputation is of the
greatest importance, foremost in relation to its influence on auditors’ behavior.
A specifically interesting aspect in this respect currently is the “society granted
privilege” of self-regulation; an ever-had privilege that the assurance profession
recently lost.43 As DeFond and Francis illustrate (2005: 5):
While the beginning of the 21st century has been marked by accounting scandals44,
a major stock market crash, and the most sweeping securities market reforms since
the 1930s, one unexpected consequence of these events is an increased awareness
that auditing matters. (…) Along with this greater appreciation, however, is also
widespread criticism that many aspects of auditing are ‘‘broken’’ and in need of
fundamental reform.
Wyatt (2004) notes that the profession, or the society as a whole, has paid a high price
for the accounting profession’s failure during the Enron and Arthur Andersen affairs
to meet the expectations of investors, creditors, and other users of financial
statements (i.e. changing equilibrium). He analyzes that forces as “corporate and
individual greed, (…) becoming too cozy with clients, and participating actively in
finding ways to avoid the provisions of accounting standards” (2004: 45) played a
significant role. Sikka (2009a) even questions whether the private sector model of
43 This is illustrative of what Larson already theorized (1977: XII); “If professions obtain extended
powers of self-evaluation and self-control they can become almost immune to external regulation. The
fact remains, however, that their privileges can always be lost. (…) Revolutionary social change should
therefore have profound implications for professional practices because it affects the social status that
established professions had achieved in previous regimes”.
44 As Moore et al. illustrate (2006: 13): “Andersen’s audit of Enron may have been the most notable
failure (…), but it was by no means the first, the largest, or the last. The earnings restatement that
precipitated Enron’s fall revised the company’s profits downward by $650 million. Yet prior to the Enron
scandal, Waste Management overstated earnings by $1.43 billion over a five-year period, and U.S.
regulators found that the company’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, conspired to hide accurate accounting
data from the public. Since Enron’s fall, WorldCom, another Andersen client, revised its profit reports
downward by a shocking $9 billion. (…) These cases are only the most vivid of the multitude of cases in
which the major auditing firms paid to settle lawsuits or lost cases in the courts”.
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auditing is attainable and suggest that alternative institutional arrangements should be
considered (e.g., state auditors).45
In response to the accounting scandals, US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in 2002 (SOX) and installed the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB, comprising a majority of non-accountants). With the creation of the
PCAOB and similar professional supervisors in many other countries (like the
Authority for the Financial Markets in the Netherlands), the accounting profession is
no longer self-regulated – although others are of the opinion that the loss of self-
regulation has been a gradual, “slippery-slope” process.46 Overall, these new
regulations transformed assurance profession “from a self-regulated industry that is
overseen by a government agency to an industry that is now directly controlled by a
quasi-governmental agency, the PCAOB” (DeFond and Francis 2005: 6). Whether
that solves the problem remains to be seen. Auditors have taken some criticism in the
recent commentaries on their role in the Lehman Brothers’ downfall: “Investors
would like to think that auditors consider not just the letter of the rules but their spirit,
too” (Economist 20 March 2010). Sikka, consistent with its prior stance, replied on
that commentary by saying: “The guards are in bed with their prisoners”.
2.3.2 The codified values of the assurance profession
The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (hereinafter: Code of Ethics) (IFAC
2009a)47 is the “codified discourse” of the assurance profession’s core values and
attitudes. The Code of Ethics comprises, in very general terms, the behavior that
professional auditors are expected to uphold. It drives behavior rather then that its
terms are behaviors. As Magala states (Magala 2009: 4): “[Values] inspire our actions,
legitimize our pursuits, power our beliefs or decorate our self-justification”. The Code
45 Sikka (2009a: 34) reasons in relation to the basis auditing business model: “The auditing firms are
capitalist enterprises and are dependent upon companies and their directors for income. The fee
dependency impairs claims of independence and has the capacity to silence auditors. It poses
fundamental questions about the private sector model of auditing which expects one set of capitalist
entrepreneurs (auditors) to regulate another set of capitalist entrepreneurs (company directors)”.
46 DeFond and Francis (2005: 11) opine that the loss of self-regulation has been gradually, but was finally
triggered by Enron’s collapse in December 2001: “We believe one critical trigger occurred when Deloitte
& Touche issued a ‘clean’ peer review report on Arthur Andersen in December 2001, just a few weeks
before Andersen publicly announced that it had shredded documents related to the Enron audit. The
credibility of the entire accounting profession was immediately in doubt along with the credibility and
integrity of the profession’s self-regulation program”. The “clean” peer review report, that concluded that
Andersen’s system of accounting and audit quality provided reasonable assurance of compliance with
professional standards, was based on 240 audit engagements in more than 30 Andersen offices but did
not include the Enron audit (Chaney and Philipich 2002).
47 On 10 July 2009, the IFAC issues its revised Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. This code is
effective as per 1 January 2011, but with its 2009 publication clearly the most current reflection of the
societal consensus of generally accepted behavior of professional auditors. The 2009 Code further
clarifies requirements and significantly strengthens the independence requirements of auditors. These
comprise, among others, revisions to prevent cross-selling practices and possible job-opportunities that
would create incentives that are more dominant than providing quality audit.
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of Ethics requires accountants to adhere to five fundamental principles (based on
IFAC 2009a):
 Integrity: to be straightforward and honest in all professional and business
relationships. Integrity also implies fair dealing and truthfulness;
 Objectivity: to not allow bias, conflict of interest or undue influence of others to
override professional or business judgments;
 Professional competence and due care: to maintain appropriate professional knowledge
and skills and to act diligently and in accordance with applicable technical and
professional standards;
 Confidentiality: to respect the confidentiality of information acquired as a result of
professional and business relationships and, therefore, not disclose or use the
information for the personal advantage of the professional or a third party; and
 Professional behavior: to comply with relevant laws and regulations and avoid any
action that discredits the profession.
One would expect to find more guidance about the meaning of “professional
behavior”. But unfortunately the additional guidance of the Code of Ethics is also
limited to fairly generic principles of compliance and socially acceptable behavior,
good reputation of the profession, acting honest and truthful, and to manage the
expectations of the general public.48 It, thus, leaves it to the professional accountant to
interpret what professional behavior means in daily practice.49 It is interesting then,
that Pflugrath et al. have shown that although “the presence of a code of ethics has a
positive impact on the quality of the judgments made by professional accountants, [it
is only effective] in the context of greater general experience that leads to higher
quality of judgments” (2007: 566). In other words, codes are subject to judgment and
less effective with inexperienced auditors.
“Independence” as such is not part of these five fundamental requirements,
because these apply only to auditors providing audit and assurance services in public
practice (i.e., not to auditors that are employed by corporations in functions such as
internal auditors). The independence requirements play a significant role in auditors’
behavior and center around five so called “threats” (section 290 of the Code of
Ethics, 2009a): self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation. The
48 In section 150 of the Code of Ethics compliance and socially acceptable behavior is referred to as to
“include actions that a reasonable and informed third party, weighing all the specific facts and
circumstances available to the professional accountant at that time, would be likely to conclude adversely
affects the good reputation of the profession”. It further refers to one part of Limperg’s theory of
rational expectations: “professional accountants shall be honest and truthful and not make exaggerated
claims for the services they are able to offer, the qualifications they possess, or experience they have
gained”.
49 These ‘terms’ of professional behavior arise from the interaction between three groups (Neale 1996):
interaction with the general public, interaction with clients, and intra-professional interaction. “The
behavior of an individual professional interacting with another of the parties is acceptable conduct if it
would be acknowledged as acceptable by all three groups” (Neale 1996: 221). However, a professional
code of ethics “is worth nothing [unless] it plays a significant role for the professionals, and even then,
critical scrutiny of how the code works in practice is called for” (Alvesson 2004: 34).
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Code of Ethics further distinguishes independence in mind and independence in
appearance (Section 290.6).50 Although, independence may be controlled at the office or
firm level, the more significant level of interest is that of the local office or even the
individual, e.g., in relation to incentives that can impact or impair independence at an
individual level.51 Bazerman et al. (2002: 99), for example, point to the risk of
individual bias due to attachment as “individual auditors’ jobs and career may depend
on success with specific clients”. Sikka (2009b) also points to the fee dependency and
related career advances creating conflicts of interest, and relates this to audit failures in
the current financial crisis. And Moore et al. (2006) even point to the inherent
limitations of trying to safeguard personal independence, due to what they call “moral
seduction” and “unconscious bias”. Carcello (2005) points out that “[t]he problem
with using firm-wide measures is that local audit teams, rather than the national firm
as a whole, perform audits” (2005: 36).
The “modal collective agreement on meanings and interpretation” (House et al.
2004: 103) is further laid out in IFAC’s International Standards on Auditing (IFAC
2009b). Avoiding ambiguity in interpretation of the standards, within the concept of
applying professional judgment, was among the key objectives of the ISA Clarity
Project.52 These standards are so-called “principles-based” which means that the
nature of the international standards is as such that it required auditors to exercise
professional judgment in interpreting and applying the standards. This does leave room
for “personal interpretation”, which is emphasized by the IFAC itself. They recently
called to “embrace issues in spirit rather then in letter”53. This sets the already
principles-based standards open to multiple interpretation, for example as a
consequence of cross-national cultural differences. However, the ISAs explicitly state
that “professional judgment is not to be used as the justification for decisions that are
not otherwise supported” (ISA 200.A27).
The main requirements of the ISAs directing auditors’ behavior in conducting an
audit are (based on ISA 200.14-24):
50 Independence in appearance is to avoid circumstances based on which a reasonable and informed
other would be likely to conclude that an auditor’s “integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism has
been compromised” (IFAC 2009a, section 290). Independence in mind is related to the state of mind that
allows the auditor to act with integrity, objectivity and professionally skeptical in his professional
judgment.
51 This is supported by, for example, DeFond and Francis (2005: 14) who point out that “the economic
importance of (large) clients is more salient at the office level”. Carcello (2005) particularly emphasizes
“the importance of studying auditor behavior using the office or individual partner as the unit of analysis”
(2005: 36). Reynolds and Francis (2000) study is an example of office-level analysis.
52 On 3 March 2009, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board issued the completed set
of clarified International Standards on Auditing and International Standards on Quality Control. “With
the completion of the Clarity Project, the IAASB has issued all its auditing standards in a form designed
to enhance the understanding and implementation of them, as well as to facilitate translation” (IAASB 3
March 2009).
53 In their recommendations to the G20’s plans to enhance sound regulation and strengthen transparency
in response to the financial crisis, the IFAC points to the ineffective operation of risk management
systems due to “a failure to follow good practices and to embrace issues in spirit rather than in letter”
(IFAC 29 March 2009).
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 Complying with the relevant ethical requirements (i.e., the Code of Ethics)
 Applying professional skepticism (i.e., skeptical judgment and decision-making)
 Exercising professional judgment (i.e., judgment and decision-making)
 Obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence (i.e., the audit process)
 Conducting an audit in accordance with the ISAs (i.e., rule observance).
ISA 220 on quality control for an audit engagement further substantiates these
behavioral requirements by articulating that, for example, the auditor shall (based on
ISA 220):
 be satisfied that the engagement team members have the appropriate
competences and capabilities;
 take responsibility for the direction, supervision and performance of the audit in
compliance with the standards;
 take responsibility for reviews being performed, and perform him/herself reviews
of audit documentation and discussions with the audit team (based on which the
auditor shall become satisfied that sufficient appropriate audit evidence was
obtained);
 be satisfied that appropriate consultations have been undertaken, both within the
audit team and with other experts;
 take responsibility for appropriate documentation of audit work performed and
conclusions reached; and
 take responsibility for the appropriateness of the audit reporting, including the
communication with the client (management and those charged with governance).
The public trust in the auditing profession depends, among others, with the
compliance of its associated auditors with these professional rules of conduct.
Preventing non-compliance or preserving quality is the main objective of the
professional (supervisory) bodies and assurance firms’ own quality controls.54 As the
outcome of auditing and auditors’ judgment and decision-making mostly cannot be
simplified to be either correct or not, but rather is a matter of professional judgment, a
process-oriented approach to compliance is used in auditing “The accounting
profession has developed standards and procedures that legitimize decisions and that are
used in practice to evaluate the work of [auditors]” (Bédard and Chi 1993: 29-30). This
is why the auditing standards include compliance with relevant ethical standards and
auditing standards as one of their fundamental behavioral principles, with a focus on
as high as possible technical audit quality.
54 The IFAC’s International Standard on Quality Control 1, for example, dealing with an audit firm’s
responsibilities for its system of quality control, was introduced with an aim to restore public confidence
after the financial debacles such as Enron-Arthur Andersen (Pflugrath et al. 2007).
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2.4 Auditors’ professional behavior
In this study, the actual professional behaviors of auditors do not only comprise the
audit-technical behaviors of actually performing an audit (i.e., the core audit process).
They also include those key behaviors of an auditor’s functioning holistically (i.e., the
broader functioning of the auditor including such behaviors as practice development
and client relationship management).
Central to the professional behavior of auditors is the audit judgment and
decision-making process while performing audit tasks. This also includes the
profession’s core competence: the audit process and performing audit tasks. Some
behaviors – behaviors that are part of and contribute to that decision-making and
audit process – are highlighted separately due to their significance to the audit process.
These are: skeptical judgments and decisions (i.e., probing and being professionally
skeptical), knowledge sharing and consultation behavior, working in fluid and flexible
audit teams (including engagement partner involvement), communication of and
negotiation on audit observations and findings, and audit documentation and
justification. Dysfunctional or deviant behaviors are those behaviors that are counter-
productive and are covered separately. Factors that are related to the broader
functioning of auditors are covered under the heading audit pricing and practice
development.
Based on a review of the auditing and accounting literature55 (e.g., Birnberg and
Shields 1989; Greenwood et al. 1990; Covaleski et al. 1998; Solomon and Trotman
2003; Almer et al. 2005; Nelson and Tan 2005; Trotman 2005; Bédard et al. 2008a;
Jenkins et al. 2008), and more specifically the literature within the behavioral study of
accountants (e.g., Ferris 1981; Dillard and Ferris 1989; Ferris 1990; Schlachter 1990;
Sorensen 1990; Libby and Luft 1993; Malone and Roberts 1996), the auditors’
behaviors identified in this study, and covered in more detail in the next sub-sections,
comprise the following:
 Judgment and decision-making
 Skeptical judgments and decisions
 Knowledge sharing and consultation behavior
 Working in fluid teams (engagement partner involvement)
 Communication and negotiation behavior on observations and findings
 Documentation and justification
 Dysfunctional behaviors
 Audit pricing and practice development.
Below, I discuss these eight behaviors of professional auditors in more detail.
55 Literature review was conducted through the following steps: (a) review of the research provided by
leading scholars in the field of (professional) behavior in general; (b) review of research syntheses in the
leading (behavioral) auditing journals; (c) review and follow-through of the literature of behavioral
scientists both inside and outside the field of auditing or professional service firms; and (d) citation data
and analysis is employed as a means of identifying and judging relevant papers and their scholarly impact
(through the use of Scopus).
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2.4.1 Judgment and decision-making
Central to the professional behavior of auditors is the audit judgment and decision-
making process. “Judgment” refers to “subjective assessments made as a prelude to
taking action”, where “decisions” mean “actions that people take to perform some task
or solve some problem” (Solomon and Trotman 2003: 396). Judgment and decision-
making research in auditing56 focuses on the nature and complexity of and on “how
experienced auditors form judgments or make decision while performing audit tasks”
(Solomon and Shields 1995: 137).57 Judgment and decision-making, thus, includes the
profession’s core competence: the audit process and performing audit tasks (i.e., the
process from client acceptance to external audit reporting). This is also seen in the
centrality of “professional judgment” in the auditing standards.58
The audit (production) process comprises audit planning, risk assessments, audit
procedures, and evaluation of audit evidence (e.g., Schilder et al. 2002; Quick et al.
2008). There is no set standard audit procedures, but the auditor has to determine
(judge and decide on) the most effective and efficient mix of audit procedures. Also,
the number of audit tasks illustrates the magnitude of the (many small and larger)
judgments and decisions required in an audit. Nelson and Tan (2005) found that much
of the audit task research focuses on the main phases of the audit process: risk
assessments (including the audit risk model and related audit planning decision),
analytical procedures and evidence evaluation, auditors’ correction decisions (whether
or not changes need to be made to the financial statements), going-concern
judgments, and fraud detection.
The less structured the audit tasks are or the more complexity and ambiguity they
comprise, the more judgment generally is required (e.g., Abdolmohammadi and
Wright 1987; Bonner 1994; Solomon and Shields 1995). Nelson and Kinney (1997),
56 The central themes of judgment and decision-making research in auditing are threefold: assessing
decision performance, establishing the factors which determine decision performance, and testing
theories of the cognitive processes which produce the decisions (Libby and Luft 1993: 425). It draws
from multiple academic disciplines such as cognitive and social psychology. “Judgment and decision-
making research in auditing uses a psychological lens to understand, evaluate, and improve judgments,
decisions, or choices in an auditing setting” (Nelson and Tan 2005).
57 Judging and deciding are inherent in every phase of the audit process (Solomon and Shields 2005). For
example, when focused on a specific financial statement assertion and account balance (e.g., valuation of
inventory), the auditor must judge the significance of the balance and assertion, how much risk there is of
misstatement, how to best produce evidence to confirm or disconfirm this assertion, how much such
evidence should be produced, and when during the course of the audit it should be produced (which
process comprises many (small) decision). Subsequently, the auditor must evaluate the resulting evidence
and form a judgment about its meaning. Together with the judgments made for other accounts,
transactions and assertions, the auditor then must integrate these findings and decide what to communicate
to the financial statement users (i.e., choose the audit report to be issued) (based on Solomon and Shields
2005).
58 “Professional judgment is the application of relevant training, knowledge and experience, within the
context provided by auditing, accounting and ethical standards, in making informed decisions about the
courses of action that are appropriate in the circumstances of the audit engagement” (ISA 200.13k,
emphasis added).
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for example, showed that more ambiguity leads auditors to be more conservative in
their judgments. Pincus (1990) evidenced that auditors who are less comfortable in
dealing with ambiguity (i.e., ambiguity-intolerant auditors) show higher decision-
making performance (i.e., made better judgments in misstatement cases).
Other factors that determine judgment and decision-making performance are
auditors’ knowledge, experience, and problem-solving abilities (e.g., Bédard and Chi
1993; Libby and Tan 1994; Tan and Kao 1999), and auditor’s confidence (e.g., Pincus
1991; Whitecotton 1996) heuristics and biases, such as the anchoring heuristic or the
confirmation bias (e.g., Shanteau 1989; Bazerman et al. 2002).
The impact of ambiguity on auditors’ judgment and decision-making process is
exacerbated by the use of (numeric) probability phrases in auditing and accounting
standards, such as “remote”, “low”, “more likely than not”, or “probable”.59
Interpretation differences of such probability phrases may well result in the
inconsistent application of the auditing standards and miscommunication between
auditors themselves already. Jiambalvo and Wilner (1985) and Amer et al. (1994), for
example, found significant variance between auditors in the interpretation of
probability phrases such as stated above. On top of that, Amer et al. (1994) found that
auditors were generally not aware of such interpretation differences. This leads to a
risk that auditors do not seek to clarify and resolve potential miscommunications. As
will be seen in Chapter 4, interpretation differences increase in cross-cultural settings.
Of specific relevance is the auditor’s ethical judgment and decision-making.
Several studies have found support for the notion that auditors’ behavior and
professional judgment is related to the auditor’s level of moral or ethical reasoning
(see Jones et al. 2003 for the most recent overview, including extensions of the Jones
model). The four stages of ethical decision-making in the Jones model (based on the
studies of Rest referred to in Cohen and Bennie 2006) are:
 Recognition of ethical issue or ethical sensitivity, i.e. interpretation of the
situation. The recognition that decisions will affect others and that he/she has a
choice.
 Making ethical judgment, i.e., what should be done: Judgment as to what is the
ethically correct course of action.
 Establishing ethical intent, i.e., what would be done: Balancing ethical factors
against other factors.
 Engaging in ethical behavior, i.e., actual response/action based on his/her
intention.
Falk et al. (1999), for example, found that auditors’ appropriate conclusions about
whether or not a qualified audit report was necessary, was positively related to their
level of moral reasoning.
59 Reimers (1992), for example, found that auditors interpret “reasonably possible” to be between 49%
and 67% (mean scores, with standard deviations of 14 downwards to 16 upwards).
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2.4.2 Skeptical judgments and decisions
In Hans Christian Andersen’s fable, “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, two scoundrels convinced a vain emperor
that they could make a magnificent cloth of silk and gold threads invisible only to the incompetent and the
stupid. After the emperor gave them money and materials to make the royal garments, they dressed him in
nothing at all. Not even the emperor, much less his courtiers, dared to admit to not seeing any clothes for the fear
of being branded stupid and incompetent. The public applauded as the emperor paraded in the buff to show off
his new ‘clothes’. Then a child asked, “Why does the emperor have no clothes?” After a moment of stunned
silence, others posed the same question. If the child’s words did not change what people saw, then why did they
change their minds?
(taken from Sunder 2002)
Skeptical judgments and decisions (manifestation of professional skepticism) belong
to the fundamental professional behaviors of auditors. The importance of professional
skepticism is well illustrated by Quadackers (2009: 9):
[I]f there would have been more skepticism on the side of the auditor this could
have reduced the effects of major recent business ‘improprieties’. (…) [Prior
research] found the lack of an appropriate level of professional skepticism to be
number 3 (60% of the cases) among the top 10 list of audit deficiencies associated
with fraud-related SEC cases. (…) Society trusts financial auditors to exercise
professional skepticism in conducting the audit. Therefore, professional skepticism
is an essential feature of contemporary audits.
Carpenter and Reimers (2009), in addition, note that “The Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, in its recent auditors inspections, cited a lack of
professional skepticism (…) as serious problems for auditors”. Quadackers points out
that auditors with higher professional skepticism “have a higher need for evidence”
(2009: 17) and elaborates by saying that professional skepticism is about a healthy
dose of “presumptive doubt” in an auditor’s further neutral stance in which the
auditor assumes no bias in management’s representation ex ante, neither in a positive
(“trusting”) or negative (“suspicion”) direction. Professional skepticism “includes
questioning contradictory audit evidence and the reliability of documents and responses
to inquiries and other information obtained from management and those charged with
governance” (ISA 200.A20, emphasis added).
Professional skepticism also means being aware of the inherent biases influencing
the auditor’s behavior. It concerns reducing the risk of “using inappropriate
assumptions in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures and
evaluating the results thereof” (ISA 200.A19, emphasis added). Quadackers (2009)
found that interpersonal trust and suspension of judgment are among the most
significant biases in skeptical judgments and decisions of auditors.60 This concept is
60 Interpersonal trust in relation to professional skepticism is defined as a general expectancy held by an
individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group
can be relied upon (Quadackers 2009). Suspension of judgment would be most closely related to the
anchoring adjustment heuristics and the confirmatory bias. Suspension of judgment is the opposite of
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subsequently “unzipped” in honesty and integrity (trust in management’s word),
institutional trust (trust in the situation or structure), and exploitation (the expectation
whether people behave exploitatively and selfishly versus fairly and altruistically).
Professional skepticism, furthermore, has been found to increase with auditors’
career levels and experience (e.g., Shaub and Lawrence 1999; Carpenter et al. 2002),
after following a specialized forensic accounting course (Carpenter et al. 2008), and
when audit partners emphasize the importance of professional skepticism on their
audit teams (Carpenter and Reimers 2009). Professional skepticism is also related to
the “persuasion knowledge” of an auditor as studied by Kaplan et al. (2008) and
Anderson et al. (2004).
2.4.3 Knowledge sharing and consultation behavior
The central importance of knowledge in auditing is illustrated by the common body of
knowledge leading to the professional qualification and in the profession’s
fundamental behavioral principle of professional competence and due care. “Since
knowledge and expertise are unevenly distributed among the personnel in audit firms,
it is vital for these organizations to devise methods for sharing of knowledge and
know-how” (Jenkins et al. 2008: 60).
Consultation is such a method, but consultation is also a critical process of the
quality control and strengthening accountability.61 Especially where much knowledge
within audit firms is tacit and hidden in individual’s values, intuitions, and experiences,
knowledge sharing takes place through socialization including processes such as
interactive conversations, apprenticeship, storytelling, and training on the job (Nonaka
and Takeuchi 1995; Vera-Munoz et al. 2006).
Vera-Munoz et al., in their study on enhancing knowledge sharing in public
accounting firms, observe (2006: 133):
an increased recognition that sharing of knowledge among employees is the
primary intangible source of sustained competitive advantage, economic growth,
and corporate value. (…) Audit firms’ ability to effectively deploy knowledge
sharing activities is increasingly vital to their competitive advantage, including
gaining tangible benefits in terms of time and costs reductions (…) and enhance
quality, effectiveness and efficiency of the audit process.
Furthermore, knowledge sharing contributes to the sharing within audit teams of
knowledge and expertise about the client’s environment, industry, business model, and
operations, which understanding is essential to the audit. For example, Bédard et al.
(1998) show that knowledge sharing adds to audit process gains (e.g., in analytical
procedures). Vera-Munoz et al. (2006) conclude that effective knowledge sharing
cognitive closure. Skeptics do not accept naively the first things they perceive or think but are more
critical; they want to see evidence before believing (based on Quadackers 2009).
61 For example, Kennedy et al. (1997) found that auditors perceive that documented conclusions are
more justifiable if the preparer consulted other peers within the firm.
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requires more than a technological solution. It requires a culture that simultaneously
rewards knowledge sharing and discourages knowledge hoarding as a source of power
or job security.62
“[T]he issue of consultation has been virtually ignored by the academic
literature” (Trotman 2005: 82). In practice, an elaborate network for formal and
informal consultations is available:
While informal consultation occurs frequently within engagement teams and
among colleagues across teams, accounting firms also enable more formal
consultation processes through the establishment of specialized internal groups
referred to as central research units (CRU) and accounting consultation units
(ACU) (Jenkins et al. 2008: 60).
The consultation procedures referred to in quality control standards is related to more
formal consultation procedures within an audit firm. Salterio and Denham (1997)
show that, to some extent, a firm’s use of research and consultation units is influenced
by its culture.63 The main benefits of having a consultation unit are the development
of more proficient practice staff through short-term rotations and the creation of an
organizational memory and consistency of accounting treatments.
2.4.4 Working in fluid teams
Characteristic for the audit profession is that an audit is conducted in hierarchically
structured audit teams64 the composition of which changes from engagement to
engagement (i.e., “fluid audit team”)65. Audit judgments and decisions are made in
multi-person team structures. Audit teams should reflect the diverse set of appropriate
62 They have analyzed the “anatomy” of three factors of knowledge sharing: information technology,
formal (e.g., meetings and review) and informal (e.g., through culture and socialization, training on the
job) interactions among auditors, and reward systems. As an example of formal knowledge sharing
settings, Carpenter (2007) studied the effectiveness of brainstorming sessions to help auditors detect
fraud. She found that brainstorming generates more quality fraud ideas (as opposed to the quantity of
ideas) and new fraud ideas, compared to the ideas individual auditors generate.
63 They distinguish “discovering firms” from “conditioned-viewing firms”. Discovering firms rely heavily
on consultation, stress consultation at the earliest possible time (e.g., by statements such as “The biggest
mistake you can make, is the mistake you make on your own!”), promote consultation recourses via
periodic newsletters, and use firm-wide peer-review systems. The conditioned-viewing firms are on the
other side of this spectrum, meaning that they rely less on formal research and consultations.
64 Professional standards require auditors at each level to be properly supervised and their work reviewed.
This has been operationalized in public accounting by successive levels of supervision (i.e., senior,
manager, then partner) (Almer et al. 2005). Generally, less experienced team members carry out specific
evidence generating steps and document in working papers the results, while more experienced team
members plan the audit procedures, supervise performance, and review the documented work. More
experienced members also make decisions to consult with appropriate persons about any special
problems that arise (based on Solomon and Shields 1995).
65 “Fluid” refers to the composition of audit teams that changes from engagement to engagement, i.e.
auditors generally work on multiple audit engagements, in multiple teams, with each a different
composition.
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expertise and skills necessary for the audit. For example, hierarchical teams have
shown to be more effective at error detection when the team is comprised of
personnel with different necessary skills (Owhoso et al. 2002). In other words, the
effectiveness of an audit team can gain from the right mix of diverse talents, cognitive
abilities, skills and abilities. Sufficient involvement of the audit engagement partner
and consecutive levels of audit (senior) managers is critical for audit engagement
performance. This is also recognized by the auditors’ clients’ audit committees, who
perceive that partner and manager attention that has been given to the audit to have the
most significant impact on audit quality, rather than other factors such as
independence, expertise of the team, quality controls, or the audit firm’s litigation rate
(e.g., Schroeder et al. 1986; Ghebremichael 2006).
Auditors’ working in teams fosters dissemination of organizational knowledge,
norms, and values. Almer et al. (2005) note positive features of “fluid audit teams”
(e.g., sharing of knowledge, norms and values, early opportunities to supervise, and
building a social network), but also point out that the fluid character of audit teams
has the potential to hamper trust and deeper relationships among team members.
This, in turn, can negatively impact performance appraisals and commitment. In
relation to knowledge sharing and education within the team, Bonner and Walker
(1994) find that explanatory feedback (i.e., explaining to the “learner” why the given
answer was correct or not), coupled with upfront instructions using “understanding
rules”66 promote the greatest degree of knowledge and experience acquisition and
experience gaining of audit team members. Thus, this is closely linked to coaching and
“training-on-the-job” which can be considered as one of the main training
mechanisms within audit firms.
Working in fluid audit teams also serves as a form of control due to individual
accountability to many team members over time. Research has shown that
accountability within the audit team is induced through the review process as an
important safeguard for engagement performance (e.g., Gibbins and Trotman 2002;
Pierce and Sweeney 2005: 364).67 The review process, consequently, is a significant
part of teamwork, but accountability research recognizes, however, that “the prospect of
a review is sufficient to induce greater vigilance among preparers” (Nelson and Tan
2005: 55). Audit team review is more and more an iterative process of verbal
interaction and review by interview, as opposed to the more traditional sequential
computer-mediated review process (e.g., Rich et al. 1997; Barret et al. 2005; Pierce and
Sweeney 2005: 342). This face-to-face review has been shown to strengthen the
accountability-inducing effect of the prospect of review (Brazel et al. 2004). However,
Wilks (2002) has shown that real-time, face-to-face review also poses a risk for the
autonomous decision-making of individual audit team members as they tend to work
towards their manager’s views (“stylizing”) and tend to agree with those views as soon
66 “Understanding rules” provide explanations with the steps and information about why the steps are
performed, how they relate to each other, and so forth” (Bonner and Walker 1994: 159).
67 Pierce and Sweeney (2005), however, also argue that the review process is just part of image
management and justification in case of litigation, and that audit partners have other sources for their
“audit comfort” when signing off (2005: 340).
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as they know them. Subordinates better knowing the preferences and expectations of
the reviewer, has been shown to have unintended adverse effects to the effectiveness
of the audit review process, e.g., subordinates “stylizing” their work done and
documentation to suit their manager (e.g., Johnson and Kaplan 1991; Lord 1992;
Koonce et al. 1995; Gibbins and Trotman 2002). Overall, team work and the review
and consultation processes are important for audit firm socialization and in relation to
quality controls for engagement performance, in line with, e.g., ISA 220 on quality
controls.
2.4.5 Communication and negotiation behavior
The significance of communication and auditor-client relationship to auditing can be
seen in the very fundamental principles of the agency theory and in the profession’s
Code of Ethics and independence principles. The assurance profession recognized the
importance of two-way communication in auditing. ISA 260 (IFAC 2009b) provides
guidance for the auditor’s communication with those charged with governance,
including some specific matters to be communicated to them. The auditor-client
relationship was also one of the main focal points of Sarbanes-Oxley that was
intended to regain public trust (DeFond and Francis 2005: 14).
An auditor’s formal communication of the observations and findings generally
has two forms:
 The auditor’s report or opinion “to the society at large” accompanying the client’s
financial statements (reflecting the auditor’s conclusion on the financial
statements based on the audit). The auditor’s report is a fairly standard
communication based on the generally accepted text of the audit opinion as
included in the auditing standards, i.e., this hardly reflects any specific behavior,
other than reflecting the outcome of the audit process.
 The auditor’s reporting to “those charges with governance”, i.e. management
(board of directors) and the audit committee (or non-executive directors).
Of specific relevance to the effectiveness of the audit process and the quality of
companies’ external financial reporting is the auditor-client negotiation process. So far
the auditing practice has largely ignored that the effect of audit quality on the quality
of the financial statements is contingent upon the discussions and negotiations between
auditors and the client’s management in how they resolve important audit issues (as
noted, for example, by Cohen et al. 2007; Brown and Wright 2008; McCracken et al.
2008).68 The negotiation process refers to the final stages of the audit where the
68 It is therefore notable that audit quality as such has been the focus of several streams of research as
well as the object of recent and substantial changes in audit regulation. However, in these studies it is
oftentimes ignored what audit quality means for the quality of the associated company’s financial
statements. “Auditor-client interactions are fundamental to preserving audit quality, as these interactions
include negotiations over changes in the financial statements necessary for the auditor to provide an
unqualified opinion” (Nelson and Tan 2005: 61).
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auditor works with the client when forming the auditors’ financial reporting
(correction) decisions before issuing the audit opinion. The two parties may encounter
situations where their reporting goals are materially different. This conflict can compel
the auditor and client to enter into formal or informal negotiations, comprising pre-
negotiation decisions and negotiation tactics (Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007).69
The negotiation process is a game full of nuances and pitfalls, and this game is
generally won by the client.70 This includes the process of “shadow negotiations”
where parties attempt to position each other with regard to their roles, the legitimacy
of their positions, and their relative negotiating power.71 Hatfield et al. (2008b), for
example, show that the outcome of the negotiations (and, thus, quality of financial
reporting) is already influenced by very common discussion variables such as the order
and magnitude of potential adjustments discussed. Trotman et al. (2005) show that
auditors benefit from considering the client perspective (empathy)72 or playing “give-
69 Brown and Wright (2008) provide an overview of the auditor-client negotiation process. The
negotiation process consists of three stages (based on Brown and Wright 2008): (a) the pre-negotiation
phase entails planning for upcoming negotiations, which may include explicit consideration of the
interests, options, alternatives, and goals of both parties involved; (b) the negotiation phase wherein the
auditor and client (e.g., CFO or controller) implement their respective negotiation strategies and thereby
exchange information and views during the actual negotiations; and (c) negotiation outcomes.
Negotiation literature identifies five broad negotiation strategies: concessionary, contending,
compromising, avoiding, and integrative. In the extreme, negotiations involving threats, tension, guarded
or biased sharing of information, and a lack of trust can result in the termination or resignation of the
auditor.
70 The auditor generally sees the negotiation process as an additional fact finding exercise whereby the
client provides them with further information in response to their arguments for an adjustment prior to
the auditor making the final judgment (Trotman 2005: 185). The client, however, approaches conflict
resolution very differently. Clients generally seem to be better equipped in the negotiation tactics. For
example, Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) show that clients were more flexible than auditors, better able to
determine the auditor’s goals and limits, and more likely to use negotiation tactics (such as bid
high/concede later and trade-off one reporting issue for another). Tan and Trotman (2007) give
additional insight into how “the game” is played between a client and its auditor and that the client is
better able to anticipate on this game. They show that CFOs’ counter-offers to the auditors’ proposed
audit adjustments tend to be higher (i.e. more in favor of the client) when the auditor adopts a gradual or
delayed concession strategy.
71 Part of “how the game is played” are “shadow” negotiations. Gibbins, Salterio and McCracken studied
the negotiation behavior from the perspective of the actual audit partner-CFO relationship in a series of
studies (Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2005; McCracken et al. 2008). These significantly impact the
position of the auditor and his or her relationship with the client, and, hence, the effectiveness of the
auditor’s decision process.71 Strategic position goes as far as audit firms managing the assignment of
partners to engagements based on CFO preferences and removing those partners who are in “poor”
relationships, irrespective of why the relationship is considered by the CFO to be “poor” (McCracken et
al. 2008). These “strategies” in turn feed the CFO’s power in the “shadow” negotiations.
72 On the other hand, Hatfield et al. (2008a) show that the use of a reciprocity-based strategy does not
affect the quality of financial statements (audit), but simply facilitates the process of posting significant
items. They found in an experimental setup on different negotiation tactics that the end result was the
same.
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and-take”.73 Negotiation processes and outcomes can, thus, serve to strengthen or
damage the ongoing auditor-client relationship, which is important in establishing
mutual trust, respect, likely future strategies, and information sharing. Furthermore,
negotiated outcomes can set a precedent for future negotiations74 or result in feelings
of reciprocity that create expectations on the outcome of such negotiations (Nelson
and Tan 2005). Others point out that an auditors effectiveness depends on the
existence and proper functioning of an audit committee (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003a;
Ng and Tan 2003; DeZoort et al. 2008) or the restrictiveness of accounting standards
(e.g., Nelson et al. 2002; Ng and Tan 2003)75, but also on the auditor’s manner and
details of communication with and reporting to the audit committee (e.g., DeZoort et
al. 2003b).
2.4.6 Documentation and justification
Documentation and justification is grounded in the accountability principles of the
assurance profession. Documentation is the basis for an auditor’s justification76 of
judgments as part of his or her accountability to others (i.e., the requirement to justify
one’s judgments to others. “The auditor is required to prepare audit documentation
sufficient to enable an experienced auditor, having no previous connection with the
audit, to understand the significant professional judgments made in reaching
conclusions on significant matters arising during the audit” (ISA 230.8). For example,
working papers and other documentation are held as evidence in case of litigation to
prove that the audit process was conducted in accordance with the auditing standards
(e.g., Nelson and Tan 2005). Two forms of audit documentation are generally
distinguished, where the basic audit procedures are the same:
73 Sanchez et al. (2007), for example, show that CFO’s indicate greater willingness to record material
adjustments when they are made aware that the auditor has already waived immaterial adjustments (and
are more satisfied with and likely to retain the auditor).
74 For example, the acceptance by the auditor of a revenue recognition method adopted by the client in
the current year makes it difficult in the following year to argue that the method is not appropriate.
75 Ng and Tan (2003), for example, found that auditors are less likely to allow aggressive reporting if there
authoritative guidance exists for a more conservative position. Other behavioral traits (such as empathy
or an auditor’s incentives) influence an auditor’s willingness to search for and go along with a client’s
preferred way of reporting: “In general, [past research] provides evidence that auditors are more likely to
make correction decisions that favor their clients when the balance of auditors’ incentives favor the client
and when some latitude exists that enables the auditors to justify the client-favored treatment.” (Nelson and
Tan 2005: 46, emphasis added). Nelson et al. (2002, 2003) provide evidence that the manner in which
managers attempt aggressive accounting (e.g., earnings management) depends on the precision of relevant
GAAP, and that auditors are most effective in thwarting management aggressiveness when there exists
precise GAAP that precludes the managers’ preferred reporting position. Nelson et al. (2002) show that
auditors are less likely to adjust earnings management attempts which are structured with respect to
precise standards. Trompeter (1994) found that differences in GAAP restrictiveness tend to have a larger
effect on the correction decision of auditors who are compensated more according to local office
revenues (hence, constraining an auditor’s personal incentives). In conclusion, the restrictiveness of
accounting standards has a significant effect on the professional behavior of auditors.
76 “Justifying is the act of providing evidence to support one’s judgments or decisions” (Peecher 1996).
“Justification” refers to the documented output of this process of justification.
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 Summary memos, that typically summarize the sample source and selection
criteria, audit procedures performed, and conclusions reached without providing
any details of the individual evidence items examined. Details relating to audit
evidence often are provided only for exceptions noted.
 Detailed working papers – Auditors completing detailed audit work-papers not
only examine source documents, but provide all of the specific information for
each sample item examined (such as names, dates, amounts, etc.), procedures
performed for each item, and results for each item.
Payne and Ramsay (2008) showed that documentation through detailed working
papers contributes to audit effectiveness due to the deeper cognitive processing that
this entails. They argue that deeper processing leads to better error detection, evidence
evaluation, and memory (the latter being a critical precursor to the accuracy of audit
judgments and decisions). Payne and Ramsay note that given the recent regulatory
pressures on increased audit quality, audit firms have generally returned to using more
detailed working papers.77
Other studies in auditing have examined how different types of documentation
affect auditors’ judgments. Agoglia et al. (2003), for example, show that the type of
audit documentation and justifications impact an auditor’s fraud likelihood judgments
(both of the preparer and of the reviewer). Tan and Jamal (2006) have shown that
“stylizing” efforts of subordinates to please the preferences of their managers drives
documentation and affects the reviewers effectiveness. Koonce et al. (1995), as
another example, have shown that auditors who expect a subsequent review
document more justifications.
Documentation and justification includes making appropriate use of the
electronic audit (filing) system. “Audit firms promote these systems as essential for
facilitating and achieving high-quality financial statement audits” (Dowling 2009).
Research shows, however, that the appropriate use of electronic audit systems by
auditors is nowhere close to being automatic and depends on factors such as auditors’
attitude and system restrictiveness.78
77 Previously, auditing firms used a reduced level of documentation for certain audit tests in order to
increase efficiency and reduce litigation risks. Such documentation often consisted of only a summary
memo explaining overall procedures and findings; details relating to audit evidence often were provided
only for exceptions noted. The alternative is to prepare a detailed workpaper listing the specifics of all
items examined, procedures performed for each item, and results for each item (Payne and Ramsay 2008).
78 As these audit systems can only be restrictive and prescriptive to a certain extent, given the application
of these systems for many different client environments, “audit firms must accept, to some extent, the
risk that auditors do not use their audit support system in the way the design team intended” (Dowling
2009). He finds that auditors generally use electronic audit system appropriately, but that inappropriate
use is linked to normative pressure (team- and firm-level consensus on appropriation), external control
(system restrictiveness and effectiveness of the audit review process), auditor attitude, and self-efficacy.
“To manage this risk and achieve high-quality audits, audit firms need to implement strategies that
promote the appropriate use of these systems” (Dowling 2009).
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2.4.7 Dysfunctional behaviors
Dysfunctional behavior (also referred to as quality threatening behavior, reduced audit
quality acts or deviant workplace behavior by other researchers) is defined as “any
behavior by auditors which has the potential to adversely affect audit quality”
(Sweeney and Pierce 2004). Bédard et al. (2008a) provide a good insight into the forms
of dysfunctional behavior and the frequency of auditors’ indulgence in dysfunctional
behavior:
Extant research examines the frequency of such QTB [quality threatening
behavior] as collection of insufficient audit evidence, inadequate work paper (i.e.,
audit documentation) review, other violations of generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS), violations of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
failure to book material adjustments, truncating sample sizes, accepting doubtful
evidence, relying on internal audit work of questionable quality, insufficient risk
adjustment in audit procedure planning, false or premature sign-off, failure to do
thorough research, and under-reporting of time. Across these studies, a
surprisingly large proportion of auditors admit to engaging in QTB. For example,
Kelley and Margheim (1990) report that 31 percent admit to doing less than
‘‘reasonable’’ work, and only 40 percent of the seniors surveyed by Otley and
Pierce (1996) deny having prematurely signed off on an audit step.79
Jelinek and Jelinek (2008) associate “workplace stress” to be a significant factor
resulting in “deviant workplace behavior”.80 The additional workload as a
consequence of SOX, for example, has been reported to lead audit staff to “cut
corners” to get through the workload. They distinguish three forms of deviant
workplace behavior (2008: 224), of which organizational deviant behavior, such as
under-reporting of time (e.g., recording less hours in one’s time sheet than the number
of hours actually worked) and premature sign-off (or “cutting corners”) has received
maximum attention. However, given the increased notion of the audit staff being the
face of the firm in attracting, retaining and building relationships with clients, there is
an increased relevance for further research on the impact of deviant interpersonal
behavior occurring between co-workers (e.g., spreading of rumors, blaming other
team members for things gone wrong, or accepting credit for someone else’s work)
and deviant front-line behavior (such as when employees air “dirty laundry” to clients
about problems they are having with their organization, making the firm or a partner
of the firm look bad to a client).81
79 In addition, Tan and Jamal (2006) point to strategic behavior, “stylization”, and perception
management of audit work paper preparers.
80 “Workplace behavior deviance” is the voluntary behavior of organizational member that violates
significant organizational norms and, in doing so, threatens the well being of the organization and/or its
members (Jelinek and Jelinek 2008).
81 As audit firms increasingly expect their auditors to behave professionally while at the same time build
relationships, and hence share information and feelings authentically that are more personal in nature as
part of that relationship building, and clients test their audit firm’s integrity tby expecting to see that they
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Almer et al. (2005) further point at “shirking”, leading to dysfunctional
behavior.82 Shirking in an audit setting can include wide-ranging activities such as
social loafing83, failure to fully engage in more complex thinking, and audit-quality
reduction acts such as premature sign-off of an audit step and under-reporting of
time. An interesting finding is that of Malone and Roberts (1996: 62)84, who found
that “auditors who had progressed beyond the staff level had higher incidences [of
dysfunctional] behaviors”, although others find a more nuanced picture.85 Large client
size and the presence of a fixed-fee audit contract were found to be most strongly
associated with dysfunctional behavior of partners..
Among the most studied dysfunctional behaviors is under-reporting of time (e.g.,
Kelley and Seiler 1982; Kelley and Margheim 1990; Otley and Pierce 1996; Sweeney
and Pierce 2006) and prematurely signing-off an audit step as completed without
actually completing the necessary procedure (e.g., Alderman and Deitrick 1982;
Margheim and Pany 1986; Raghunathan 1991). Otley and Pierce (1996) find that a
majority of seniors report having been asked either directly or indirectly by their
managers to under-report time, and more than one-third report that they responded
to tight budgets by reducing the quality of audit work. Dirsmith and Covaleski (1985:
155), had already earlier found: “While the formal policy for every office from which
people were contacted was that “eating time” was strictly forbidden, the informal
system noted that it is one way of demonstrating a commitment to the firm and also
the client”. As much as 58% of respondents in the study of Raghunathan (1991)
reported to have engaged in premature sign-offs at one time or the other.86 Time
treat their staff as well as (they say that) they treat their clients, more research efforts should be put on
how to align and create consistency in the organizational and personal behavior of the “front-line” service
providers.
82 “Shirking includes any action by a member of a team that diverges from the interests of the team as a
whole. Shirking includes not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, oversight, incapacity, and even
honest mistakes. In other words, shirking is simply the inevitable consequence of bounded rationality and
opportunism within agency relationships. Shirking is related to self-interest, risk-preferences, bounded
rationality (i.e. individuals are limited in their ability to attend to all possible decision factors, thus
decisions are made without consideration of complete knowledge), information asymmetry, perceived
pressures, and ethical preferences” (Almer et al. 2005: 2-3).
83 That is, the moral hazard resulting from less effort being exerted by individuals who work in teams
because it is difficult to measure individual work effort.
84 Malone and Roberts (1996) proposed a conceptual model explaining the drivers for dysfunctional
behavior, being on personality characteristics (e.g., locus of control, type-A behavior of “hard driving”,
need for achievement, self-esteem, etc.), professional characteristics (e.g., organizational commitment,
intent to stay, etc.), quality control and review procedures, audit firm structure, and time budget pressure.
Donnelly et al. (2003) furthermore point to dysfunctional behavior as a reaction to the environment (i.e.,
the control system, time pressure and supervisor style).
85 Carcello et al. (1996) looking at (perceived) inappropriate behavior of audit partners did not find much
dysfunctional behaviors at partner level. They did find that when partners exhibit deviant workplace
behavior, this was related to inadequate working paper review. The dysfunctional behaviors that Carcello
et al. (1996) hypothesized at partner level were gathering insufficient audit evidence, performing
inadequate workpaper review, committing other GAAS violations, committing GAAP violation, and
failing to insist that the client book material adjustments.
86 Raghunathan (1991: 77), looking at actual premature sign-off behaviors (as opposed to perceived
behaviors), found “premature sign-off, while not uncommon, do not appear to occur frequently; the
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budget pressure is generally the most significant factor inducing under-reporting of
time or premature sign-off (e.g., Alderman and Deitrick 1982; Kelley and Margheim
1990; McNair 1991: 638), which subsequently affects audit performance and a vicious
circle (e.g., leading to poor personnel decisions, obscuring the need for budget
revision and resulting in unrecognized time pressures on future audits).87
2.4.8 Audit pricing and practice development
Although the behaviors of auditors while performing audit tasks is the focus of this
study, the behaviors related to the broader functioning of the auditor should not be
ignored. Such behaviors, which are inseparable from the auditor’s functioning as a
whole, comprise tasks such as people recruitment, development and training,
relationship management, business development and audit pricing, and general
practice development including identity management and socialization (e.g., Hooks et
al. 1994). Wyatt (2004) and Barret et al. (2005) note that practice development and
other managerial skills have become relatively more important, while technical skills
are relatively less important (e.g., rainmakers and effective client relationship partners
are highly valued). The “business of auditing” increasingly focuses on financial results
and an auditor’s ability to maximize the profitability of an individual audit or account
(e.g., McNair 1991; Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Wyatt 2004). Relationship
management is important as part of distinguishing the audit service to clients (e.g.,
Alvesson 2004) and for making and developing contacts (e.g., Hooks et al. 1994).88
Account and portfolio management is an inseparable aspect of relationship
management and an auditor’s daily work, during which “auditors assess financial risk,
audit risk and auditor business risk, and consider whether engagement fees are
sufficient to cover current and future expected engagement costs” (Johnstone and
Bédard 2004).89 I want to lift out two behaviors that are specifically relevant to
auditing: (a) audit pricing and business development, and (b) activities in relation to
practice management. These are discussed in more detail below.
most commonly quoted reasons (…) are the auditor’s belief that the audit step is not essential (low risk),
followed by time limitations; and that seniors appear to be the group most likely to sign-off prematurely
(…) and because of time limitations more often than do the other levels of audit personnel”. They
conclude that although the magnitude of premature sign-off behavior is not significant, the problem does
exist and should be addressed given the effect it can have on audit quality.
87 Bédard et al. (2008b) found that prior year negative budget variance and fee pressure resulted in audit
team decreasing its reported audit hours. Furthermore, they found that engagement teams respond to
imposed budget pressure also by reducing reported hours. Ettredge et al. (2008) find that engagement
teams' reported hours also vary asymmetrically with prior budget variance.
88 Hooks et al. (1994) found that audit partners ranked client referrals and recommendations as the most
important practice development source, followed by referrals from within their own firms, former
colleagues and business contacts, and their reputation for expertise.
89 They show, for example, that audit firms are removing the riskier clients from their portfolios as the
results of risk avoidance that the firms use to purposefully manage their client portfolios.
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2.4.8.1 Audit pricing and business development
The basic principle of audit pricing is fairly simple, as Hayes et al. illustrate (2005: 86):
Professional fees should be a fair reflection of the value of the professional service
performed for the client, taking into account the skill and knowledge required, the
level of training and experience of the persons performing the service, the time
necessary for the services and the degree of responsibility that performing those
services entail.
Apart from this general notion on audit fee calculation, auditors apply different
pricing strategies, among which fee-cutting or “low-balling” (e.g., DeAngelo 1981a),
charging Big 4 or industry expertise “fee-premiums” (e.g., Simunic 1980)90 and
charging “risk premia” (e.g., Johnstone and Bédard 2001). The academic evidence,
however, is mixed on the existence and magnitude, and their impact on audit
effectiveness, of “Big 4 premiums” (e.g., Choi et al. 2008) and “low-balling” (e.g.,
Dopuch and King 1996). And although “low-balling” or bidding an audit at a
minimum cost is discouraged by most professional organizations, it is commonplace
in practice (e.g., Hayes et al. 2005).
DeAngelo (1981a) was one of the first accounting researchers to point out that
competitive pressures were causing large public accounting firms to “low-ball” their
initial fee structures to obtain audit clients. McNair (1991: 637) referred to the core
audit as being a “loss leader”, which “investment” should be earned back through the
provision of additional consulting services. This provision of non-audit services next
to audit services (i.e., “cross-selling”) has been a much debated issue considered to
impact audit pricing and independence of auditors.91 Francis, for example, argues that
“a case can be made that audit quality will always be somewhat suspect if other
services are provided that are perceived to potentially compromise the auditor’s
objectivity and skepticism” (Francis 2004: 345).
Fee pressure in auditing continues to increase due to difficulties that audit firm
management experiences in getting the level of fees needed to cover the cost to
achieve an acceptable level of audit quality. Competition, leading to reduced prices
(and, thus, fee pressure), therefore, continues to be a particular worry of the auditing
standards setters and supervisory institutions who state that the effects of competition
90 A fee premium associated with audits performed by Big 4. Craswell et al. (1995) not only report an
audit fee premium for the Big 4 name, but also an audit fee premium for audit specialization within the
Big 4.
91 Research on the impact on independence of the combination of providing non-audit services (i.e.
consulting or management advisory services) by the incumbent auditor goes back as far as the landmark
research of Simunic (1984). The essence of this discussion can be found in what Arthur Levitt, the then
Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission of the US, said in May 2000 (quoted in Dopuch et al.
2001: 95): “The audit is sometimes priced lower to attract clients willing to pay for higher margin
consulting services. (…) I’m concerned that the audit function is simply being used as a springboard to
more lucrative consulting services”.
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may not apply in the market of auditing services (Johnstone et al. 2004) as they fear
that quality is sacrificed for business reasons (McNair’s “cost/quality” dilemma).92
2.4.8.2 Activities related to general practice management
Accounting firms are mostly organized as professional partnerships. The nature of
how such a partnership is managed is characterized, among other things, by a fairly
high degree of autonomy and the downplaying of organizational hierarchy. Covaleski
et al. (1998: 293), in their ethnographic study comprising in-depth interviews with 180
auditors over a period of 15 years within the (then) Big 6 audit firms, found that
auditors exercise a high degree of professional judgment in solving complex issues and
that “professional-bureaucratic” conflicts arise given this autonomy. Organizational
hierarchical structures, for example, are oftentimes sidestepped by “rainmakers” or
knowledge-based authority, involving a high degree of self-determination. In the audit
firm partnerships, strategic direction and decision-making is weak and dominated by
negotiation, consensus building, and iteration. Greenwood et al., for example, note
that “[i]mplementing a strategic decision depends on widespread acceptance and
professional conviction rather than on corporate manipulation of resources, rewards,
and sanctions” (Greenwood et al. 1990: 750).93
Consequently, next to the more traditional management control measures used
by auditors in practice, such as “management by objectives” (e.g., revenue growth,
realization rates, etc.), mentoring, and compensation-reward systems (Covaleski et al.
1998; Jenkins et al. 2008), management of a professional partnership generally comes
down to using a number of “socializations themes” (e.g., Maister 1993; Lowendahl
1997; Alvesson 2004; Pierce and Sweeney 2005), such as clan controls (e.g., Ouchi
1980)94, reinforcing common beliefs and values95, and working with a strong client
92 Houston (1999) showed that fee pressure due to reduced audit fees leads to audit budgeting that is less
responsive to audit risks (i.e., the risk that not all risks are appropriately covered). Gramling (1999), for
example, found that auditors who are confronted with fee pressure due to clients with a low audit fee
preference are more likely to rely on internal audit work of questionable quality (which is considered a
“quality-threatening behavior”) (from Hooks et al. 1994).
93 The following quote by a senior managing partner illustrates the tension between the managing
partners and other partners very well (Covaleski et al. 1998: 316): “Progress and the accomplishment of
what we are trying to accomplish has a price. The price is for existing partners to give up some of their
control, power and freedom for the greater good. On balance they tend to resist doing this. The one area
that constantly plagues me in my day-to-day management is the difficulty in managing a business
composed of owners, professional prima donnas, if you like-where everything involves strong consensus
building”.
94 In their interviews of Big 4 audit partners, Pierce and Sweeney (2005) report that these clan controls are
used extensively in large international accounting firms. As summarized in Jenkins et al. (2008: 53), “In
Addition to formalized controls instituted through audit methodology and operating procedures, less
formal clan controls based on experience and intuition are widely used to monitor the performance of
subordinates and ensure audit quality (…) [which] allow highly experienced individuals (e.g., managers
and partners) another avenue to exercise their power”. “Under a clan control system, performance
evaluation is a continuous process of subtle signals from old-time members” (Pierce and Sweeney 2005:
343 quoting Macintosh 1985).
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orientation (e.g., Anderson-Gough et al. 2000).96 Such socialization measures are not
only used at lower levels of audit staff97, but also as “peer pressure” at the partner
level (e.g., Covaleski et al. 1998)98, which then lead to everyday behaviors of meeting
the social pressure and managing perceptions.
95 This would include the broad influence of partners on the firm’s culture through image management
and informal communications, or even acknowledging the use of “partners” “sixth sense” or “intuition”
(Pierce and Sweeney 2005: 358).
96 These “client controls” range from explicit client demands, internally emphasized client orientations
(including client satisfaction reviews) to the “image” of a client reflected in the organizational culture.
Illustrating the latter, Anderson-Gough et al. (2000: 1171) showed how trainees in a large accountancy
firm not only respond to specific clients or base their judgment on real-life encounters, but invent ideas
of the client which then become true, at least in terms of control effect where this notion had “an
abstract and symbolic significance when invoked to justify general requirements of behavior”.
97 As one employee in an accounting firm observed in the study of Covaleski et al. (1998: 317) that his
“emerging identity of being ‘chargeable’ was less associated with possessing expertise and wielding
knowledge than with managing business relations with clients”. This leads to (a) incentives for certain
behavior to meet the socialization pressures, e.g., an ambition to shape perceptions and the need to “keep
up appearances”; (b) certain behavior to manage the socialization pressures through others’ perceptions of
you (e.g., strategic behavior of subordinates in relation to their performance appraisals); and (c) an end
result or performance “based on” that behavior (i.e. perceived performance). Managing that the gap
between perceived performance and actual performance is not becoming too big, is then becoming an
everyday behavior (“managing expectations”).
98 That socialization is not only relevant at lower levels of audit staff and does not stop at partner-level, it
can well be illustrated by the following quote of a regional managing partner interviewed by Covaleski et
al. (1998: 311): ”When we have monthly sales meetings with all the partners, each partner has sales goals
and targets. And every month we have a report that comes out, (…) it’s got it by partner’s name, and it
shows what he did last year, what he did year to date last year, and what his plan is for this year. Every
month he sees the peer pressure because he’s got to get up (…), and he’s got to explain [to fellow
partners] why he’s behind or ahead of plan”.
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2.5 National culture in the context of the drivers of professional behavior
Individual behavior is motivated by one’s desire for pleasure
and avoidance of displeasure (egotistical hedonism)
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in House et al. (2004: 517)
2.5.1 What drives professional behavior? A conceptual framework
In the previous sections, I have illustrated how professional behavior, in general, and
that of auditors in particular, is defined and used in this study. In this section, the
question as to what drives such behavior is central, with the objective to put the
potential effect of national culture on behavior into context and perspective.
In this section, I present a conceptual framework for the systematic explanation
of the professional behavior of auditors. This framework builds on the theories and
definition of professional behavior covered in § 2.2 and is extended based on a
number of frameworks proposed within the behavioral study of accountants, such as
that of Dillard and Ferris (1989)99, Schlachter (1990)100, Libby and Luft (1993)101, and
Malone and Roberts (1996)102. With this conceptual framework, I try to capture,
structure, and analyze our current academic understanding of the drivers of
professional behavior of auditors.103 This overview also provides a more generic
99 Dillard and Ferris (1989) present a model of individual work behaviors in professional accounting firms
based on the attribution theory and the expectancy theory. In categorizing the variables that explain work
behavior, they distinguish between demographic/physiological variables (which characterize the
individual, e.g., mental ability and socio-cultural attributes), cognitive/psychological variables (which
reside in the individual’s mind, e.g., attitude, learning and experience, perception and attribution,
personality and motivation), and environmental/organizational variables (which reside outside the
individual and are typically related to the structure of the work environment, e.g., reward systems,
performance evaluation, and organizational culture).
100 Schlachter (1990) proposes a framework of perspectives or levels from which professional (ethical)
behavior in public accounting practices could be analyzed. He proposes a two divisional model dividing
the public accounting profession from the external environment. Within the profession of accounting,
Schlachter identifies four “behavioral perspectives” which are: the individual, the local office, the multi-
office firm and the professional institute. Factors from the external environment driving behavior are
considered by Schlachter to be the interaction with clients, licensing bodies, related third parties, and
regulatory bodies.
101 Libby and Luft (1993) theorize that audit decision performance is a function of (cognitive) abilities,
knowledge, environment, and motivation.
102 Malone and Roberts (1996) propose a conceptual model for explaining the drivers for “dysfunctional”
or deviant auditor’s behavior. They refer to personality characteristics (e.g., locus of control, self-esteem,
type-A behavior of “hard driving” or competitiveness, need for achievement, etc.), professional
characteristics (e.g., organizational and professional commitment, and intent to stay), and what I would
summarize as audit firm management controls such as quality control and review procedures, audit firm
structure, and time budget pressure.
103 Presenting a conceptual framework means that the framework touches upon many behavioral aspects
known within professional and auditing research, rather than covering each behavioral factor in-depth.
This level is considered sufficient in the beginning to understand the behavioral dimensions in auditing
and presenting them to the audience of this study (Van Maanen 1988: 25). Needless to say this leads me
to abstract from the full detail and complexity of the drivers of professional behavior in real life.
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insight into the behavior of professionals and employees in their work environment.
The following components or categories of drivers of behavior are distinguished and
illustrated subsequently:
These drivers are further illustrated as follows:
 Psychological and cognitive factors: Behavioral scientists generally agree that
the primary factors responsible for variation in human behavior are the individual
psychological and cognitive variables (e.g., Istvan 1973; Rhode et al. 1976; Dillard
and Ferris 1989; Snead and Harrel 1991).104 These not only comprise factors such
as motivation, locus of control, moral reasoning, bounded rationality, but also the
“basic human impulses” or “visceral traits” as the universal existential or “animal”
reflexes such as fear, envy, greed, and other irresistible “desires” and self-interests
(see § 2.5.2);
 National cultural variables: Poortinga (1992) notes that national culture places
boundaries on human behavior by defining acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
Apart from the national cultural variables as defined by House et al. (2004),
covered in Chapter 3 of this thesis, these variables include the level of societal
corruption and ethics (reference is made to § 2.5.3 and Chapter 3);
104 Rhode et al. (1976), for example, found “biographical” and personality factors (such as parent’s
education and occupation, religious preference, higher university grade point average, and extra-curricular
activities) to differ between audit staff that left the firm within their first five years of employment and
staff that remained working within the audit firm. Istvan (1973) found that partners were typically higher
on dominance and extroversion and lower on passivity and conformity, in contrast to audit staff. Snead










Figure 1 – The effect of national culture in the context of the drivers of professional behavior
National culture
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 Contextual factors, also referred to as the boundary and enforcement systems105
(or lenses, constraints, choice alternatives, or Ajzen’s normative beliefs) – the
primary “appetite suppressants” (Alvesson 2002): “The fact that people act under
different ‘constraints’, can often explain a great deal of variation in behavior”
(Elster 2007: 6). These constraints mainly comprise the societal norms, values and
beliefs within which an individual can choose his or her action. Next to national
cultural variables, two “contextual factors” are distinguished in this study:
o Professional contextual variables: Considering the professional culture
is relevant because being a professional leads to certain behavior (e.g.,
protective behavior) or is the driver of behavior (e.g., social status and
mobility). Barley and Kunda (2001) emphasize “the importance of an
occupational perspective in organizational analysis".106 These variables
comprise, for example, professional autonomy, codes of conduct and
standards, accountability and oversight, education and knowledge, and
nature and complexity of the task (see § 2.5.4).
o Organizational contextual variables: Since auditors spend a large part
of their working life in accounting firms, their professional attitudes are
likely to be shaped by organizational culture and value systems. These
variables comprise, for example, organizational image and socialization,
management control, the employment relationship, audit approach and
quality controls, and nature of the firm (see § 2.5.5).
 External interaction and environment: Personalities and cultures do not exist
in isolation, but in the external interface with other actors or how we are seen and
how we see others: “Although identities are constructed within organizations,
organizational members are strongly influenced by their interaction with
outsiders” (Alvesson and Kärreman 2007: 711). The effect can be seen in almost
all behavioral theories covered earlier and is specifically relevant to the service
industry and professional service firms.107 With this factor I mean interaction with
the environment external to the profession and professional108, such as clients, the
105 Jenkins et al. (2008) refer to this as “boundary-setting forces” which are the factors that guide and
shape behavior and that provide legitimacy for (intended) behavior (hence, enforcement).
106 “Accountants construct their identities and organize their practices not only around their employer of
the market for their services, but also around their occupational affiliations” (Barley and Kunda 2004: 26).
107 “By articulating the concept of emotional labor and its implications for customer, employers, and
employees in a variety of occupation, [numerous scholars] forged the notion that service workers traffic
in interaction” (Barley and Kunda 2001: 87). Professionals generally work in the service industry, thereby,
providing professional service to others (in this case, mainly clients). Consequently, the interaction with
others in the societal arena influences how auditors behave to a large extent. Interaction with others
provides impulses, incentives, reflections, and boundaries of professional behavior. Also, Nelson and Tan
(2005) refer to the interaction between auditor and other stakeholders as one of the three categories of
judgment and decision-making in auditing (hence, behavior).
108 Although many of the factors associated with national, occupational, and organizational culture are
external to the person of the auditor as well, these factors are closely associated with the immediate
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society at large, capital markets, etc., or rather the interdependence with externalities of
professional behavior.109 These factors comprise variables such as interaction with
clients (including negotiation tactics), interaction with the society at large, and the
litigiousness of the environment (see § 2.5.6).
 Professional behavioral factors: In this study as covered in § 2.4.
To reflect the multiple interactions and hierarchy between the constructs and the
interdependence between intentions and actual behavior, the framework includes
“feedback loops” connecting the components (consistent with, for example, Schlachter
1990).110
These variables and factors are further illustrated in the context of auditors’
professional behavior in the next subsections. A complete overview of the framework,
detailing the underlying variables, is included in Appendix 1.
2.5.2 Psychological and cognitive drivers and limitations
Most of the factors under this heading are related to an individual’s personality,
psychological cognition, and character. These comprise factors such as motivation
(including reward), locus of control (e.g., Rotter 1966)111 and confidence (e.g.,
Shanteau 1989: 2; Pincus 1991; Whitecotton 1996), moral reasoning (including ethics
“being” of the auditor. That is, these cultural variables are considered to act primarily as “internalized”
guiding principles for the auditor’s intended actions (i.e., before and regardless of the actual action),
whereas the interaction variables are those influencing factors arising from the actual (inter)action of and
with others (i.e., the responses of external factors that in itself influences or alters the behavior or
auditors, which auditors adapt to).
109 Hence, these factors could also be seen as outcomes or results of the behaviors, as Elster illustrates as
well (2007: 300): “While actions are shaped by desires, they can also shape desires. Thus in addition to the
intended outcome of an action, there is sometimes an unintended one: a change of desire”. In this study,
these external factors are considered to shape the ultimate behavior. It could best be pictured as an
intermediate force between intended and ultimate behavior, with an a tempo feedback loop between the two,
consistent with Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior. However, this is not considered to add to the overall
insight, clarity and understanding of the model. Hence, for ease of presentation, this feedback loop
between intended and actual behavior, moderated by the external interactions, is not shown in the model.
Nevertheless, I acknowledge that this is one of such simplification biases inherent to providing an
overview.
110 Schlachter (1990) also proposed a “feedback loop” between behavior (action) and the behavioral
driver to reflect the interaction among them.
111 Within auditing research, locus of control is mainly studied in relation to dysfunctional or “reduced
audit quality” behavior. Malone and Roberts (1996), for example, argue that locus of control and self-
esteem are two of the key personality characteristics in their model explaining dysfunctional behavior.
Donnelly et al. (2003) evidenced that individual factors significantly affect dysfunctional behavior, such as
external locus of control and lower levels of self-rated performance. Reed et al. (1994) have related locus
of control to such behavioral matters as job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover
intentions. Tsui and Gul (1996) found a relationship between external locus of control and an auditor’s
ability to resist management pressure in audit conflict situations. Chan and Leung (2006) showed that
“internals” are more likely to show an ability to recognize ethical issues than “externals”.
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and risk appetite), bounded rationality (including biases and heuristics); or even mood
states (e.g., Chung et al. 2005; Forgas and East 2008), but also the “basic human
impulses” or “visceral traits” as the universal existential or “animal” reflexes such as
fear, envy, greed, and other irresistible “desires” and self-interests.
Most of the challenges faced by the profession today are said to be related to
personality characteristics (Haynes et al. 2008). Two personality traits that are
considered to be of specific relevance today are emotional intelligence (or empathy
and interpersonal relationship skills) and creativity.112 Emotional intelligence has been
found to have a positive influence on client relationships, management control, people
development, and engagement quality (e.g., Power 2003; Barret et al. 2005; Pierce and
Sweeney 2005; Trotman 2005).113 Creativity has been associated with problem-solving
abilities and decision-making, confidence and competitiveness, communication skills
and achieving a “distinctive image in the marketplace”, and innovative and multi-
competence thinking (e.g., Shanteau 1989; Hood and Koberg 1991; Al-Beraidi and
Rickards 2003).114
Behavioral drivers that are considered specifically relevant and pervasive for the
auditing context in relation to the subjective interpretation and application of the
standards are:
 “Animal spirits” and motivation (including greed and reward);
 Moral reasoning;
 Bounded rationality (including biases and heuristics).
Below I discuss these three drivers in more detail.
112 As early as 1973, Istvan hinted at the relevance of “soft skills” to the future of the auditing profession
(1973: 35): “Accountants by nature seem to be more data-oriented than people-oriented. This intrinsic
facet of our profession is in conflict with our future professional needs”. But it still took a while for his
conviction to find solid ground and to become recognized as significant and relevant by broader circles of
accountants.
113 Trotman et al. (2005) show that auditors benefit in auditor-client negotiations from being empathic
and considering the client perspective. In their study on the partners’ perspective on management
controls within an audit firm, Pierce and Sweeney noted that “Frequent reference was made to this sixth
sense as an instinctive form of control, which was considered to be an essential quality for anyone
wishing to gain admission to the partnership” (2005: 365). They refer to Power (2003) who suggested that
hunch and intuition are extremely important elements in the conduct of an audit “such as knowing what
questions to ask during the review by interview and knowing which audit merits additional review time”,
which to a large extent depends on an auditors ability to read the “subtle signals” of the body language of
their juniors. Interesting in relation to emotional intelligence and empathy is also the study of Haynes et
al. (2008) of auditors’ situational flexibility in adopting different personality profiles “to address the skills
required for the global business environment”. Where accounting students preferred “Myers-Briggs type
indicator” dimensions of sensing, thinking and judging while at work, they adopted quite different
personality profiles while socializing. In more social settings, auditors have been found to be able to
utilize a much broader range of personality-related behaviors (such as intuition and feeling). This has led
Haynes et al. (2008: 94) to suggest to change the auditing education to “encourages the use of such
abilities, [rather than] recruiting different students, (…) to assist accountants bring forth those
characteristics that are required by the profession as it seeks to change”.
114 Hood and Koberg (1991) found partners in Big 4 firms to be more creative than audit staff, which is
an interesting finding in light of the assumed business added value of the creativity trait.
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2.5.2.1 “Animal spirits” and motivation (including greed and reward)
The point is, ladies and gentlemen, that greed – for a lack of a better word – is good. Greed is right. Greed
works. Greed clarifies, cuts through and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed in all of its forms
– greed for life, for money, for love, for knowledge – has marked upward surge of mankind.
(Gordon Gekko, 1987, in “Wall Street”, who will – rumor has it – return after his
imprisonment in “Wall Street 2” in 2010)
Freud referred to the authentic desire of the “id”, which Elster calls visceral traits and
impulses: the “irresistible” desires, temptations, anxieties and other emotional, mental,
or physiological ‘impulses” and feelings that are so strong “as to crowd out all other
considerations” (Elster 2007: 76). These impulses can be fear, pain, shame, thirst,
hunger, envy, anger, greed, revenge, etc.. “They have the potential, not always realized,
for blocking deliberation, trade-offs, and even choice” Elster continues.115
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) compare these impulses with “animal spirits” of the
mind (2009: 4). They argue that the current financial crisis is caused precisely by these
“animal spirits” – “confidence, fairness, corruption and antisocial behavior, money
illusion, and stories” – among which “‘greed” is predominant.116 And greed coincides
with aspects such as self-interest and myopia: “[Self-]interest is the pursuit of personal
advantage, be it money, fame, power, or salvation” (Elster 2007: 78).117 Hence,
humans will always want more and more as they are a “wanting animal” (Maslow
1943: 395).118 This is what Partnoy (2003) called “infectious greed” when he analyzed
how greed and deceit corrupted the financial markets. Wyatt points to corporate and
individual greed also being present in the assurance profession.119 These visceral traits
115 Elster (2007) paints the “caricature” of the rational agent in this picture as the opposite behavioral
traits of these innate impulses. In between, Elster reasons, “we find behavior that is partly motivated by
visceral factors, yet is also somewhat sensitive to costs-benefit considerations” such as strength of interest
being neutralized by social conscious (e.g., guilt feelings).
116 Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 29-38): “Each of the past three economic contradictions in the United
States – the recession of July 1990 to March 1991, the recession of March to November 2001, and the
recession that began in December 2007 – involved corruption scandals. Scandals played a role in
determining the severity of each of these recessions. (…) All public corruptions involve the managing of
other people’s money. There is therefore always the opportunity for the managers to pocket the money
and run. (…) The business cycle is connected to fluctuations in personal commitment to principles of
good behavior and to fluctuations in predatory activity [i.e., greed]”.
117 Birnberg and Shields illustrate “self-interest” as a key feature sharply, as follows (1989: 29):
“Individuals are motivated by self-interest. Moral hazard exists because contracts between principal and
agent only can be made on observable variables. These usually are imperfect measures of actual behavior.
Adverse selection points to the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent.
Individuals have private knowledge that is of value to the firm. Only under favorable conditions will the
agent truthfully reveal it. In the formal model the agent is effort averse. Given a choice, the worker
prefers leisure to effort and must be rewarded to make him or her work”.
118 This is illustrated by Maslow’s further conclusion that “the hierarchy [of needs] principle is usually
observed in terms of increasing percentages of non-satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy”, leading to the
intriguing paradox of the more we get, the less satisfied we are with it, and the more we want even more.
119 Wyatt (2004) points to corporate and individual greed as one of the main factors having tarnished the
reputation of the auditing profession after the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002. While describing the
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are, to such an extent, universally present at the personality level in humans of all kind,
that auditors would not be expected to react differently to these impulses compared
with any other human being. How exactly these innate human impulses affect
auditors’ behavior is food for future research.
Where basic human “‘impulses” are considered to be of a more unconscious,
uncontrollable kind, motivations are those behavioral drivers that are more conscious
(or rational to some extent).120 Within the professional environment of auditing this is
further analyzed, mainly by Dillard and Ferris (Ferris 1977; Dillard 1979; Ferris et al.
1980), through the Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy theory paradigm of Vroom
that was central in occupational behavioral sciences.121 Other scholars have based their
behavioral study on McClelland’s trichotomy of need theory.122 The theory’s validity
was demonstrated in a number of environments.123
Reward is one of the primary motives for action and efforts. If the reward is
wanted badly enough, a person will initiate any action to obtain that reward. And it is
this appreciation of the reward that differs between people – be it monetary rewards
(i.e. money124) or non-monetary reward (such as status, prestige, recognition, or
history of audit firms and their growing profitable consulting business on the side, Wyatt acknowledges
that in retrospect it is easy to see the greed factor at work: “The consulting arms exerted increasing
pressure for additional profit shares and for ever-increasing rates of growth. (…) Since the partnership
form or organization did not permit the use of stock options, accounting firm partners had to grow firm
revenues and profits in order to enjoy wealth increases like those of the top executives of their clients
[who were enjoying stock option profits]” (Wyatt 2004: 49). Wyatt acknowledges that it is easy in
retrospect, “at the time, however, the changing focus on revenue and profit growth was viewed as merely
adapting to the changing times”. Nevertheless, “in essence, the cultures of the firms had gradually
changed from a central emphasis on delivering professional services in a professional manner to an
emphasis on growing revenues and profitability”.
120 Motivations arise out of a more or less conscious weighing of effort, risk, and reward. Parson and
Shils (1951) already account for motivation as the core of the “personality system of orientation”. Ferris
and Larcker (1983: 2), in explaining variables of auditor performance in a large public accounting firm,
note motivation as one of the primary determinants of work-related behavior. Lampe and Earnest (1984)
view motivation as a key to accountants’ productivity.
121 According to Vroom (1964, as discussed in Ferris et al. 1980), motivation depends on the likelihood
that effort will lead to the reward valued most as compensation for that effort. Instead of reward, one
could also read a potential loss that one would want to prevent anxiously. Somewhat in line with
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Dillard and Ferris (1979) showed for example that “high job security” and
“personal growth and development” were among the positive indicators for auditors not to leave the
audit firm.
122 McClelland (1961) suggested and validated this suggestions that the work behavior of most individuals
is motivated by three needs – need for achievement (nAch), need for affiliation (nAff), and need for
power (nP). He reasons that behaviors may differ due to motivational differences among individual, i.e.,
the individual involved has affiliation, power and achievement needs that differ as far as their share in
motivating him or her goes.
123 Harrel and Stahl (1984: 241) found, among others, that within the auditing profession “an individual’s
need for achievement was positive associated with his or her performance rating (…) and self-assessed
work performance [and hence job satisfaction]”. Malone and Roberts (1996) suggest, among others, need
for achievement as being one of the personality characteristics in their model explaining dysfunctional
behavior (reduced audit quality behavior, see § 2.9.8).
124 The current society-wide discussions (or rather outrage) about “excessive compensation and bonuses”
is entirely focused on the monetary side of reward and motivation. Although money indeed makes the
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personal development)125. Particularly when dealing with professionals, next to
economic incentives, non-economic rewards also affect behavior. Jenkins et al. (2008:
60) conclude that the “limited research on organizational control and
compensation/reward systems in audit firms suggest that these incentive structures
affect partner and employee behavior”.
2.5.2.2 Moral reasoning
In the last two decades, and especially after the recent corporate accounting scandals
(Cohen and Bennie 2006), much research attention has been given to the ethical or
moral behavior of accountants (e.g., Ponemon and Gabhart 1990; Ponemon 1992a,
1992b; Shaub et al. 1993; Emanuels 1995; Jones et al. 2003).126
These psychological frameworks have mainly been based on Kohlberg’s theory
(1964) of moral cognition.127 Three stages of morality are distinguished — personal
interest, maintaining (social) norms, and post-conventional sophistication of ethical
reasoning.128 Although research of the Jones model of “moral intensity” (Jones 1991)
within auditing is yet fairly limited, the work of Cohen and Bennie is quite noteworthy,
especially given the considered explanatory power of the model. “Different situations
will elicit moral intensity factor ‘weightings’ that change, depending on the situation
and context of the moral issue” (Cohen and Bennie 2006: 2). These “weightings”
differ from person to person, and are (based on Cohen and Bennie 2006):
world go round, this discussion is, therefore, limited and one-sided. Many non-pecuniary rewards can play
an evenly, if not bigger, defining role in driving human action. Fraudulent behaviors in cases such as
Enron and Ahold were much more about personal status, power, and recognition than about money
only. Nevertheless, compensation, especially the variable bonus part of it, incentivizes certain behaviors.
As in banking, where certain compensation and bonus schemes triggered excessive risk taking
(Economist 16 May 2009), incentives and bonuses also encourages certain behavior (e.g. being
commercially driver) or discourage other behavior (e.g. how much of a partner’s reward is depending on
quality review results). Becoming a partner may not seldom depend on ones commercial contribution to
the money pit, rather than ones capabilities of doing a quality audit.
125 Almer et al. (2005) refer to both pecuniary rewards (salary and benefits) and non-pecuniary rewards
(e.g. development, flexibility and autonomy, deferred compensation in anticipation of future partnership
in the firm) as factors in the compensation received by the auditor. In any profession altruism, for
example, should be seen as rewards, adding to the professional’s status, affiliation or belonging.
126 Scholars in this field attempt to unravel and evaluate factors affecting that ethical behavior. These
studies incorporate or expressly consider a psychological framework for the ethical reasoning process
and, generally, find a strong relationship between auditors’ moral development and his/her judgment and
decision-making.
127 Kohlberg states that human moral reasoning is developed in a series of overlapping stages during a
human’s life (starting with childhood), with higher-level moral schemas gradually gaining and lower-level
schemas gradually declining. “Imaginatively putting oneself in the place of another, or social perspective
taking, is central to moral development and behavior. It relates to the right and the good of morality, that
is, to justice or mutual respect and to empathy or caring” (Gibbs 2003: 1). “It is about the problem
solving strategies and cognitive structures people use to guide their moral decision-making, make sense of
the world, and construct meaning” (Rest et al. 1999: 17).
128 This is documented and made measurable, among others, using Rest’s (1979) “Defining Issues Test”.
Tsui and Gul (1996), for example, applied this test to measure ethical reasoning of auditors in conflict
situations.
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 Magnitude of the consequences, i.e., the sum of harms and benefits resulting from
a given action;
 Social consensus, i.e., the extent of agreement that an action is ethical or unethical;
 Probability of effect, i.e., the likelihood of consequences actually occurring;
 Temporal immediacy, i.e., the length of time between the action and the onset of
the consequence;
 Proximity, i.e., the affinity with the victim or beneficiary; and
 Concentration of effect, i.e., the function of the number of people affected.
Coram et al. (2008) provided support for the Jones model in the context of an audit
by showing that the “moral intensity” varies over different moral issues of “reduced
audit quality” behaviors, and hence, is issue-contingent.
The most important factor within the auditing context is the magnitude of the
consequences, followed by social consensus and probability of effect (Cohen and
Bennie 2006: 14). In other words, auditors’ moral reasoning is the “weighting” of the
potential reward versus the risk of getting caught. Noteworthy is that scholars have
shown that the intrinsic moral reasoning of auditors may not be any “higher” than the
average professional (e.g., Emanuels 1995; Schatzberg et al. 2005) and lower than that
could be expected of auditors based on their professional qualifications (Emanuels
1995). In their study of how both economic incentives and moral reasoning influence
auditor reporting, Schatzberg et al. (2005) find that auditors’ appropriate reporting
behavior is positively affected by moral reasoning, but negatively by economic
incentives. However, they also find that the effect of economic incentives diminishes
when economic penalties increase in the market. In other words, supervision (i.e., the
risk of getting caught in combination with sufficiently large economic or social
penalties) is an effective or even necessary measure to uphold auditors’ moral
reasoning (and, thus, compliance with conventional norms).
Furthermore, “[r]esearchers have found that ethical behavior is significantly
influenced by the other people that an individual encounters in a professional
environment” (Shaub et al. 1993: 147). Moral reasoning is strongly influenced by the
social surroundings of an auditor. Specifically interesting is the study of Lord and
DeZoort (2001), who investigated two forms of social influence pressure on auditors’
moral reasoning: obedience pressure (from commands made by superiors) and
conformity pressure (from examples set by peers). They show that obedience pressure
(and peer pressure not) increased auditors’ willingness to sign-off on materially
misstated financial statements. Social pressure from “above” (but not from “peers”)
has, thus, a strong and significant effect on the ethical decision-making behavior of
auditors.
2.5.2.3 Bounded rationality (including biases and heuristics)
Like every human being, an auditor’s judgment and decision-making process is faulty
and highly prone to a number of cognitive limitations (judgmental biases) and
generalizations (heuristics or “rules of thumb”). In auditing research, much interest
goes out to whether auditors are cognitively limited and susceptible to heuristics and
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biases described in the psychology literature (Shanteau 1989), most notably those
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974):
 Anchoring and adjustment heuristic: Auditors focus on an initial value (i.e., anchor) in
the decision setting and, based on the available information, adjust from that
value to arrive at a judgment. The issue here is that adjustments from the anchor
are generally insufficient, meaning that the starting point is highly relevant in
reaching the ultimate judgment (which then is biased toward the starting point).
For example, anchoring behavior has been shown to give undue credence to
client representations in analytical procedures (Kinney and Uecker 1982) when
auditors “anchor” on client-provided information in the expectation formation.129
 Representativeness heuristic: Auditors assess the probability that an item or event is
similar to others based on commonalities. More representative events are judged
to occur more often or to be more probable, i.e. the unexpected (e.g., “black
swans”) is least considered, although it could well be the explanation for a given
issue. This heuristic relates to biases such as stereotyping (neglecting the base rate)
and the use of fallible evidence (based on a disregard of the source reliability or
sample size).130
 Confirmatory bias: The auditor is naturally inclined to attend to evidence that
confirms the hypothesis being tested (i.e., the expected or preferred outcome) as
opposed to information that disconfirms the expected outcome. People generally
and pervasively engage in confirmatory strategies when searching for information
(“information-search bias”) and when retrieving information from memory
(“biased recall”), and regard confirming evidence as more informative (i.e.,
stronger). Glover et al. (2005), for example, provide evidence that “auditors
attribute more strength to a weak, aggregate-level analytical procedure that creates
129 “Auditing has been characterized as a sequential process of obtaining and evaluating evidence. During
this process auditors continuously update their beliefs about the audit assertion being examined” (Tubbs
et al. 1990). Ashton and Ashton (1988) and Tubbs et al. (1990: 452) provide evidence that auditors
exhibit “recency effects” consistent with the “belief-adjustment model” that Hogarth and Einhorn
developed in the 1980s and further evidenced (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). This model posits that
people update beliefs using a sequential anchoring and adjustment process. Kennedy (1993) notes that
“end of sequence” tasks are more cognitively demanding (than step-by-step) because it requires an
individual to aggregate evidence before integrating it with an “anchor”. Further studies have shown that
the recency effect is mitigated by experience, the review process and accountability (Nelson and Tan
2005).
130 That cognitive limitations, such as the representative heuristic, can have a far reaching impact and can
be illustrated by the study of Joe (2003) who shows that even press coverage of a client influences the
audit opinion. This is evidenced through the “dilution bias” that auditors are susceptible to (Hackenbrack
1992). A dilution effect is said to occur when judgments made in the presence of both diagnostic
(relevant to the case) and non-diagnostic (not audit relevant) information are less extreme than those
made only in the presence of diagnostic information (Nisbett et al. 1981). It was further found that time
pressure and accountability eliminate the dilution effect, and that experience mitigates this bias through
the review process (Nelson and Tan 2005), all of which seems logical from an efficiency perspective.
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an expectation that is not significantly different from the unaudited number (i.e.,
“favorable” outcome)”.131
Bazerman et al. (2002) pointed to the auditing’s vulnerability to unconscious bias as
the real problem why good accountants do bad audits. This would be primarily related
to the client relationship, self-serving bias, and independence.132 They argue that
auditors will consciously and opportunistically misuse bias to facilitate themselves.133
Moore et al. (2006) posit a more forgiving take on auditors’ intentional misuse of bias.
They argue that the current independence regulations have created “an environment
in which auditor independence is virtually impossible” (2006: 15) as these regulations
ignore “the structural features of the auditor-client relationship that create conflicts of
interest”. These conflicts of interest, in turn, affect auditor judgment unconsciously,
Moore et al. reason. This unconscious bias would be far more pervasive:
Evidence on unconscious bias suggests that people are not very good at
disregarding their own self-interest and evaluating information impartially, even
when they try to do so. (…) People justify self-serving decisions by using the
arguments that happen to favor them, without awareness of this selectivity. (…)
People appear to evaluate evidence in a selective fashion when they have a stake in
reaching a particular conclusion [and] research has shown that professionals are
vulnerable to the same motivated biases as laypeople (Moore et al. 2006: 16-17).134
131 Confirmation bias can also be seen in between-auditor interaction for example. Attribution theory
posits that individuals do not react directly to the behavior of others, but first go through an intermediate
process of attributing behavior to its cause (Birnberg et al. 1977; Shields et al. 1981). Once these
attributions are formed, they affect the subsequent behavior of the individual toward the target person.
“Work style similarity” and “Personal liking”, for example, are attribution mechanisms evidenced to
impact performance evaluations, what can be explained by “similarity-attractions”: “Similarity-attraction
theory describes a situation in which individuals tend to like others who are similar to themselves. This is
based on the argument that people evaluate their own opinions, abilities, and behaviors by comparison
with those of others. By evaluating oneself against other who are similar, an individual’s self-concept is
increased” (Xu and Tuttle 2005: 195). “Attribution theory focuses on the interpretation of behavior or
stimuli rather than on the acquisition or production of information” (Dillard and Ferris 1989: 211).
132 Bazerman et al. argue that “calls for auditor independence implicitly adopt a naïve, unrealistic model
of auditor psychology” (1997: 91). They point out that although the profession’s Code of Ethics
“acknowledges the pressures on the integrity and objectivity of the auditor, but contends that auditors
can achieve a level of independence [i.e. accountability]”, however, that “auditors may find it
psychological impossible to remain impartial and objective” (1997: 89). They explain, based on a number
of experiments, that, “in sum, auditors’ judgments are likely to be biased in favor of their own and their
client’s interests. This bias occurs indirectly as a result of selective sifting and integrating audit
information. As a result, the bias is likely to be unintentional and impervious to moral suasion or the
threat of delayed and probabilistic sanctions [i.e. accountability], which are likely to seem quite remote”.
133 Bazerman et al. (2002: 98) elaborate that bias will thrive “wherever there is the possibility of
interpreting information in different ways” (ambiguity), wherever the auditor has “strong business
reasons to remain in clients’ good graces” (attachment), and “when people are endorsing others’ biased
judgments” as an audit ultimately endorses or rejects the client’s accounting rather than taking an own
independent stance (approval).
134 Moore et al. (2006: 17) point also to “plausible deniability” and “escalation of commitment”, meaning
that “when it comes to biased judgments, evidence suggests that people are more willing to endorse a
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Bazerman et al. (2002) acknowledge these more innocent but pervasive human traits,
and thus that these are intrinsic to human behavior, but nevertheless call for radical
measures in an effort to control these unconscious traits.135
2.5.3 National cultural variables
The nine dimensions of nation culture guiding the behavior of people that House et
al. (2004) developed in their GLOBE study will be the frame of reference from this










These cross-national cultural dimensions, and their impact on behavior in general, are
covered in Chapter 3 on cross-national cultural differences.
These dimensions reflect the societal cultural variables, except for one societal
factor that is of specific relevance to auditing: the societal acceptance of corruption or
the level of societal ethics. Kimbro (2002: 332) poses that “individuals will consciously
or unconsciously consider the moral cost of becoming involved in corrupt activity.
(…) The private morality aspect is related to the value system of the society”. House
et al. (2004: 558) have related corruption with cultural power distance (i.e., hierarchical
and pyramidal societies) and collectivistic values, under which unequal power relations
are valued, meaning that corrupt behavior would be legitimated as a privilege of
position. This would mean that auditors in countries with collectivistic values and high
Power Distance generally may be confronted with higher fraud risks at their clients. It
is noteworthy that Kimbro (2002), on the contrary, found that for the generally stable
biased proposal made by someone else than to make one on their own” and “that people tend to escalate
their commitment to a previous course of action, [meaning that] moral seduction occurs one step at a
time [and] that ethical lapses are more likely to occur gradually” where auditors feel compelled to justify
the previous year’s (unjustified) decision. Both mechanisms can be well identified in the behavior and
decision-making of auditors, as indicated above.
135 Bazerman et al. (2002: 102) conclude to suggest a number of “radical remedies” to “eliminate
incentives that create self-serving biases”, from “fixed, limited contract periods during which the auditor
cannot be terminated (…) and the client must be prohibited from rehiring the audit firm at the end of the
contract” to more pragmatic suggestions for education as “auditors must come to appreciate the
profound impact of self-serving biases on judgment”. Although provocative to some extent, one can
recognize certain expects of their reasoning in the auditors international code of ethics.
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and wealthy countries with well developed financial and accounting systems, it is the
individualistic cultural dimension of a country that leads to higher corruption, which
may be bourn on such factors as greed and self-indulgence.
Cross-national differences in the contextual (professional and organizational) and
environmental variables of the framework are considered “culture-free” contingency-
based differences.136 Although cross-national cultural differences in these factors are
influencing auditors’ behavior indirectly137, they will not be further covered in this thesis
in a structured fashion (i.e., only when specifically relevant to our understanding). This
theoretical review also excludes the cultural impact on the psychological/cognitive
variables of the framework of auditors’ behavior. In general, these are considered to
be universal traits, i.e., not culture specific.138 Rather, a direct culturally grounded
anthropological approach (Chanchani and MacGregor 1999) is taken, as this study
focuses on the cross-national cultures in explaining differences in auditors’
professional behavior. This will be further covered in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
2.5.4 Professional contextual variables
The professional contextual variables comprise the more professional “boundary-
setting forces” (Jenkins et al. 2008) such as the code of professional conduct and
ethics; auditing standards and compliance; education, knowledge, experience, and
(problem-solving) ability (e.g., Bonner and Lewis 1990; Libby and Frederick 1990;
Bédard and Chi 1993; Libby and Tan 1994; Tan and Kao 1999)139; and public
accountability and supervision (e.g., Lord 1992; Kennedy 1993; Libby and Luft
1993)140. It also entails factors such as professional autonomy and commitment (e.g.,
Aranya and Ferris 1983; Barley and Kunda 2004: 26; Smith and Hall 2008) 141;
136 In the contingency approach the researcher attempts to find variables that would explain variation
among countries, which are considered ‘culture-free’ and neglecting the human agency (Saudagaran and
Diga 1999).
137 The relationship between these forces and a country’s culture, socialization, institutions and enacted
behaviors, are so intertwined that they cannot be easily isolated. Important to note is that the cross-
national differences in these occupational, organizational and interactional variables of the conceptual
framework can thus also be confounding factors interfering in a causal or contextual relationship between
cross-national cultural differences and auditors’ professional behavior.
138 In cross-cultural research a general distinction is made between etic (universal) and emic (cultural-
specific). Emics are ideas, behaviors, items and concepts that are culture specific. Etics are ideas,
behaviors, items, and concepts that are culture general, i.e., universal (Triandis 1994; Smith and Bond
1998). Etics would be the basis human traits and spirits such as envy, greed, fear, aggression, emotions, et
cetera.
139 For example, Brown and Johnstone (2004) observe that more experienced auditors are more skeptical
in their approach to negotiation (e.g., offering fewer bids and fewer monetary concessions), and that this
approach pays off by giving higher satisfaction with negotiation outcome. Moreover, they observe that
less experienced auditors are more likely to concede when facing a high-risk engagement (who
presumably will be more persuasive). Kaplan et al. (2008) have shown that audit seniors with more
experience are less inclined to go along with (favorable) management’s assessments and conclude that “as
auditors gain experience, they also gain persuasive knowledge, which allows them to deflect
management’s persuasion attempts”.
140 Accountability is defined as “the existence of social pressure to justify one’s judgments to significant
others” (Tetlock 1983: 285) and has been found to translate into better audit performance and to
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job complexity and ambiguity (e.g., Pincus 1990; Bonner 1994; Abdolmohammadi
1999; Zimbelman and Waller 1999); and profession-related job stress.
Behavioral drivers in the context of the profession that are considered specifically
relevant and pervasive for the auditing context in relation to the subjective
interpretation and application of the standards are:
 The effect of auditing standards on behavior (rules versus principles-based); and
 Recent aggravators increasing professional workplace stress and consequently,
deviant behavior.
These two drivers are discussed in more detail below.
2.5.4.1 Auditing standards (rules versus principles-based)
The IFAC sets, among others, international auditing and assurance standards and a
code of ethics for professional accountants. These standards are so-called “principles-
based”, which means that the nature of the international standards is such that it
required auditors to exercise professional judgment in applying them. This is recently
emphasized by the IFAC itself, which recently called to embrace issues in spirit rather
than in letter (IFAC 29 March 2009), setting the already principles-based standards
open for multiple interpretation.
Nevertheless, an increased compliance and rules-based wind has been blowing in
recent years. For example, Moore et al. point to the increased focus in auditing on
compliance to the rules, rather than adhering to the underlying principle as an example
of the widespread “shift in corporate ethics, from a focus on what is morally right to a
focus on what is technically legal” (Moore et al. 2006: 13). Others have argued that
this over-emphasis on compliance leads to “ticking the box” behavior and an
intellectual drain of the profession (Jelinek and Jelinek 2008).142 Ticking the box
improve judgment consistency and agreement within the audit team (“consensus”) (e.g., Kennedy 1993:
231; Almer et al. 2005: 7). Lord (1992), for example, showed that auditors who were personally
accountable for their decisions (opposed to those accountants ”protected” by anonymity in an
experimental setting) were less likely to issue a ”clean” opinion.
141 Despite the recent significant changes in the profession and organizational context of auditing,
Suddaby et al. (2009: 409) find that “a majority of accounting professionals remain committed to their
profession”. Yet, they have noted the strongest deviation between professional and organizational
commitment especially “in the elite core of the profession”, in the Big 4 audit firms. Smith and Hall
(2008: 75) argue that “public accountants may shift the focus of their commitment from an unstable work
organization to the relative stability of their profession”. Professional commitment “has been linked to
important outcomes such as improved work performance, reduced turnover intentions, and greater
satisfaction at both the organizational and professional level” (Hall et al. 2005: 89). Higher professional
commitment furthermore has been related to moral development (e.g., King 2002), ethical attitudes, such
as rule observance attitudes (e.g., Shaub et al. 1993) and more appropriate decision-making (e.g., Jeffrey
and Weatherholt 1996).
142 Kosmala and Herrbach (2006), for example, argue that compliance pressure transforms professionals
into “ compliant” employees, who may not be inclined to challenge issues.
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compliance behavior has also been associated to the recent audit failures, which would
call for a back-to-basics revision of the audit approach.143
The rules versus principles distinction is also reflected in the standard audit
approached that firms have implemented. These are based on the audit firms’
interpretation of the international auditing standards.144 Their methodologies are
designed to assure compliance with the standards on the one hand, and to increase the
efficiency of the audit process on the other.145 Two distinct forms of audit firms
are recognized based on their audit methodologies: structured and unstructured firms
(e.g., Cushing and Loebbecke 1986; Wallage 1991; Bowrin 1998; Hyatt and Prawitt
2001). Structured firms are characterized by their more formalized organizational
structure as well as by the structure of their audit methodology (e.g., Wallage 1991).
The more structured firms tend to employ more prescribed audit methodologies
focused on the consistency of the audit process (compared to less structured firms
that are relatively more focused on the outcome and audit judgment). Kinney (1986)
found that structured firms preferred more structured standards from the standards
setters (i.e., “rules-based”).146
Interesting in this respect is that Schroeder et al. (1989, quoted in Sorensen 1990)
found that professional and organizational commitment (e.g., the soul and culture of
the firm) is higher with audit partners and managers from unstructured firms, and
lower with structured firms. “As an interpretation of these findings, [managers and
partners] who are given greater autonomy [an important virtue to auditors personally]
143 Reinstein and McMillan (2004) showed that if auditors “had ethically applied [the auditing standards
on fraud] the Enron debacle would likely never have happened”. They conclude to argue that “the Enron
debacle suggests that the profession should adopt more of a “back to basics” approach to auditing”,
meaning away from the overemphasis on the business risk audit model and more of substantive approach
to testing. Indeed, Knechel (the designer of the business risk audit model) suggests (Knechel 2007) that
“the aftermath of Enron (…) may provide a viable foundation for reconsidering business risk auditing”.
144 Audit technology is defined by Libby and Luft (1993) to include the whole apparatus of guidance and
support that is made available to auditors with the purpose of aiding and controlling their judgment.
Although audit approaches differ from firm to firm (e.g., Blokdijk et al. 2006: 27), research on audit
approaches has been done through two perspectives: that of structured versus unstructured approaches,
and that of the technological perspective (e.g., electronic filing and other decision aids).
145 Power (2003), however, argues that formalized and prescribed audit approaches function often more
to legitimize individual and organizational behavior than to support efficient and rational decision-
making, borrowing from Humphrey and Moizer 1990, who observed that “official guidance plays little
role in everyday audit work, but rather it legitimizes work in the event of disputes with clients”. Power
furthermore argues that the audit has been split into two (or even three) audits: “one dealing with
documentation and form filling (compliance with the traditional structured approach) and the other more
risk-oriented, operated by higher level partners”. A third form Power sees is “consulting being designed
into the audit process itself” as can be seen in the audit planning process, which process is “a myth. (…)
The boundaries between ”audit planning” and ”knowledge acquisition” as a basis for cross-selling other
assurance and risk management advisory services is no longer a clear one” (2003: 384). Power concludes
that “the audit process is permeated by hunch and intuition, despite projects to introduce more formal
structure” (2003: 389).
146 Dowling and Leech (2007) have also reported down-sides (“costs”) of applying electronic audit
systems, such as a potential over-reliance on recommendations made by the system, mechanistic behavior
(i.e., emphasis on ‘‘ticking the box’’ over judgment) and limitations on use due to perceived complexity.
These features can result in auditors not adopting a decision aid or misusing it.
Chapter 2 – Auditors’ Professional Behavior – A Conceptual Framework
59
are apparently more committed to the profession and to the firm providing a greater
professional expression” (Sorensen 1990: 331). In other words, the more rules audit
firms set and the less aligned the corporate values are with personal values, the less
committed auditors are to take responsibility and ownership. This results, among
other things, in auditors finding “mazes” to rationalize the socially “unacceptable”
behavior “acceptable” irrespective of the (increased number of) rules.
2.5.4.2 Profession-related workplace stress
Jelinek and Jelinek sketch how the current developments in the audit profession lead
to increases in an auditor’s workload and, consequently, increases in workplace stress
(2008: 224):
Public accounting has its share of highly stressed workers; it is among the most
stressful professions (…). This is largely because a single Big 4 auditor serves a
portfolio of clients, each of whom demand sage, expert advice and attention, and
who want reports filed faster than the previous year and at a lower cost. In
response, audit firms increasingly lean on their auditors to get more done in less
time. For audit professionals, this means increased travel, unwanted overtime, and
an overloaded schedule that demands they bounce from client to client. It also
means that the busy season swallows up more and more of the calendar every year,
which, in effect, cuts into personal time and increases the burden felt by the
auditors’ families, which in turn ratchets up feelings of guilt and perpetuates even
higher levels of stress.
The most significant part of their argument is that “while accountants at large firms
have been facing stress for years147” Jelinek and Jelinek point to a number of societal
and professional developments that are making the auditor’s job even more stressful.
These “aggravators”, that would increase deviant workplace behavior, are (based on
Jelinek and Jelinek 2008: 224-225):
 The Sarbanes-Oxley effect, creating additional workloads, specifically in relation
to the requirement under Section 404 for an audit opinion on the client’s internal
controls, next to the opinion on the financial statements148;
 The market effect, due to a shortage of and increased demand for talent. Some
firms are beginning to acknowledge that market conditions may be spiraling out
of control;
147 They even go so far as to refer to studies that show that auditors in the US suffer more headaches
than any other professional and that in the UK the suicide rate among accountants is 10% higher than
average. Nevertheless, Jelinek and Jelinek have a point in noting ”workplace stress” as a factor impacting
auditors’ behavior significantly – in this case they refer specifically to ”deviant workplace behavior’,
among which ”cutting corners” (e.g. premature sign-off) and under-reporting of time.
148 Jelinek and Jelinek (2008) report about 72% of US accountants responding that their jobs were
becoming more stressful, leading 25% of respondents to report that they regretted their decision to enter
the accounting profession.
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 The public enemy effect, due to the “public distrust”, carried over from past
accounting scandals.149
A fourth, more recent additional “aggravator” that I would add, can be found in the
“credit crunch” and the economic downturn of 2008-2009. On the one hand, these
lead to pressure on audit fees and a drop in those additional consulting services that
are still allowed and, hence, pressure on revenues and profitability. Anecdotal evidence
already shows that audits again are “bought” as an investment in a strategy of selling
additional audit or consulting services in future; hence, effectively this is a return to
the 1990s.150 On the other hand, clients need more attention with the issues and
challenges confronting them such as finance restructuring, cost reduction programs,
reorganizations, impairment charges, and disposals.
A fifth “aggravator” can be seen in the increased importance of “interpersonal
skills” and “emotional intelligence” which auditors are expected to develop (as
referred to earlier in this chapter). For auditors, generally being inherently “data-
oriented” (Istvan 1973), this may already be a stretch in itself. At the same time Barret
et al. (2005) refer to this as well, “managing evidence and documentation is
increasingly important” in these “compliance ages” (indicating indeed a need for data
orientation). Hence, the two (to many opposite) behavioral traits are vying for
attention and are, hence, leading to additional workplace stress.
2.5.5 Organizational contextual variables
Under the heading “organizational cultural factors” I cover those behavioral drivers
that originate from or are connected to the auditor as part of the audit firm he or she
works in. These factors comprise organizational image (e.g., Francis 2004: 345; Pierce
and Sweeney 2005: 363)151 and acculturation152; the employment relationship between
149 Following the debacles, such as Enron-Anderson, precipitous drops in the public’s perception of the
entire profession were reported, leading to “widespread soul-searching among many auditors (…) fueled
by what social psychologists call ”cognitive dissonance”, or a feeling of discomfort resulting from
performing an action that runs counter to one’s customary conception of “oneself” (Jelinek and Jelinek
2008: 228).
150 Even in these times of auditor independence, or maybe just because of these economically tough
times, a revival of the ”commercial” auditor can be noticed. For example, in February 2010 Deloitte
openly confessed to count on a constructive and valuable relationship as advisor after their loss of the
financial audit of ABN Amro Bank to KPMG (and related fees of €32.5 million). Although
understandable, the important point is that at that time Deloitte was still working on the finalization of
the financial audit of ABN Amro Bank for 2009 (based on Van Wijnen 12 Februari 2010).
151 Image management is important for audit firms (Power 2003) and “plays a key role in clan control by
projecting a positive and carefully managed public image of the partnership both externally to the public
and clients and internally to audit staff” (Pierce and Sweeney 2005: 363). Pierce and Sweeney even
conclude that partners ignore the existence of, for example, dysfunctional behavior in order not to
contaminate the good image or firm culture (2005: 363): “The absence of open discussion and explicit
recognition of the risk of ”quality threatening behaviors’ appears to form part of internal and external
image management”.
152 Successful acculturation of employees influences an organization’s and an auditor’s performance
(Jenkins et al. 2008: 48) and retention with the firm. Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) found that employees
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the auditor and the audit firm and “personnel concepts” (e.g., Ferris 1981; Alvesson
2004; Almer et al. 2005; Smith and Hall 2008), including professional-organizational
conflict (e.g., Bamber and Iyer 2002)153; management controls within a professional
service firm; teamwork or “between-auditor interactions” (e.g., Almer et al. 2005;
Pierce and Sweeney 2005: 364); a firm’s audit approach and technological
development (e.g., Libby and Luft 1993; Bédard et al. 2006; Blokdijk et al. 2006;
Dowling and Leech 2007; Bédard et al. 2008a; Dowling 2009); and the size and nature
of the audit firm and business practice (e.g., Greenwood et al. 1990; Pratt and
Beaulieu 1992; Reynolds and Francis 2000).
Behavioral drivers in the context of the organization that are considered
specifically relevant and pervasive for the auditing context in relation to the subjective
interpretation and application of the standards are:
 Audit firm’s management controls and socialization
 The business of auditing and the cost-quality dilemma.
These two drivers are discussed in more detail below.
2.5.5.1 Audit firm’s management controls and socialization
“Partnerships differ from most other business firms because their form of ownership
and governance is distinctive. (…). In a partnership, by contrast [to typical business
firms where shareholders are usually outside the organization], ownership,
management, and operations are fused” (Greenwood et al. 1990: 729-730).154
Consequently, as seen in § 2.4.8.2 management of a professional partnership generally
comes down to a number of “socialization themes”, such as clan controls, reinforcing
common beliefs and values, and working with a strong client orientation.
who fit well with a firm’s culture likely remain with the firm longer. Benke and Rhode (1984) support this
by having shown that those who are of a poor fit either leave voluntarily or are not promoted by the firm.
153 Bamber and Iyer (2002), in their study of Big 4 public accountants, found job autonomy to increase
both auditors’ professional and organizational identification and commitment, and to reduce
organizational-professional conflict. This suggests that “job autonomy amplifies the professional attitude
of an auditor, thus, decreasing undesirable behavior and the need to monitor” (Jenkins et al. 2008: 50).
154 Greenwood et al. (1990: 730) paint a fairly clear picture of the traditional management structure of the
partnership form of an international accounting organization: The structure's dominant feature is that the
[inter]national office of a firm, the formal equivalent of a corporate headquarters, is controlled through a
form of representative democracy. At the strategic apex is a partnership body, which generally meets at
least twice a year and which elects an executive policy committee. The executive policy committee, drawn
from the ranks of the partnership, is typically constituted to represent major functional areas, such as
audit and taxation, and major geographical areas. Other committees, called national committees, are
similarly constituted and are concerned with both major functional areas and managerial functions such
as professional development, professional standards, and marketing. The important point is that the
structural vehicles of the national office are committees comprising partners drawn from the field, not, as
in other business, individuals. These committees, moreover, are ultimately accountable to the full body of
a partnership: individual partners thus figure at both the base and the apex of these organizations. The
main positions in a Big 4 audit firm in descending order of rank are generally partner, (senior) manager,
supervisor, senior accountant and junior or staff accountant. Partners assume the final responsibility for
all work performed and share most directly in the financial profits or losses.
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Firms employ such corporate socialization measures to manage the quality of
professional services provided by employees, and to ensure compliance with firm-
wide policies, initiatives, and goals (Covaleski et al. 1998).155 Fogarty (1992: 130) refers
to this as the socialization process in which individuals are molded by the organization
to which they seek membership (‘role acquisition’).156 Some state that socialization is
increasingly difficult in today’s assurance firms.157 Lord and DeZoort (2001)
distinguish two forms of social influence pressure:
 Obedience pressure or “tone at the top” (from commands made by superiors): “Tone
at the top”, throughout the ranks, is important because young professionals
frequently model behaviors of more senior personnel in an attempt to ensure
success (Jenkins et al. 2008: 53); and
 Conformity pressure or “peer pressure” (from examples set by peers): Being a
member of an “elite” company may fuel social identity, image and self-esteem.
But peer-pressure can also be a destabilizing force in professional behavior under
“stiff internal competition” (Alvesson 2004: 197), where it may lead to intensive
identity work and very active “symbolic labor” or tactical behavior.
Socialization, furthermore, has a pervasive influence over time and at different levels
in an organization. Chow et al. (2002) and Hood and Koberg (1991) reported evidence
of culture differences across rank.158
Other important management controls are formal counseling sessions and
performance appraisals (e.g., Covaleski et al. 1998).Tan and Jamal (2006) point to
reputation management in auditing context where preparers of work papers engage in
strategic behavior as stylizing work papers and perception management to favor the
outcome of the performance appraisal process. This can be an issue as partners and
managers are shown not to be very well able to assess their subordinates’ abilities (e.g.,
Kennedy and Peecher 1997; Messier Jr. et al. 2008). The performance appraisal
process was traditionally considered to provide incentives for the preparer to manage
his/her reputation in the eyes of the reviewer.
155 Suddaby et al. (2009: 411) paint a less positive picture of the socialization objective, by stating that
“individual professionals are subject to a series of socialization practices” or “disciplinary techniques”
designed to align professional and organizational goals and which constrain professional judgment – in a
variety of more or less subtle ways.
156 He identified three categories of acculturation techniques: coercive (i.e., economic, structural, and
legitimization); mimetic (i.e., role modeling and mentoring), and; normative (i.e., professionalization).
157 Sweeney and Pierce (2004: 805) put out a warning on the effectiveness of socialization controls:
“Informal controls such as social controls are increasingly difficult to implement in the current audit
environment due to the high level of staff turnover, lack of job continuity and the recruitment of
qualified seniors who have trained in other firms and have thus missed at least some of the socialization
that occurs during the training contract”. For example, Covaleski et al. (1998) and Viator (2001) find that
informal mentoring is common and largely effective, but that formal mentoring programs are largely
ineffective and of short duration.
158 Hood and Koberg (1991: 18), for example, showed that “partners [within the then Big 8] perceived
the culture of their organization as significantly more innovative and supportive” compared to
bureaucratic, and compared to the audit staff employees too.
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More recently, it has been acknowledged that the “up-or-out” system that triggered
this process seems to be replaced with an “out-or-up” principle, which poses new
challenges. A common concept within auditing is the “up-or-out” principle: “If an
individual is not promoted within the usual “window”, she or he is counseled to leave
the firm. (…) While a significant proportion of the individuals who remain with the
firm for five years make it to the managerial ranks, it is much more difficult to make it
through the final “screen to partnership” (McNair 1991: 639). However, given the
changing environment, Sweeney and Pierce (2004), find that traditional “up-or-out”
strategy to have been replaced by an “out-or-up” policy, “with promotion occurring
automatically for many of the auditors who remain in the firm”. Audit firms appear to
have less choice regarding who gets promoted and, given the need to retain staff, the
formal evaluation system is perceived by seniors as being less relevant in promotion
decision than previously”. They point to the risk of “qualitative overload pressure” on
audit staff as the result thereof, due to the “increased levels of responsibility assigned
to audit juniors and seniors (…) that can result from individuals being promoted too
quickly”.
2.5.5.2 The business of audit: a cost-quality dilemma
Audit firms face an “inherent governance dilemma”; the constant conflict between the
business of auditing159 and the profession of auditing, or the “cost-quality dilemma”
(McNair 1991). This conflict, in combination with the fact that audit quality, which is
largely unobservable to the public, is difficult even for auditors themselves to measure
(Power 1993) and poses a pressure for auditors to sacrifice audit quality in favor of
reducing audit costs (McNair 1991: 637). And aggressive audit fee competition makes
it difficult to charge these additional costs to their clients (Sweeney and Pierce 2004).
The more traditional management or business controls in audit firms focus on
chargeable hours (or market-financial targets) and tight (production) cost controls
(such as time budget)160. Nowadays, such controls have become increasingly
important.161
159 The “business of auditing” refers to the auditor’s ability to maximize the profitability of an individual
audit or account (McNair 1991).
160 A significant aspect of audit firm’s management controls is to exercise tight cost control without
compromising quality standards (McNair 1991). Given that audit firms are labor intensive and audit
quality is difficult to measure, formal cost control is exercised by using time budgets (Sweeney and Pierce
2006). Time budget achievement has been found to be one of the primary criteria for performance
evaluation (Kelley and Seiler 1982). Two forms of time pressure are distinguished (Sweeney and Pierce
2004: 789): deadline pressure (pressure to have the work completed by a certain date) and budget
pressure (pressure to control the number of hours charged to a job). Deadline pressure has been found to
be more pervasive in its influence on auditors’ behavior.
161 Financial targets were not overly dominant a couple of decades ago, on the then still much appreciated
notion that “partnership implies a career commitment, which is inconsistent with financial myopia and
tight accountability” (Greenwood et al. 1990: 736). Suddaby et al. (2009: 414) add that professional audit
firms historically were generally “less demanding in terms of financial accountability (…) and have more
strongly reinforced traditional professional norms and values than do corporate forms of
organization”.161 Tolerant accountability would have characterized professional partnerships because they
were concerned with long-term measures of performance that are not strictly financial. Nowadays,
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“Given the competitive nature of public accounting (…) auditors are inclined to
be aggressive in the domain of practice development” (Cohen and Trompeter
1998).162 This is mainly evident in the cross-selling behavior of auditors. Wyatt has
illustrated the increased pressure on fees, sales and income during the 1980s telling
(2004: 48):
The relative success of the consultants created enormous pressure on the auditing
and tax practice, both to grow revenues and increase margins. The successes in the
consulting practice increasingly influenced behavior by auditing and tax leaders,
and the impact of these behavioral changes gradually affected the behavior patterns
of audit and tax personnel as well. (…) Auditing was acknowledged by the 1980s to
be a commodity service, even by many in the profession and, therefore, became
subject to extreme fee pressure. (…) Top leadership within the firms gradually
moved from those with outstanding technical accounting and auditing skills to
those who were recognized as the preeminent ‘rainmakers’ within the organization.
(…) There were no dramatic turning points, no particular events that one can point
to and say, ‘This was the start of the downfall’.
While analyzing the culture change in accounting firms in the 1980s and 1990s, Wyatt
concludes (2004: 50), “Cross-selling a range of consulting services to audit clients
became one of the important criteria in the evaluation of audit partners. (…) Keeping
the client happy and doing what was necessary to retain the client achieved a
prominence”. Its impact on an auditor’s decision-making process is evidenced in
several studies (e.g., Farmer et al. 1987; Falk et al. 1999; Nelson and Tan 2005)163. As
Jenkins et al. state (2008: 46): “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the demise of
Arthur Andersen LLP serve as reminders of the consequences of fostering a culture
that values revenue generation over quality service”.
With the sale of the consulting business by most of the Big 4 accounting firms
and the ban on consulting services threatening audit firms’ independence triggered
around the 2002 enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, for a number of years the
further centralization of management controls has led to an emphasis on financial numbers rather than
on professional values and quality. “The firms wish partners to become identifiable as a ‘realization rate’
or a ’revenue stream’ so that the partner could be compared with peers, ranked, and thus pressured to
comply with the norm” (1998: 310).
162 Cohen and Trompeter (1998) have examined how audit managers’ judgments may be affected by the
business of auditing and related practice development objectives. They find that the type of client
(whether it is an existing client or a potential client to be gained) and the aggressiveness of the partner
with respect to business development significantly (negatively) impacted the audit managers’ appropriate
judgments on accounting treatments. They conclude that accountability is, therefore, important in the
professional audit environment.
163 Farmer et al. (1987) have found that auditors are more likely to require their client to change their
accounting treatment when the risk of client loss is low. Falk et al. 1999 show that auditors’ conclusions
about whether a qualified opinion was necessary were negatively correlated to the adverse consequences
of issuing a qualified report (such as financial loss and loss of a client). And other studies have highlighted
that “the balance of auditors” incentives for client retention versus audit quality affects not only their
correction decisions given that a misstatement is detected, but also the audit planning decisions that
determine whether a mis-statement is detected in the first place” (Nelson and Tan 2005).
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audit firms took a step back towards what some would call the “right” professional
direction (away from consulting services). However, with Sarbanes-Oxley becoming
somewhat lenient and the pressure on fees for a commodity service continuing (or
increasing with the credit crunch), the “cycle” is on his way “up” again. The recent
upswing of “low-balling” practices internationally, is illustrative for the audit business
environment hardening up, which will lead to increased pressure on fees and income
and a push on firms to provide additional services. Or as Wyatt puts it sharply (2004:
51):
The firms (…) continue to expand the range of services offered within their
auditing and tax divisions, compensating in part for the previous services that have
had to be discontinued under the provisions of recent legislation. (…) However,
the underlying causes of the decline in accounting professionalism remain in place.
With that Wyatt points to the behavioral change that needs to be realized, initially
through the “tone at the top”. Suddaby et al. underlines this need by arguing that the
organizational context and content of auditors’ professional work, as it has developed
since the 1980s, is a possible explanation for the “erosion of professional values” (2009:
409). Sikka in response puts it even stronger by saying (2009a: 428-429): “Most
accountants work in bureaucratic settings driven by commercial rather than
professional logic. In pursuit of efficiency, standardization, predictability and market
domination, the work of accountants is subjected to controls and could be said to be
proletarianized”.
2.5.6 External interaction and environment
The behavioral drivers covered under the external interaction and environment are
related to the interaction of the auditor with other actors and the environment external
to the auditor, the audit firm, and the profession. The first and foremost external actor
shaping auditors’ behavior is the client, including the audit committee (e.g., DeZoort
et al. 2003b, 2003a, 2008). The interaction with the client brings about the trust and
attachment dilemma164 and information and power asymmetry165, or client capture
164 On the one hand auditors make considered investments in their client to be their trusted advisor (e.g.,
Fichman and Levinthal 1991). On the other hand those same relationships are important sources of
information and audit evidence. With management as a pervasive source of information, this poses a
“trust dilemma” (Kaplan et al. 2008). Kaplan et al. (2008) and showed that more experienced auditors are
better able to deal with the persuasiveness of their clients and conclude that experience adds to an
auditor’s persuasive knowledge, which allows them to stand up to management’s persuasion attempts (also
see Anderson et al. 2004).
165 On the one hand “the power asymmetry favors the professional owing to its knowledge and/or status
in a specific area (knowledge-based position of superiority to the client)” (Alvesson 2004: 26). On the
other hand “as the client is paying, there is frequently a financial asymmetry favoring the client and
placing the [professional] in a subordinated position. (…) Paying high fees makes them feel entitled to
demand efforts and sacrifice that they would not ask of their own personnel” (Alvesson 2004: 104).
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(Suddaby et al. 2007).166 Other “external actors” shaping auditors behavior are the
interactions with society at large (e.g., public trust and reputation); the litigiousness of
the business environment; and the competition among audit firms and the related fee
pressures (see § 2.5.5.2). The interaction with society at large includes the socio-
economic factors in the external environment of the auditor, such as the credit crunch
or corporate failures.167
Behavioral drivers of the interaction interface that are considered specifically
relevant and pervasive for the auditing context in relation to the subjective
interpretation and application of the standards are:
 Public trust and reputation
 Litigiousness of the audit environment.
These two drivers are discussed in more detail below.
2.5.6.1 Public trust and reputation
The interaction with “society at large” comes into play through the fundamental
principles underlying the audit profession (e.g., the agency theory and the auditor’s
responsibility towards a variety of third parties in general. As such it mainly impacts
auditors’ behavior in an indirect way. In particular, an audit firm’s reputation, and
more generally the “public trust”168 in the profession as a whole, is affected by the
perception society at large has of the audit profession and the audit quality they are
perceived to provide, as seen in the last decade.169 The importance of public trust and
reputation is well illustrated in the Arthur Andersen case. “The day Arthur Andersen
loses the public’s trust is the day we are out of business” said Steve Samek, Country
Managing Partner USA for Arthur Andersen in 1999 (quoted by Pflugrath et al. 2007).
This prediction turned out to be true with the Enron collapse.
It is in these crises and failures that the interaction with “society at large” has the
most significant or direct impact on the auditors. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley and
166 The salience of the information asymmetry in auditing is that auditors in essence have no incentive to
close the “expectation gap” by being more transparent about what they do and how they do it. Sunder
(2002) notes, for example, that “interactions between the auditor and important stakeholders are likely to
be strategic in nature – each party has a particular set of interests”.
167 Other environmental and socio-economic factors that may have an impact in the audit profession are,
for example, the legislative environment, economic status, maturity of the profession, and labor market
effects.
168 Trust as such is an essential, yet sensitive issue. “The market is a very imperfect evaluator and clients
have mixed feelings about the [professionals] they are getting services and products from. More broadly,
there is often considerable distrust, skepticism, or at least the absence of full confirmation of the
professional’s claim to having a superior and effectively problem-solving knowledge base. (…) We find
two common opinions about consultancy work: it is not ”real” and it is overpaid” (Alvesson 2004: 198).
This theme is closely related to what I call in this study ”perceived” quality or performance. Jelinek and
Jelinek (2008) refer to ”public disgust” as the result of the financial debacles at the start of this century.
169 “Recent high-profile corporate collapses, such as Enron and WorldCom, have brought into question
the status and credibility of the accounting profession, especially auditors, with allegation of accountants’
violations of public trust” (Pflugrath et al. 2007).
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similar legislations in many other countries, with significant impact on the position
and responsibilities of the auditor, were enacted in response to the audit failures
around the Enron-Anderson case and in effect led to the profession’s loss of self-
regulation. The “credit crunch” and the current financial crisis is another example
where increased (or at least changed) societal expectations of the auditing profession
have an impact. As such, these societal “equilibrium changes” result in an ongoing
discussion around the expectation gap, i.e., significant differences between what the
public expects from an audit and what the assurance professional perceives the
objectives to be and how he/she interprets and applies them.
Hence, reputation is one of the most important existential factors for the Big 4
accounting firms. It brings about competitive advantages and barriers for others, “in
that clients will only consider and select from a limited set of firms with a good
reputation” (Alvesson 2004: 73), hence the Big 4 accounting organizations.
Greenwood et al. point to three reputation benefits for audit firms (2005: 663): “the
ability to hire the very best students; lower marketing costs because clients actively
seek high-status firms; and the ability to charge premiums because of their brand
name”. They close to say that these benefits, however, constitute a sensitive vicious
cycle. Weber et al. (2008) supported this “reputation rationale” for audit quality by
illustrating the negative effects on KPMG Germany’s client portfolio after the widely
publicized (and thus reputation damaging) 2002 ComROAD AG accounting scandal
(“97% of the calendar year 2000 revenues were fictitious”).
Professional reputation is closely related to perceived audit quality, where clients
associate reputation to a perceived credible commitment to high quality. For example,
Chaney and Philipich (2002) show that stock markets are sensitive to the reputation of
the auditor of the companies they invest in.170 This perception subsequently leads to a
willingness to pay a premium (“quasi-rents”) (e.g., Weber et al. 2008). This is also
related to the “insurance/liability theory” (Watts and Zimmerman 1983) that
rationalizes that an audit firm’s reputation serves as a bond for audit quality. Because
larger firms tend to be wealthier (i.e. they have “deep pockets”) they have greater
incentive to provide high-quality audits. DeAngelo (1981b: 185) argues that larger,
reputable audit firms have “more to lose” by providing low-quality audit services.171
2.5.6.2 Litigiousness of the audit environment
Prior research “suggests that auditor performance is sensitive to changes in legal
liability” (Carcello 2005: 32). A number of studies show how litigation risk impacts the
behavior of auditors. Farmer et al. (1987) have found that auditors are more likely to
require their client to change their accounting treatment when the risk of litigation is
high. Khurana and Raman (2004), in a cross-sectional study of Big 4 versus non-Big 4
170 “On the three days following Andersen's admission that a significant number of documents had been
shredded (10 January 2002), we find that Andersen's other clients experienced a statistically negative
market reaction, suggesting that investors downgraded the quality of the audits performed by Andersen”
(Chaney and Philipich 2002).
171 Indeed, Reynolds and Francis (2000) found that auditors report more conservatively for larger clients
(i.e., higher monetary risk), “suggesting that reputation protection dominates auditor behavior”.
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firms, suggest that it is litigation exposure rather than protecting the brand name that
drives perceived audit quality.
De Fond and Francis openly question whether the current litigiousness of the
environment is not too “brutal'’ for health reasons (2005: 6):
[I]t is an open question whether we need the kind of extreme litigation exposure
we currently have in the U.S. in order to achieve an appropriate level of audit
quality. We observe that countries such as Canada and Australia appear to have
credible auditing without imposing such a brutally litigious environment.
Pierce and Sweeney (2005: 342) observe how this can turn the scale: “Risk of litigation
now tends to arise more from a failure to ensure audit processes are carried out rather
than a concern with client documents”. Weber et al. (2008) point to a long-lasting
professional discussion related to “capping” auditors maximum liability in litigation,
which, for example, has existed in Germany since 1931. These features would lead to
what is considered a healthier and balanced accountability pressure on auditors.172
2.6 Summary and conclusion
Given the relevance of behavior in general and to the assurance profession in
particular, the research question central in this chapter is:
 What is professional behavior in general and that of auditors in particular, what
drives professional behavior, and how does culture play a role in this context?
Based on the study of definitions and fundamental theories, the definition of
professional behavior used in this study is based on the notion that professional
behavior is:
 driven by one’s human nature and personal needs, motivations, ethics, and
psychological cognitions and limitations;
 guided and controlled by internalized values and beliefs that are shaped by
personalized interpretations of national, professional, and organizational cultures,
conventions, and norms;
 conditioned by the external constraints and situational contingencies from
discretional interactions with external actors and the profession’s immediate
business environment;
 leading to “actions”, being the actual professional behaviors visible to the outside
world, and a certain “end result” or performance.
Auditors’ professional behaviors identified in this study and the basis for the empirical
phases of this study, comprise the following:
172 Weber et al. (2008) still find support for the reputation rationale in Germany.
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 Judgment and decision-making
 Skeptical judgments and decisions
 Knowledge sharing and consultation behavior
 Working in fluid teams (engagement partner involvement)
 Communication and negotiation behavior on observations and findings
 Documentation and justification
 Dysfunctional behaviors
 Audit pricing and practice development
Based on this definition and the behavioral conceptualizations covered in Chapter 2,
these professional behaviors are visualized in the context of its drivers in the following
proposed conceptual framework of drivers of professional behavior (a detailed
overview is included in Appendix 1):
The relative effect of national culture in the context of the professional behavior of
auditors is the focus of this study, as illustrated in § 1.3. National cultural differences










Figure 1 – The effect of national culture in the context of the drivers of professional behavior
National culture
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3. Cross-national Cultural Differences
A cultural orientation describes the attitudes of most people most of the time,
never of all the people all of the time
(Adler 2002: 22)
3.1 Introduction
This chapter covers the studies that define cross-national cultural differences and
shows how these cross-national cultural differences affect professional behavior in
general. In § 3.2, a short exposition on the definition of national culture is provided,
including the general understanding of what is meant by national cultures based on the
studies of Hofstede (1980, 2001), Schwartz (1992, 1999), Trompenaars (1997), and
House et al. (2004). § 3.3 discussed the cultural dimensions defined by House et al.
(2004, Project GLOBE) in more detail. Levels (e.g., values, beliefs, and behaviors),
layers (e.g., individual, organizational, and occupational cultures), and other relevant
cultural phenomena and caveats are covered in § 3.4. A summary and conclusion is
included in § 3.5.
In the context of drivers of professional behavior, the focus of this chapter is on
national cultural differences influencing behavior in general. This can be illustrated as
follows:
How cross-national cultural differences have their impact in the specific context of
auditing and auditors’ professional behavior is covered in Chapter 4.




External / environmental factors
Professional
behaviors
Figure 2 – The focus of Chapter 3: national culture in the context of drivers of professional behavior
National culture
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3.2 What are national cultures?
3.2.1 In search of a definition of (national) culture
When talking about culture, one quickly notices that many different understandings
and definitions derived from different methodological assumptions exist. Culture is
hard to grasp in concepts, let alone to define in precise terms. Although many scholars
in different disciplines have tried to come up with an all-inclusive and universal
definition of what culture actually is, to this day a universally agreed-upon definition
of culture is lacking (e.g., Magala 2005: 6). What then is culture? A number of relevant
definitions include the following:
 Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and
transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of
human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of
culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and
especially their attached values (Kluckhohn 1951: 86).
 Culture is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes members of
one group or category of people from another (Hofstede 2001: 9).
 Culture is a way of life of a group of people, the configuration of all the more or
less stereotyped patterns of learned behavior which are handed down from one
generation to the next through means of language and imitations (Adler 2002: 16).
 Culture is a set of parameters of collectives that differentiate the collectives from
each other in meaningful ways. Culture is variously defined in terms of several
commonly shared processes: shared ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting; shared
meanings of identities; shared socially constructed environments; common ways
in which technologies are used; and commonly experienced events including the
history, language, and religion of their members (House et al. 2004: 15, 57).
Based on such interpretations, generally speaking, culture seems to distinguish one
group from another based on:
 a certain set of values, beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes; which
 is shared, interpreted, and transmitted over time within a collective; and that
 makes the collective unique and distinguishes that collective from other
collectives.
This study focuses on national cultures, more specifically on cross-national cultural
differences. National culture functions as a proxy for societal culture. National culture
comprises values, beliefs, norms, and behavioral patterns of national group (Leung et
al. 2005). The dominant forces that shape national cultures comprise, amongst others,
ecological factors, history, language, wars, and religions.173 These dominant forces are
173 For example, “an important reason why Japan is a collectivist country is that its environment has been
harsh and unsupportive for the survival of its population. It takes a minimum of 20 people to successfully
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reflected in a country’s culture, which in turn is intertwined with many phenomena
within that country: law, educational systems, political structures, communication
traits, emotional expressions, technological development, etc.
National borders do not naturally demarcate borders of societal cultures.
Cultures run over national borders (e.g., Schwartz 1999: 25) and differ within national
borders as well (e.g., House et al. 2004: 22). Furthermore, cultural dimensions
inherently are thus generalizations of a whole population with a risk of “stereotyping”.174
Cultural dimensions are inherently oversimplifications of reality.175 Other caveats, such
as levels and layers of culture, are covered in § 3.4.
As shown in studies by Hofstede, Schwartz, Trompenaars, and House et al.,
analyzing societal cultures according to national borders is a concept that proved to
work within the field of management science. These studies have been preceded by
and to a large extent based on Parsons and Shills’ (1951)176 “General Theory of
Action” and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s value orientation (1961).177
cultivate, grow and harvest a rice paddy” (Javidan and House 2001). Religion or doctrines as
Protestantism or Calvinism may well have lead to the achievement and performance-oriented nature in
the Germanic countries; and language borders seldom demarcate cultural borders within countries (e.g.
Switzerland, Canada, or Belgium). In countries that have been colonized in the past, one can still
recognize cultural similarities with the colonizer (e.g. the legal system in the Philippines has an Anglo-
Saxon influence).
174 The following quote of Triandis is illustrative (1994: 19): “When you think of culture, try to avoid
thinking of nationality, religion, race, or occupation as the only criterion that defines culture. The use of a
single criterion is likely to lead to confusion, as would happen if you put all people who eat pizza
frequently in one cultural category! Culture is a complex whole, and it is best to use many criteria to
discriminate one culture from another. Most modern states consist of many cultures; most corporations
have unique cultures; most occupations have some aspects of distinct cultures”.
175 “[Dimensions] do not “exist” in a tangible sense. They are constructs, not directly accessible to
observation but inferable from verbal statements and other behaviors (…). If they exist, it is in our minds
– we have defined them into existence” (Hofstede 1996: 894). House et al. (2004: 235): “[T]he reader still
needs to take caution in generalizing our findings at the society level. Societal cultures are too complex to
be measured in their entirety in any single study.”
176 Parsons and Shils have described a first set of what they call pattern variables within cultural systems.
In their theory, cultural systems are considered one of the three levels of the “systems of orientation” that
guide people’s actions and behaviors. They describe cultural systems as the organization of the values,
norms, and symbols which guide the choices made by actors and which limit the types of interaction
which may occur among actors. These choices are guided by preferred choice alternatives or
programming – a pattern of the five choice-alternatives (Parsons and Shils 1951: 80 ff): Affectivity –
Affective neutrality; Self-orientation – Collectivity-orientation; Universalism – Particularism; Ascription – Achievement;
and Specificity – Diffuseness.
177 Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) defined a set of ”value orientations” as conceptions of what is
considered desirable that distinguishes cultural orientations of societies. People from different cultures
have to and/or prefer to rank-order the values in different ways of importance (”continuum”). In their
exposition of a theory of variations in value orientations, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck argued that cultures
differ on five “value orientations” (1961: 11 ff): Human nature orientation; Man-nature orientation; Time
orientation; Activity orientation; and Relational orientation.
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3.2.2 Hofstede’s dimensions of cultural variability (1980, 2001)
Hofstede’s study of the cultural dimensions, conducted in the 1970s and first
published in 1980, was the first study mapping over 50 countries on a limited number
of cultural dimensions.178 Over the last 30 years, it has been “the best known cross-
cultural study” (House et al. 2004: 239) and used by many scholars as a starting point
for cross-cultural management studies.179 It has been replicated on at least a number
of dimensions in over 100 studies (Hofstede 2001: 463-466). Until the GLOBE study
(House et al. 2004), it has been the most comprehensive comparative nation-level
study in terms of both range of countries and the number of respondents involved.
“The robustness of Hofstede’s model, in spite of growing criticism, is being
acknowledged far beyond the academic world” (Magala 2009: 24).180
In summary, the five cultural dimensions of Hofstede are described as follows
(based on Hofstede 1997, 2001):
 Power Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations
and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The basic
problem involved is the degree of human inequality that underlies the functioning
of each particular society.
 Uncertainty Avoidance is the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel
either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured
situations are novel, unknown, surprising, and different from usual. The basic
problem involved is the degree to which a society tries to control the
uncontrollable.
 Individualism versus collectivism is the degree to which individuals are supposed to
look after themselves or remain integrated into groups, usually around the family.
 Masculinity versus its opposite, femininity refers to the distribution of emotional
roles between the genders; it opposes “tough” masculine to “tender” feminine
societies. Male achievement reinforces masculine assertiveness and competition;
female care reinforces feminine nurturance, a concern for relationships and for
living environment.
178 Hofstede collected empirical data on value orientations of approximately 116,000 employees in 72
countries of one large multinational business organization (IBM). Initially four dimensions were
uncovered based on these data (Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism-Collectivism, and
Masculinity-Femininity). Based on a subsequent study, published as the Chinese Culture Connection
(1987), Hofstede added a fifth dimension, Long Term Orientation (initially called Confucian Work
Dynamism.
179 For an overview, refer to Kirkman et al. (2006) who reviewed 180 studies published in 40 business and
psychology journals and two international annual volumes between 1980 and June 2002 to consolidate
what is empirically verifiable about Hofstede’s cultural values framework.
180 “There can be little doubt that the single work that has been most influenced the development of
research into cross-cultural psychology has been the seminal study that was carried out by the Dutch
social psychologist, Geert Hofstede (…) leading in 1980 to the publication of his classic study, Cultures
Consequences (Smith et al. 2006). In 2001, Hofstede issued a second, rewritten version of his study, Cultures
consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations.
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 Long-term versus short-term orientation refers to the extent to which a culture
programs its members to accept delayed gratification of their material, social, and
emotional needs.
Despite the popularity of Hofstede’s “founding” study and its frequent use by
academia, a number of scholars have criticized his work (e.g., McSweeney 2002;
Baskerville 2003, 2005; Javidan et al. 2006a) or were “only” able to partially replicate
Hofstede’s dimensions (e.g., Sondergaard 1994; Hoppe 1998; Merrit 2000). One of the
main limitations of Hofstede’s study is generally considered to be that it was based on
IBM questionnaires that were designed to measure something other than cultural
differences and that subsequently was reinterpreted to reflect cultural dimensions.
This is one of the main reasons for increasing critique on Hofstede’s study over the
last decade and why some researchers may qualify Hofstede’s study as landmark 30
years ago (e.g., McSweeney 2002; Baskerville 2003, 2005; Javidan et al. 2006a), yet
today less plausible and tenable because of the changing pattern of socialization and
increased hybridization of cultural contents due to intensive communications on a
global scale (the internet effect).
3.2.3 Schwartz’s cultural value types (1992, 1999)
Another prominent study is that of Schwartz. In his 1999 study, which built on his
1992 and 1994 theories and studies, Schwartz contributed to a further understanding
of cultural values of countries: “the implicitly and explicitly shared abstract ideas about
what is good, right, and desirable in a society (…). These cultural values are the bases
for the specific norms that tell people what is appropriate in various situations”
(Schwartz 1999: 25). The priorities or choice of these cultural values are considered to
be reflected in “the ways that societal institutions (e.g., the family, education,
economic, political, and religious systems) function, their goals and their modes of
operation” (Schwartz 1999: 25). Values can be drawn upon “to select socially
appropriate behavior and to justify their behavioral choices to others” (Schwartz 1999:
25). Schwartz derived seven types of values, structured along three polar dimensions,
which were validated using Schwartz (1992) value survey of 56 single values (of which
45 values showed equivalence) submitted to 35,000 respondents (teachers and
students) from 49 countries. These seven (individual level) value types are considered
to form three bipolar (societal level) dimensions that express the contradictions
between the alternative resolutions of the following issues (based on Schwartz 1999:
26 ff):
 Conservatism (or Embeddedness) versus (Intellectual and Affective) Autonomy, which is
based on the issue of the nature of the relationship between the individual and the
group. This value type addresses two questions: Whose interests should take
precedence, the individual’s or the group’s? And, to what extent are persons
autonomous versus embedded in their group?
 Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism (power difference versus societal basis), which deals
with the issue of how to guarantee responsible behavior that will preserve the
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social fabric. To manage the unavoidable social interdependencies some sort of
hierarchy is considered necessary.
 Mastery versus Harmony addresses the issue of humankind to the natural and social
world. Do people in the society generally tend to believe they can actively master
and change the world and get ahead through active self-assertion and ambition?
Or do people generally accept the world as it is, and rather try to fit in
harmoniously rather than to change or exploit it?
Schwartz has put these value types into a structure where certain poles contradict the
others (e.g. conservatism and autonomy), whereas other poles of different issues are
complementary (e.g. hierarchy and mastery, which value types are found to exist
simultaneously in cultures). Schwartz’ study and cultural scales are “clearly assessing
cultural values” (House et al. 2004: 141) rather than practices or behaviors, although
Schwartz hypothesized the impact of his cultural values on dimensions of work
(Schwartz 1999: 40).
3.2.4 Trompenaars’ cultural diversity in business (1997)
In their book “Riding the waves of culture” (1997) Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner focused on explaining cultural diversity in business. When looking at
Trompenaars’ seven cultural dimensions, one will recognize them to be based on
Parsons and Shils’ five dimensions of cultural systems (1951) and two of the value
orientations of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). These dimensions are (based on
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1997):
 Universalism versus Particularism: rules versus relationships. Whereas in universalistic
cultures people generally adhere to the standards which are universally agreed, in
particularistic cultures people encounter particular obligations to people they
know.
 Individualism versus Communitarianism: the individual versus the group. Do we relate
to others by discovering what each one of us individually wants and then trying to
negotiate the differences, or do we place ahead of this some shared concepts of
the public and collective good?;
 Neutral versus Affective: the range of feelings expressed. Members of cultures which
are affectively neutral do not telegraph their feelings but keep them carefully
controlled and subdued. In contrast, in cultures high on affectivity people show
their feelings plainly by laughing, smiling, grimacing, scowling and gesturing; they
attempt to find immediate outlets for their feelings;
 Specific versus Diffuse: the range of involvement. Do we engage with others in
specific areas of life and single levels of personality only, or in multiple areas of
our lives and at several areas of personality at the same time (diffuse). In diffuse
cultures, the concept of “saving face” is related to the belief that something made
public is always personal too.
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 Achievement versus Ascription: how status is accorded. While some societies accord
status to people on the basis of their achievements, others ascribe it to them by
virtue of age, class, gender, education, and so on (ascription).
 Sequential versus Synchronic: How we think about time (past, present and future) is
related to whether our view of time is sequential, as series of passing events which
happen one after the other, or whether it is synchronic, with past, present, and
future all interrelated and with several events happening at the same time.
 Internal versus External Control: Societies either believe that they can and should
control nature by imposing their will, or they believe that man is part of nature
and must go along with its laws, directions and forces.181
These dimensions, however, were only partly validated (Hooghiemstra 2003: 61) and
academically not very well accepted.182 However, from a business and practice
standpoint, Trompenaars’ work is much appreciated and finds ample application.
3.2.5 House et al.’s Project GLOBE (2004)
The 10-year research project “GLOBE” (Global Leadership and Organizational
Behavior Effectiveness research program) refers to “a worldwide, multiphase, multi-
method (…) programmatic research effort designed to explore the fascinating and
complex effects of culture on leadership, organizational effectiveness, economic
competitiveness of societies, and the human condition of members of the societies
studied” (House et al. 2004: 10-11). To address these issues, an extensive quantitative
and qualitative cross-cultural study was conducted based on responses on 735
questionnaire items of 17,370 managers from 951 organizations functioning in 62
societies. The cultural part of project GLOBE, which was used in their study to
explain different preferences in leadership styles,183 is of specific relevance to this
study.
181 Interesting to this study is that Trompenaars’ interpreted the “Man-nature orientation” of Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck (1961) as internal versus external local of control based on Rotter 1960s scale
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1997: 141). Applied to internal versus external locus of control, this
dimension is related to inner-directedness (what happens to me is my own doing) versus outer-
directedness (sometimes I feel that I do not have enough control over the directions my life is taking).
182 One of the main critiques came from Hofstede in his article with a somewhat vindictive title “Riding
the waves of commerce: A test of Trompenaars’ ”Model” of national culture differences” (Hofstede
1996: 197): “A serious shortcoming of Trompenaars’ data bank which no professional analysis can
correct is its evident lack of content validity. (…) Trompenaars did not start his research with an open-
ended inventory of issues that were on the minds of his future respondents around the world; he took his
concepts, as well as most of his questions, from the American literature of the middle of the century,
which was unavoidably ethnocentric. He did not change his concepts on the basis of his own findings
either, nor did he follow the development of the state-of-the-art in comparative culture research since
1961.”
183 The cultural dimensions of the study of House et al. functioned as the independent variables in
GLOBE’s subsequent study of the relationship between culture and leadership style, which is not covered
in this thesis. Reference is made to House et al. (2004).
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As a result of this research effort, project GLOBE presents 62 society scores on
9 major attributes of culture.184 They define culture as (House et al. 2004: 15):
Shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of
significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives
that are transmitted across generation.
Project GLOBE took prior (cultural) studies, such as Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
(1961), McClelland (1961), and Hofstede (1980, 2001), a step further by
“unzipping”185 them.186 The GLOBE dimensions form the newest set of dimensions
that can be pragmatically applied in management science. The nine cultural
dimensions House et al. identified through project GLOBE, which are discussed in
more detail in § 3.3, are the following (taken from House et al. 2004: 30):
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Assertiveness, Institutional Collectivism,
In-Group Collectivism, Future Orientation, Performance Orientation, Humane
Orientation, and Gender Egalitarianism.
House et al. (2004) measure both cultural practices and cultural values.187
Furthermore, they measure culture at both national (societal) and organizational level.
By collecting data on both practices and values at both the society and organization
levels of analysis, GLOBE answered the question of whether both values and
practices differ meaningfully at both the society and organization levels. House et al.
confirmed this question positively (as further covered in § 3.4.2).
Its primary strength, according to House et al., is that GLOBE has not made
“assumptions about how to best measure cultural phenomena [but] used multiple
measurement methods to empirically test which methods are most meaningful” (2004:
184 And how these dimensions relate to several important external dependent variables, referred to as
unobtrusive measures like the World Values Survey (e.g., economic wealth).
185 For example, Magala states that general weaknesses of cultural models “result from the extended
scope of dimensions, which require “unzipping” (2004: 1). This unzipping was already started in research
communities but “is slowed down by Hofstede’s precarious institutional embedding in academic
communities”. Magala continues (2004: 13): “[T]he representatives of the academic communities are
ready to re-engineer [our] identities”.
186 For example, GLOBE found that Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity measure confounded at least four
dimensions of societal culture (House et al. 2004: 347), and hence yielded findings that are difficult to
interpret. Consequently, House et al. unzipped this cultural dimension in Performance Orientation
(success striving), Humane Orientation (nurturance), Assertiveness, and Gender Egalitarianism
(dimensions which were empirically confirmed). As another example, the performance orientation
dimension in GLOBE is mainly related to McClelland’s (1961) concept of need for achievement (House
et al. 2004: 240).
187 Practices are measures of “What is,…” or “What are,…” common behaviors, institutional practices,
proscriptions, and prescriptions. Values are expressed as “What should be,…”. As each respondent was
to respond on both the practices and values, the values measured are referred to as “contextualized
values”, which means that the questionnaire items were designed to yield current societal and
organizational practices and respondents’ values with respect to these practices.
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24). Based on specific methodological measures taken,188 House et al. conclude that
“the constructs measured by the GLOBE scales generalize beyond the sample from
which the data were obtained, the method used to collect these data, and the ‘sets of
operations’ applied on these data [and thus that] [t]he findings reflect the broader
societal and organizational cultures under study” (2004: 92). However, comparing
project GLOBE with the earlier cultural studies, one must also acknowledge that
“[e]ach has inherent errors, and neither can be considered as providing the one best
way to denote national culture” (Smith 2006: 915). The GLOBE project is,
nevertheless, the most sophisticated project to date involving over 150 researchers in
62 countries, has incorporated 30 years of cumulative experience after the landmark
work of Hofstede, and is specifically designed to measure cultural differences. To go
with Javidan et al.’s conclusion on the 2006 exchange between Hofstede and House et
al. (2006b: 899): “[I]t is time to move beyond Hofstede’s approach and to design
constructs and scales that are more comprehensive, cross-culturally developed,
theoretically sound, and empirically verifiable.” This last remark is particularly true
after recent waves of empirical criticism of Hofstede (e.g., by Brendan McSweeney
cited earlier).
For this study, House et al.’s project GLOBE will be the frame of reference of
cultural dimensions as it is the most up-to-date national culture study, it addressed a
number of important limitations of the next-best alternative (Hofstede’s study), and
because it is the most elaborate cultural study compared with other available culture
schemes (e.g., Schwartz and Trompenaars).
3.3 House et al.’s cultural dimensions further illustrated
As House et al. (2004) is the frame of reference for this study, these are described in
more detail in this section. This section is largely based on House et al. (2004). It will
be referred to only when explicitly quoted.
188 The (questionnaire) items were developed on the basis of the work of prior scholars (e.g., Hofstede,
Triandis, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, and McClelland), interviews and focus groups conducted in several
cultures, extant organizational and culture theory, and two pilot studies among middle managers (House
et al. 2004: 21). Through empirical validation, the GLOBE project found significant differentiation
among cultures on these dimensions as hypothesized and found significant respondent agreement within
cultures for all dimensions. House et al. (2004: 21) state that “[This] indicates that the scales can be
meaningfully applied to measure (…) cultural variables at the societal and organizational levels of
analysis” and thus have “construct validity”. GLOBE furthermore refers to the construct validity of the
scales and the correlation of the cultural scales with unobtrusive measures and with scales derived from
the World Value Survey. The items were designed to obtain data about the societal and organizational
cultural variables. Respondents rated the items on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The items were grouped in
“quartets” to measure across two levels of analysis (societal and organizational) and across the two
cultural manifestations (practices and values). The GLOBE scales were developed by following a
multistage process in which a more qualitative evaluation of items was followed by a more quantitative
assessment of scales properties. The scales were constructed to measure constructs at the organizational
and societal level of analysis, not at the individual level. The measurement instrument was designed to
address the “ecological fallacy” and “reversed ecological fallacy” (House et al. 2004: 99).
The Behavior of Assurance Professionals – A Cross-cultural Perspective
80
Power distance (or power concentration versus decentralization): the degree to
which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be
stratified and concentrated at higher levels of an organization or government.
High
Argentina (and other Latin American countries),
Thailand and India (and other Southern Asian
countries), Russia, Germany, Italy, and France.
Low
Denmark (and other Nordic European countries),
the Netherlands, Israel, and USA and Australia
(and other Anglo-Saxon countries).
Source: House et al. (2004)
Power distance “reflects the extent to which a community accepts and endorsed
authority, power differences, and status privileges” (House et al. 2004: 513); the extent
to which members of a culture expect and agree that power should be shared
unequally (and disproportionately189). “In high power distance societies, power holders
are granted greater status, privileges, and material rewards than those without power”
(House et al. 2004: 166).190 Power distance relates to decision-making styles of bosses,
the ability to influence,191 the opportunity to have independent thought and express
opinions, deference to authority, the use of artifacts as titles, ranks, and status (versus
equal treatment based on someone’s self-worth and their contributions to the
organization) and the sharing of information. House et al. (2004: 555) refer to the
Enron breakdown as an illustrative example of how threatening power distance can be
when valued in an organization.192
189 An unequal distribution of power per se is not equivalent to power distance; it concerns the
disproportionate inequality of the distribution of resources generated from different power positions (which
is universally disliked).
190 As House et al. illustrate (2004: 518): “In high power distance cultures such as France, some
individuals are perceived to have a higher overall rank whose power is unquestionable and virtually
unattainable by those with lower power. In low power distance countries such as the Scandinavian
countries and the Netherlands, each individual is respected and appreciated for what that person has to
offer, and people expect access to upward mobility in both their classes and their jobs. (…) Differences
in power distance are by no means confined to Western thought. In China around 500 BCE, Confusius
spoke of five hierarchical relationships, each with its norms and duties: ruler-subject, father-son, older
brother-younger brother, husband-wife, and senior friend-junior friend. In these relationships, the junior
partner owed the senior respect and obedience; the senior partner, in turn, owed the junior protection,
consideration, help, support, and assistance in personal and spiritual matters.”
191 Different sources or forms of power are distinguished (House et al. 2004: 514): coercive power (fear
of punishment if not in compliance with what the power holder wants); reward power (enactment of
positive behaviors to obtain valuable rewards); legitimate power (based on one’s authority or position
within a formal hierarchy); expert power (based on one’s expert supremacy over another person, which
may also include the power of information); referent power (through one’s own identification in the
leader, which may also include charismatic power); and network power (through the structural holes in
social network someone bridges).
192 “If power distance is valued in organizations, it becomes critical for the leadership to take steps for
being protected from the likely criticism of arbitrary decisions and oversight, as illustrated recently, for
instance, by the case of leadership in the Enron Corporation of the United States” (House et al. 2004:
555).
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Uncertainty avoidance: the extent to which members of an organization or society
strive to avoid uncertainty of future events by relying on established social norms,
rituals, and bureaucratic practices.
High
Germany (and other Germanic European
countries), Sweden (and other Nordic European
countries), Singapore, and China.
Low
Russia (and other Eastern European countries),
Argentina and Brazil (and other Latin American
countries), Korea, and Italy.
Source: House et al. (2004)
People in high uncertainty avoidance cultures actively seek to decrease the probability
of unpredictable future events that could adversely affect the operation of an
organization or society and remedy the success of such adverse effects. “The
uncertainty avoidance value construct focuses on the extent to which people seek
orderliness, consistency, structure, formalized procedures, and laws to deal with
naturally occurring uncertainties as well as important events in their daily lives. It is
linked to the use of procedures, such as standardized decision rules, that can minimize
the need to predict uncertain events in the future” (House et al. 2004: 166-167). It
involves aspects of coordination, technology, rules, law, policies, and rituals used by
an organization to deal with uncertainty. It is related to phenomena as a preference of
job security, keeping meticulous records, documentation, avoiding ambiguity,
information and feedback seeking, taking calculated risks, stress, and resistance to
change. With auditors being considered to be more conservative by nature (e.g., Smith
and Kida 1991), the effects of uncertainty avoidance could be expected to have
increased impact.
Assertiveness: the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are
assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships.
High
Germany, the Netherlands (and other Germanic
countries), Hungary and Greece (and other Eastern
European countries), Mexico, Argentina and Brazil
(and other Latin American countries), USA, Spain,
and Korea.
Low
New Zealand, Sweden (and other Nordic
European countries), Japan and China (Confucian
Asia), and Thailand and India (Southern Asia).
Source: House et al. (2004)
Assertiveness193 is related to the ability to say what one feels, to an individualistic
aspect of self-fulfillment, to contradict and disagree, and to “saying no”. Assertiveness
193 The difference between assertiveness and aggressiveness lays in the social acceptability of one’s
behavior, where assertiveness is about someone standing up for himself and taking initiative and
aggression is often about violence, hostility and antisocial behaviour. Further, aggression leads to harm
and strained relationships, whereas the goal of assertive behaviour has a more positive light towards
achieving stronger relationships (based on House et al. 2004: 396).
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is essentially about expression and communication styles; the extent of communication
of one’s own opinion. Given the emphasis on competition, highly assertive societies
should theoretically be expected to ascribe status based on achievements rather than
on attributes such as age, profession, or family connection (as is generally done in high
power distance cultures). It furthermore oftentimes is associated with the difference
between men and women (with attributes like agreeableness, likeability, and
nurturance), “although the differences are in part stereotypical rather than true”
(House et al. 2004: 400).
Individualism and Collectivism
Individualism versus Collectivism is related to “the extent to which people are
autonomous individuals or embedded in their groups (…) [For example], the
recognition of individuals as being interdependent and as having duties and obligation
to other group members are defined attributes of the cultural construct called
Collectivism” (House et al. 2004: 438-440). Whereas In-Group Collectivism is related
to the Individualism-Collectivism dimension at the level of family integrity,
Institutional Collectivism is related to the non-kin components of the dimension (not
primarily personal-relational driven).
Institutional Collectivism (I): the degree to which organizational and societal
institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and
collective action.
High
Sweden (and other Nordic European countries),
Japan, Korea and China (and other Confucian
Asian countries), and Philippines and Malaysia (and
other Southern Asian countries).
Low
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (and other Latin
American countries), Italy and Spain (and other
Latin European countries), and Germany.
Source: House et al. (2004)
Institutional collectivism reflects the inducements and rewards for collective behavior
and norms, rather than incentives and rewards for the enactment of individual
freedom and autonomy. It emphasizes shared objectives, interchangeable interests,
and respect for socially legitimated institutions. “In organizations, institutional
collectivism likely takes the form of strong team orientation and development. To the
extent possible, tasks [and rewards] are likely to be based on group rather than
individual performance. Personal independence has low priority in institutionally
oriented collective societies. The notion of autonomous individuals, living free of
society while living in that society, is contrary to the norms of societies that embrace
institutional collectivism. Societies characterized by lower institutional collectivism
tend to embrace a preoccupation with self-reliance and independent personality”
(House et al. 2004: 165)194.
194 The societal cultural dimension of individualism and collectivism is generally reflected in the
organizational cultures. In individualistic cultures one will generally find organizational forms in which
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In-Group Collectivism (II): the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty,
and cohesiveness in their organizations or families.
High
Philippines and India (and other Southern Asian
countries), Mexico and Venezuela (and other Latin
American countries), China and Taiwan, Russia
and Poland (and other Eastern European
countries), and Turkey and Morocco (and other
Middle-East countries).
Low
Denmark (and other Nordic European countries),
The Netherlands and Germany (and other
Germanic European countries), the USA, Australia
and the UK (and other Anglo-Saxon countries),
and France.
Source: House et al. (2004)
In-group collectivism refers to how individuals relate to an in-group as an
autonomous unit and how they attend to responsibilities concerning their in-group. It
reflects pride in membership of the group, a strong sense of group identity, and
affective identification toward the family, group, or community. “In strong in-group
collectivistic societies, there is an emphasis on collaboration, cohesiveness, and
harmony” (House et al. 2004: 165).
Future orientation: the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies
engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and
delaying individual or collective gratification.
High
Switzerland and the Netherlands (and other
Germanic countries), Denmark (and other Nordic
European countries), Singapore, Malaysia, and
Japan, and Canada.
Low
Russia and Poland (and other Eastern European
countries), Argentina and Colombia (and other
Latin American countries), Italy, and Morroco.
Source: House et al. (2004)
the employees consider themselves largely independent from the organization (versus interdependent),
employees identify themselves through their unique skill set for which they are hired (versus the
organization being part of employee’s self-identity), and organizations offering the employees rewards in
monetary terms (versus employees receiving lifetime support and security for the whole family and social
life). In collectivistic cultures organizations are built around the collectivist values and norms, being
extensions of the family to reflect the importance of the fulfillment of obligations. Illustrative examples
can be found in comparing the US and Japan. In the US, the need for rational exchanges between an
organization and its employees is visible in an underlying notion of fairness in all aspects between
recruitment and termination of the employment contract, which is based on the notion of equity defined
by rational procedures. By contrast, managers in Japan design organizations based on family structures;
organizations consciously create collectivist organizational practices equivalent to the societal values, as
development of long-term relationships through working life, family-like practices as morning exercises
and singing, and employees being willing to make sacrifices for the company in turn for the “umbrella” of
family-like belonging and security.
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People in future-oriented cultures are inclined to organize, invest and plan for the
future, believe that their current actions will influence their future (which will matter),
believe in planning for developing their future, and look far into the future for
assessing the effects of their current actions. By contrast, people from cultures that are
lower on future orientation (i.e., present orientation) show the capability to enjoy the
moment and be spontaneous (or opportunistic in a less positive sense)195.
Performance orientation: the degree to which an organization or society encourages
and rewards group members for performance improvement, innovation, high
standards and excellence.
High
Singapore, China, and Korea (and other Confucian
Asian countries), USA, Canada, and Australia (and
other Anglo-Saxon countries), Switzerland and the
Netherlands (and other Germanic European
countries), and Malaysia, Philippines, and Iran (and
other Southern Asian countries.
Low
Russia and Hungary (and other Eastern European
countries), Venezuela and Argentina (and other
Latin American countries), Italy, Portugal, and
Greece.
Source: House et al. (2004)
Where performance is found to be highly valued almost universally, actual performance
orientation practices differ (House et al. 2004: 248). “Individuals with high need for
achievement tend to achieve pleasure from progressive improvement, like to work on
tasks with moderate probabilities of success because they represent a challenge, take
personal responsibility for their actions, seek frequent feedback, search for
information on how to do things better, and are generally innovative” (House et al.
2004: 240). Performance orientation is furthermore related to importance of
knowledge, focus on the future, self-actualization, autonomy (or self-reliance), taking
initiative, and planning, being task and results oriented, use direct, clear, and explicit
language, and having a sense of urgency of achieving things.196 A last important
characteristic is that people from high performance orientation accord status to other
people based on achievement and accomplishments, as opposed to ascription based
on a certain background or seniority of an individual.197
195 They may show incapacity or unwillingness to plan a sequence to realize their desired goals, and may
not appreciate the warning signals that their current behavior negatively influences realization of their
goals in the future. Present-oriented societies resolve current problems without regard to long-term
implications (based on House et al. 2004: 285).
196 Non-performance oriented cultures tend to focus on tradition, family, paternalistic values, and social
ties. This means that people from cultures with low performance orientation values believe in family and
social background as the key determinant of social respect, not getting the job done or achievement.
197 House et al. illustrate it very clearly as follows (2004: 242): “Achievement and ascription cultures are
fundamentally different. In the United States, the idea that anyone can become President is a strong
reflection of achievement orientation, whereas in France, becoming President without attending the right
grande école and without the right connections is impossible. In Japan, historically, promotion to higher
positions has been based on seniority, gender, and age, although this seems to be changing towards
achievement rather than ascribing status”.
Chapter 3 – Cross-national Cultural Differences
85
Humane orientation: the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies
encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring,
and kind to others.
High
Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand (and other
Southern Asian countries), Zambia and Zimbabwe
(and other Sub-Saharan African countries), Ireland,
Denmark, and Canada.
Low
Germany and Switzerland (and other Germanic
European countries), Spain, France, and Italy (and
other Latin European countries), Greece and
Hungary (and other Eastern European countries),
and Singapore.
Source: House et al. (2004)
The norms of societies valuing humane orientation are concerned with improvement
of the human condition. It is considered to relate to what is called quality of life and
to social support and security. Members of a society are responsible for enhancing
well-being, providing security, social contacts, approval, belonging and affection, and
to fight injustice.198 It was found that, although important in daily live, orientation
does not play a primary role in the workplace (House et al. 2004: 571).
Gender egalitarianism: the degree to which an organization or a society minimizes
gender role differences while promoting gender equality.
High
Hungary, Russia, and Poland (and other Eastern
European countries), Denmark and Sweden,
Canada and the UK (and other Anglo-Saxon
countries), Colombia and Argentina (and other
Latin American countries), Portugal, Singapore and
the Philippines, and the Netherlands.
Low
Morocco, Turkey and Kuwait (and other Middle
East countries), Korea, India, Switzerland,
Germany, Austria, and Spain.
Source: House et al. (2004)
Gender egalitarianism is related to the allocation of social roles between women and
men, and about the behavior that is considered appropriate for males versus females.
It reflects “societies” beliefs about whether members’ sex should determine the roles
that they play in their homes, business organizations, and communities” (House et al.
2004: 347, emphasis added). Hence, it centers on people valuing gender egalitarianism.
It should be noted that valuing gender egalitarian beliefs does not mean that more
198 Humane orientation can be illustrated through the Southern Asian societies, for example the
Philippines. “In rural Philippine, neighbours commonly offer to help if a person is constructing a house.
Filipinos love helping not just one another, but also other people. Gratitude is a prized trait in Filipino
society and any help is valued as a debt of honour. Most Germanic societies, on the other hand, tend to
view humane orientation in rather rational terms, often overburdened with formal procedures such as
those related to the condition of labour” (House et al. 2004: 581).
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women actually participate in the work environment.199 Rather, greater gender
egalitarian societies tend to advocate the notion of unity in diversity (unity without
uniformity and diversity without fragmentation). “To members of egalitarian societies,
a diverse community represents a rich source of ideas and techniques. People from
these societies not only tolerate diversity, but emphasize understanding, respect, and
the nurturing of diversity in their communities through sustained committed efforts”
(House et al. 2004: 166). Studies have shown a positive association between
development or modernization and gender-role ideology, with men’s and women’s
roles perceived more similarly200 in more economically and socially developed
countries. Hence, it can be inferred that societies valuing gender egalitarianism
generally perform better (although cause and effect are contested, as it is also shown
that economic wealth leads to gender egalitarianism).
3.4 Levels, layers, and convergence of cultures
3.4.1 Levels of national cultures (values, beliefs, and behaviors)
The first complexity in understanding culture is related to the different levels of depth
of cultures. With the “onion assumption”, Hofstede (1980, 2001) explains that values
drive practices (behaviors) in a positive way, i.e., when people value something, they
act alike.201 The general consensus is that people behave based on their values and
beliefs of how things should be done (e.g., Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 1999; Hofstede
2001; Schein 2004). This manifests in symbols, heroes and rituals.202 All three are
199 It is evidenced that the more similarly women and men are perceived to be, the greater women’s
participation in higher education and in the labour force (House et al. 2004: 349). However, valuing more
gender egalitarianism does not mean that more women actually participate in the work environment
compared to countries that are less gender egalitarian (e.g. Russia is less gender egalitarian in practice than
for example England, but the accounting function in Russia is seen as a woman’s function and filled
mainly by women too). Hence, gender egalitarianism does merely say something about women and men
being valued equal and diversity as such being appreciated. Not whether there are actually more women
working (based on House et al. 2004: 348).
200 Although the division of roles between the sexes to a certain extent is dictated by physical differences
between men and women that go back ages (such as child bearing, length, and life expectancy), gender
egalitarianism as such reflects the degree to which men and women perform common tasks and are
treated equally with respect to status, privilege, and rewards.
201 A value is a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others (Hofstede 2001: 5) – the
desired or the desirable. Values reflect relatively general beliefs of what is right and wrong or specify
general preferences – the implicit assumptions that actually guide behavior, that tell group members how
to perceive, think, and feel about things. For example, in some cultures loyalty to the group, family or
other collectives is more important than the individual itself, while in other cultures individual
achievement prevails. People from one culture can predominantly believe in the good of people, whereas
in other societies people tend to apply a more skeptical approach based on the predominant values in that
culture.
202 Symbols, the most outer, superficial layer, comprise words, gestures, pictures, objects and symbols
recognized as such only by those who share the culture. Heroes are those persons, alive or dead, real or
imaginary, who possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture and serve as models for
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visible to the outside world as practices of a certain culture; “their cultural meanings,
however, are invisible” (Hofstede 2001: 10), referring to the core values at the heart of
the culture.
However, the notion that values and beliefs drive behavior has recently been
questioned by House et al. (2004). They showed the opposite (Javidan et al. 2006b:
902): “People may hold views of what should be (i.e., [contextualized] values) based on
what they observe in action (i.e., practices)”.203 One explanation is that people
generally desire more of something they do not have.204 Another explanation could be
found in the questionnaire design aimed at measuring “contextualized values”.205
House et al. conclude that the “onion assumption” of Hofstede is too simplistic and
additional research is needed to explain such a complex relationship (Javidan et al.
2006b: 901).
For this study, cultural practices are considered to be more robust indicators or
explanatory factors of actual behavioral differences compared to cultural values. For
example, Smith et al. state that “the ‘as is’ ratings comprise the most extensive
[cultural] survey to date that has focused on the description of behaviors” (2006:
49).206 In conclusion, taking the GLOBE study as the primary cultural study of choice,
this study focuses on the cultural practices as independent variables explaining
differences in the professional behavior of auditors. The cultural values will function as a
set of “second-tier” independent variables of reflecting culture where relevant.
3.4.2 Layers of culture (individual, organizational, and occupational)
Generally, three layers of cultural analysis are considered to interact or interfere in the
relationship between societal culture and the professional behavior of auditors
functioning in that culture: the individual level, the organizational level and the
occupational level.
behavior. Rituals are collective activities that are considered socially essential in being part of the norms
of the collectivity (e.g., traditions, way of meeting and greeting).
203 This finding refers to the negative correlation House et al. have found “between cultural values and
practices in seven out of nine cultural dimensions” (2004: 729), which is “contrary to the conventional
wisdom in literature”. “According to value-belief theory, the values and beliefs held by members of
cultures influence the degree to which the behaviors of individuals, groups, and institutions within
cultures are enacted, and the degree to which they are viewed as legitimate, acceptable, and effective”
(House et al. 2004: 17).
204 For example, in cultures with low performance orientation practices (a universally desired trait), the
study shows that people value or desire greater performance orientation. This is in contrast to cultures
that are already high on performance orientation practices; they desire less more or even less performance
orientation in their cultures.
205 Project GLOBE has not split the sample into respondents on the “as is” practices questions and the
“should be” value questions to prevent a common source bias. While they split the sample of
respondents at the societal level and the organizational level, they have not done so for the values versus
practices.
206 Furthermore, project GLOBE shows that a society’s cultural practices are associated with a large
variety of societal phenomena (e.g. economic health), i.e., cultural practices are the better indicators of
societal phenomena such as “common behaviours, institutional practices, proscriptions, and
prescriptions” (House et al. 2004: 16).
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3.4.2.1 The individual level of analysis
Are all individuals within a defined culture the same? The answer, of course, is: no.
Cultures are composed from individuals who are collectively considered to “be” that given
culture. These individuals all have their own characteristics, values, and beliefs.
Nevertheless, in a given culture, all these individual values and beliefs are summed up
to the level of some common denominator or assumed homogeneity. This is
considered the case with national cultures: In a country, certain values and practices
will be dominant over others. Cultural dimensions used in this study refer to “the
value culture of the dominant, majority group” (Schwartz 1999: 25).207
Several scholars have studied the interaction between cultural values at the
individual level and those at the societal level (e.g., Smith and Schwartz 1997).208 This
is important as much of the data used to study cultures is collected from individuals
within those cultures, e.g. through questionnaires distributed to individual participants.
When comparing cultures at the societal level, “the results obtained are
characterizations of cultures but not of individuals” (Van de Vijver and Leung 1997:
124). This is generally referred to as the “ecological fallacy” (e.g., Hofstede 2001: 16),
confusing individual-level data within cultures with societal-level data between
cultures. The “reversed ecological fallacy”, on the other hand, refers to the assumption
that individual-level data is also valid at the societal level and, therefore, the
assumption that cultures are “king-sized individuals” (House et al. 2004: 99). These
cross-level inferences “can be fallacious because of a difference in meaning of
constructs at the individual and cultural levels” (Van de Vijver and Leung 1997: 125).
3.4.2.2 Organizational and occupational culture
Hofstede et al. (1990) showed that national cultures and organizational cultures are
phenomena of different orders.209 House et al. (2004) explain the mechanisms by
which industrial, organizational, and societal characteristics interact with national
culture by referring to the cultural immersion theory, the social network theory, and
the institutional theory (House et al. 2004: 77 ff). These theories propound that
organizational cultures become “isomorphic”210 with the societal cultures in which
207 These cultural dimensions are the dimensions on the basis of which countries differentiate themselves.
This, however, does not say anything about the absolute cultural value of a country; only that one country
is higher on a certain dimension than another country. For example, all countries are collectivist to a
certain extent, but one country is generally more collectivist than the other.
208 House et al. (2004: 141): “In 1994, Schwartz extended his individual-level taxonomy of human values
to the society level to identify dimensions that differentiate cultures. (…) Schwartz developed a values
survey that can be used to identify a set of values that can differentiate individuals from one another or
that can differentiate societies from one another”.
209 A well known definition of organizational culture is that of Schein (2004: 17): “A pattern of shared
basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problem”.
210 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain isomorphism as the primary principle in institutional theory.
Organizations are pressured to become isomorphic with, or conform to, a set of institutional beliefs and
processes. Normative isomorphism (apart from coercive and mimetic isomorphism), being educational or
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they are embedded, indicating that organizational cultures pass on the interacting
effect of societal cultures on professional behavior.
An important study in this respect is that of Soeters and Schreuder (1988). They
showed that organizational culture is strong enough to influence the values of
accountants and that the national roots of the firm (in this case, USA and the
Netherlands) and the auditors working in those firms are reflected in their
organizational behavior.211 Soeters and Schreuder (1988) further showed that
occupational culture also interacts with the impact of national culture although
national cultures still “shine through” distinctively.212 Some effect of occupational or
industry culture should be expected (e.g., Merrit 2000 in the aviation industry ).
However, no universally consistent effect has been found so far (e.g., House et al.
2004: 664).
In conclusion, research shows “that employees maintain or enhance their
culturally specific ways of working even when employed by multinational or global
organizations” (Adler 2002: 69).213 In other words, there is a general consensus that
organizational or occupational practices or cultures do not (significantly) eliminate the
impact of societal cultural differences on the behavior of professionals functioning in
those societies. House et al. (2004) concur by concluding that “one of the major
findings of the GLOBE research program is that organizational and managerial
professional pressures to conform to a set of rules and norms (such as licensing and continued
education), seems to be the most relevant mechanism that could be expected to function within the
auditing profession. These pressures by professional associations can be “tempered, however, by the
broader societal culture” operating within the professional society or organizational bodies (House et al.
2004: 84; Eden 2001). Sorensen (1967) for example found that attitudes and beliefs associated with
professional membership were often challenged and transformed by the structural and organizational
features of large public accounting firms.
211 This was partially confirmed by Pratt et al. (1993), in their extension to British and Australian auditors,
who concluded that there are not only cultural differences among accountants of different nationalities,
but also among accountants of the same nationalities working in different audit firms with organizational
cultures that are strong enough to attract and socialize accountants with similar values. Chow et al. (2002)
applied this in an oriental culture (Taiwan), a culture in which “cultural transferences between US firms
and other Anglo-Saxon cultures might be less readily and easily achieved, and found similar results in
distinct cultural settings as well”. The rationale is that it is reflected in those accountants through
“selection” (at entry level) and “socialization” (through the ranks).
212 They found that the accounting occupation (or industry) is characterized by a low level of Uncertainty
Avoidance (“lower than even the lowest scoring country in Hofstede’s 1980 study”, House et al. 2004:
77). However, they also found that the US accounting firms have lower levels of Uncertainty Avoidance
than Dutch accounting firms (which is consistent with Uncertainty Avoidance value scores of House)
suggesting that irrespective of an occupational effect the professional behavior of auditors is still affected
by the societal cultures in which they function.
213 For example, Hofstede (2001) showed that national culture explained more of the differences in
employees’ attitudes and behaviors than professional role, age, gender, or race. Schwartz (1999: 40) found
an impact of cultural values on the work centrality, suggesting an impact of societal culture on work
behavior. Earlier, Laurent (1983, 1986) found cultural differences to be more pronounced among
employees working in the same multinational company than among employees working for different
organizations in various countries. Moreover, Arnold et al. (2007) found that differences in ethical
perceptions “associate with the subjects’ country to a much greater degree than with the subjects’
employer, employment level or gender” (2007: 335).
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practices tend to reflect the societal orientation in which they function. (…)
Organizational cultures reflect the societies in which they are embedded” (2004: 6, 37).
Hence, societal cultural differences are expected to influence the professional behavior
of auditors within that society, irrespective of the organizational or occupational
culture. This conclusion is relevant to this study as it is conducted with respondents
from the same international accounting firm and the same occupation.
3.4.3 Globalization and convergence of cultures
To what extent are national cultures stable? With ongoing globalization, including
increased technological connectivity (e.g. internet), could one expect cultures to grow
towards each other? Will the current economic crises, with its increased impact due to
“global connectivity”, push forward globalization or hamper it? Or is the world even
becoming “flat” as Friedman (2005) refers to the “horizontalization of values”? If
ecological and geographical constraints shape cultures, would modernizations such as
motor vehicles, planes, trains and technology be expected to change cultures as they
overcome the ecological and geographical constraints? The answer to these questions
is not clear, although the general consensus seems to be that cultures do not change or
converge rapidly, especially where it concerns cultural values.214 Globalized media,
political change and migration, and computer-mediated communication are known
sources of cultural change, whereas the role of the family is less well understood (e.g.,
Leung et al. 2005). “The increased connection among countries, and the globalization
of corporations, does not mean that cultural differences are disappearing or
diminishing”, state House et al. (2004: 5). They continue: “On the contrary, as
economic borders come down, cultural barriers [and thus their impact] could go up,
thus presenting new challenges and opportunities in business” (also referred to as
“glo-localization”) .215
Hofstede states, “changes [in cultural norms] occur through shifts in ecological
conditions – technological, economical216 and hygienic” (2001: 12). Hofstede
214 Although values are considered to be relatively stable, the more superficial cultural practices or habits
change more rapidly over (larger or shorter) time. This can be observed in daily life. For example, while a
hand kiss by a gentleman greeting a lady was considered appropriate a century ago, today this is not
considered contemporary behaviour, whereas the underlying value may well have not changed. This is
just as men in the UK no longer greet women by raising their hat, if they wear one nowadays at all.
215 A salient example can be found in The Economist (4 July 2009). Goldenberg and Levy argue that
globalization in terms of electronic communications may have shrunk, rather than expanded, horizons.
They have found that people are “overwhelmingly e-mailing others in the same city, rather than those far
away”. In their study of the spread of babies’ names over the period 1970 to 2005 they have found that
the proportion of babies given similar names in a given US state increased by 30% in the period 1995-
2005 compared to 1970. This “curious result” illustrates “glo-localization” rather than globalization.
216 Smith et al. (2006: 66) refer to Inglehart and Oyserman’s 2004 study to point out that one important
way that culture changes is under the impact of economic development; “[E]xperiencing prosperity
minimizes survival concerns, making societal values associated with survival less important and allowing
for increased focus on social values associated with self-expression and personal choice” (Inglehart and
Oyserman 2004: 74). Having said that, this phenomenon also seems to imply that cultural convergence
driven by economical development could divide the world into two parts: one poor and one rich, both
parts in which cultures differ within these bands.
Chapter 3 – Cross-national Cultural Differences
91
illustrates that societal values, the core of a culture, will hardly change, whereas
practices or behaviors are susceptible to change earlier. Smith et al. (2006: 255-257)
point to several scholars who have shown high degrees of similarity in national-level
values over one or two decades. This implies that although values may change over
time due to ”modernization”, the relative difference between countries with respect to
their value dimensions remains relatively stable. “National values thus appear to be
relatively stable across considerable time spans” (Smith et al. 2006: 59).
In conclusion, for purposes of this study, although cultures do change over (long
periods of) time, national cultures are considered appropriately stable. As House et al.
state (2004: 709): “The project GLOBE results (…), along with research findings
from other large scale studies (…) lead us to reject the culture convergence hypothesis,
particularly in its most extreme deterministic form.” They continue: “Although we
acknowledge that global communication, technological innovation, and
industrialization can create a milieu for cultural change, a convergence of cultural
values is by no means assured”.
3.5 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed national cultures and the various models that unraveled
cultural dimensions. From this analysis, the definition of national culture that seems
most relevant is that of House et al. (2004: 15):
Culture is defined as shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations
or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of
members of collectives that are transmitted across generation.
The nine dimensions of nation culture that House et al. (2004) developed in their
GLOBE study are the frame of reference for this study. These cultural dimensions are
detailed on the next page.
National cultures manifest both in practices and values. This study focuses on
cultural practices as independent variables reflecting national cultures. Cultural
practices are considered to be more robust explanatory variables (if at all) of the cross-
national differences in the professional behavior of auditors.
Based on the analysis of the interaction between national cultures and
organizational and occupational cultures, it is concluded that both organizational and
occupational cultures do not eliminate the effect of national cultures on the
professional behavior of auditors. Research shows that local organizational and
occupational cultures reflect the societal cultures of the countries in which they are
embedded.
How cross-national cultural differences have their impact in the specific context
of auditing and auditors’ professional behavior is the subject of Chapter 4.
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Culture construct Definition
Power Distance The degree to which members of an organization or a society
expect and agree that power should be stratified and
concentrated at higher levels of an organization or
government.
Uncertainty Avoidance The extent to which members of an organization or a society
strive to avoid uncertainty of future events by relying on
established social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices.
Assertiveness The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies




The degree to which organizational and societal institutional
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of
resources and collective action.
In-Group Collectivism
(Collectivism II)
The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and
cohesiveness in their organizations or families.
Future Orientation The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies
engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning,
investing in the future, and delaying individual or collective
gratification.
Performance Orientation The degree to which an organization or a society encourages
and rewards group members for performance improvement,
innovation, high standards, and excellence.
Humane Orientation The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies
are encouraged and rewarded for being fair, altruistic,
friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others.
Gender Egalitarianism The degree to which an organization or a society minimizes
gender role differences while promoting gender equality.
Table 1 – House et al. culture construct definitions (2004)
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4. Loop One: Cross-National Cultural Difference in
Auditors’ Professional Behavior – A Grounded Theory
4.1 Introduction
We already have a relatively robust understanding of the individual components of
auditors’ professional behavior (Chapter 2) and cross-national cultural differences
(Chapter 3) as such. But much is still unknown about the association between the two:
the impact of cross-national cultural differences on auditors’ professional behavior.
Although a number of prior studies cover cross-national differences in auditors’
professional behavior, only a few have taken cross-national cultural differences into
account as explanatory variables (e.g., Roxas and Stoneback 1997; Arnold et al. 1999,
2001; Patel et al. 2002; Smith and Hume 2005; Arnold et al. 2007). In other words, the
current academic understanding of the impact of cross-national cultural differences on
the professional behavior of auditors is far from being complete, structured, and
comprehensive (as also illustrated in Chapter 1 of this thesis). Currently, it merely
provides a first glance. Therefore, central to this chapter is the following question:
 Is auditors’ professional behavior expected to be affected by cross-national
cultural differences, and, if so, how?
To answer this question, a grounded theory approach is adopted as follows:
 Based on grounded theory methodology, I explore which auditor behaviors differ
cross-nationally and how these differences could be explained through different
national (cultural) determinants. Open structured interviews are conducted with
35 internationally experienced senior auditors and recognized audit practice
leaders. These interviews are complemented by observational notes taken by the
author over the two years spent in conducting this study. Analysis of the cross-
cultural data yields empirically grounded indications of how audit practitioners
perceive auditor behavior to differ cross-nationally. This analysis is structured in
line with the nine constructs of auditors’ behavior as included in the conceptual
framework of Chapter 2 (§ 2.5).
 These empirical findings are complemented by a review of the current academic
understanding of cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behavior,
both with and without cross-national cultural differences as explanatory variables.
This also includes an analysis of how these behaviors are theorized to relate to the
cross-cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, assertiveness,
and (institutional and in-group) collectivism as per House et al. (2004).
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 Each section results in a proposition. These propositions together lead to a
grounded theory on how these cross-national cultural dimensions are expected to
impact the behavioral trait covered in that section.
The focus of this chapter, therefore, is to develop grounded theory-based
propositions on the association of cross-national differences in the professional
behavior of auditors and cross-national cultural differences. This can be illustrated as
follows:
This chapter is structured as follows. After an introduction in § 4.1, in § 4.2, I set out
the research strategy chosen for this phase (grounded theory) and the methods applied
for data collection and analysis. The data yielded from interviews, observations, and
review of existing theory is analyzed in § 4.3, which in § 4.4 results in a grounded
theory on the impact of cross-national cultural differences on auditors’ professional










External / environmental factors
Professional behaviors
Figure 3 – Focus of Chapter 4: A grounded theory on cross-national cultural differences in auditors’ professional
behavior
National culture
- Judgment and decision-making
- Skeptical judgments and decision
- Knowledge sharing and consultation
- Working in fluid teams
- Communication and negotiation
- Documentation and justification
- Dysfunctional behavior
- Audit pricing and practice development
A grounded
theory
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4.2 Research strategy and methodology
4.2.1 Grounded theory
The current academic understanding of the impact of cross-national cultural
differences on the professional behavior of auditors is far from complete. 217
Currently, it merely provides a first glance on some cross-cultural issues related to the
behavior of auditors, rather than a comprehensive and structured overview thereof.
As Glaser (1992) puts it while referring to a field of behavioral research of which little
is known: “Qualitative methods can be used to uncover the nature of people’s actions
and experiences and perspectives which are as yet little known in the world of
research products”. For cross-cultural research as such, the recognized method is first
to try to understand the area and population being studied before delving into the
actual research. In a methodological note on content validity, Hofstede (1996)
emphasizes the importance of undertaking cross-national research with “an open-
ended inventory of issues that were on the minds of future respondents around the
world”.
Grounded theory offers a sound and structured way of analyzing what is
happening in the world of international auditing and the issues it faces in terms of
cross-national cultural differences in auditors’ behavior. Grounded theory is (Glaser
1992):
a basic research approach in a new area, to do the qualitative research and analysis
first in order to formulate the quantitative research so it will not force the data
under study and will yield the empirical facts that test, verify and extend the
qualitative hypotheses
Grounded theory is most appropriate “where researchers have an interesting
phenomenon without explanation and from which they seek to discover theory from
data [i.e.,] how individuals interpret reality” (Suddaby 2006: 636). In other words,
grounded theory is an analytical research approach in which meanings are inferred
from the data collected, rather than imposed from one single other source, such as
theory. However, this does not mean that existing theory should be ignored – neither
during the fieldwork nor during analysis (Suddaby 2006). Rather, a grounded theory
approach draws from existing substantive research. Hence, prior literature is included
as an integral part of the data collection and analysis process218 – data and theory are
constantly compared and contrasted.
217 Based on the literature review of cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behaviour (with or
without cross-national cultural differences as explanatory variable) as included in the introduction of this
thesis and integrated in the analysis of data in § 4.3, it is concluded that much is yet to be (further)
researched within an auditing context.
218 The theoretical analysis of this Chapter is done through literature review and citation analysis similar
to that discussed in § 2.3.1. Starting with international research in the field of auditing and the behavioral
study of accountants, this cross-cultural analysis is complemented by cross-cultural studies from the field
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The core of grounded theory comprises two interrelated actions: (a) asking
effective questions aimed at advancing understanding; and (b) making constant
(theoretical) comparisons (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Grounded theory offers sound
guidance on how to ask questions, but its strength and added value for this study are
found in making (theoretical) comparisons, adding to the understanding of the
universe of international auditing in such a way that it is valid. Theoretical
comparisons are tools for looking at an object somewhat objectively, rather than
naming or classifying it without a thorough examination of the object at the property
and dimensional level. “The object is to become sensitive to the number and types of
properties that might pertain to phenomena that otherwise might not be noticed or
noticed only much later” (Strauss and Corbin 1998).
This ”becoming sensitive” is referred to as emergence of concepts, which are
being gradually designed and developed as a researcher goes along collecting and
interpreting empirical data. Emergence of concepts and theory during the research
process is what grounded theory is all about.219 Consistent with grounded theory and
given the exploratory nature of this study, no a priori hypotheses are presented; rather,
propositions and directions for future research are formulated in conclusion as a
(grounded) theory. Ultimately a grounded theory approach is designed to develop new
integrated insights into the behavior under investigation, closely connected to existing
theory and literature; in this case, a grounded theory on the impact of cross-national
cultural differences on the professional behavior of auditors.
Grounded theory and related approaches, such as ethnography, are widely
applied in accounting and auditing research (e.g., Gibbins et al. 1990; Power 1991;
Davie 2005; Holland 2005; Ahrens and Mollona 2007; Bisbe 2007; Efferin and
Hopper 2007). The American Accounting Association’s monograph on empirical
research in accounting (Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya 1979) suggests using grounded
theory to generate hypotheses and discover significant variables and relations among
them within the complexity and richness of the naturalistic, practice settings. “Since
field studies are conducted in a more realistic environment, external validity and the
practical significance of the results of such studies are high” (Abdel-Khalik and
Ajinkya 1979: 45). McKinnon (1988) called for the use of qualitative field studies in
accounting within its organizational and social context, and illustrated strategies and
tactics based on grounded theory. The use of grounded theory was further encouraged
by Parker and Roffey (1997) who illustrated the potential contribution of grounded
theory to (interpretive) accounting.
of business (e.g., Journal of International Business Studies), management (e.g., International Journal of
Cross-Cultural Management; Academy of Management Journal), ethics (e.g., Journal of Business Ethics),
organizational behavior (e.g., Journal of Organizational Behavior; Journal of Management; Organizational
Science), and (organizational) psychology (e.g., Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology).
219 The concept of emergence is the core essence of grounded theory, which can be substantiated by the
fact that the founders of grounded theory, i.e., Glaser and Strauss, strongly disagreed in later years on the
meaning of emergence and the way to apply it (versus forcing the data). See mainly Glaser (1992).
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4.2.2 Sample, data collection, and analysis
Open structured interviews are conducted with 35 internationally experienced auditors
and recognized audit practice leaders of one of the biggest networks of affiliated
international accounting organizations in the world (hereinafter, the international
accounting organization). The value and relevance of auditors’ own observations and
perception can be recognized in the fact that these auditors play a central role in the
international auditing practice as such. These interviews are complemented by
observational notes taken over the two years spent in conducting this phase of the
study (mid-2005 to mid-2007). I obtained access to the interviewees having received
permission from the international accounting organization after several meetings and
presentations with a number of key players in the organization. Confidentiality and
anonymity are assured to all participants and to the international accounting
organization as a whole.220
The main questions asked are included in an interview instrument which
comprises semi-structured, predefined questions aimed to yield the data needed for
answering the question at hand:
What do auditors observe to be the main differences in professional behaviors
between auditors from different countries?
The questions are accompanied by an interview guide to gain structure. It should be
noted that the questions are designed in such a way that they encourage the
interviewees to respond openly, and not to force them towards any predefined
behavior found in literature (only when the interviewee needed some stimulation, a
number of random examples were provided). In other words, the interviewees were
not a priori provided with an overview of behaviors or expected relations between
behaviors and cultural differences. Given the open structure of the interviews in
relation to the topic, most of the interviewees inherently touched upon their
perception of the impact of national cultures on the behavioral differences they
observed. The interview questions and guide are reviewed and piloted before the start
of the interviews. A summary of the interview questions is included in Appendix 1.
The full interview instrument is available from the author upon request.
The auditors (interviewees) were selected as part of a predefined target audience.
Three selection criteria are applied: interviewees should (a) have extensive
international experience in the financial auditing practice, (b) be sufficiently reflective
and communicative (i.e., they should be able to give a substantive view on some of the
behavioral factors that are related to their field of work), and (c) be an audit partner or
220 The following confidentiality terms have been agreed upon to gain access to the international
accounting organization and applied in this study: anonymity of the international accounting organization
(including any references to its organization or examples referred to during the interviews), anonymity of
the auditors participating in the interviews, and anonymity of the countries included in the study or
referred to by the interviewees. The resulting anonymity in the analysis of the yielded data does not
hamper the validity or relevance of the research and findings in relation to the research question at hand.
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manager in the accounting organizations (to safeguard an appropriate level of audit
practice experience). The target audience was furthermore designed to represent at
least the major countries in international accounting (e.g., the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and France) and, in addition, the most
distinctive countries in terms of their cultural background (as measured by House et
al., 2004, such as Japan, Brazil, Spain, and South Africa). Through the interviewees, 29
countries (among which those mentioned above) mirroring these target criteria are
represented in the interview population. Details on the level of international
experience represented by the interview population, as well as other demographics and
characteristics, are included in the descriptive statistics of Appendix 2.
The size of the interview population was not set in advance but aimed at
theoretical saturation, i.e., the point at which no new properties, dimensions or
relationships emerge during the analysis (Glaser 1992). Eventually, a total of 35
auditors were interviewed, three of whom were selected to replace three prospective
interviewees who did not accept the invitation.221 These three are replaced by
interviewees with comparable profiles to fit the predefined target audience. This results
in an interview population of 35 internationally experienced senior auditors, ensuring both functional
representation (i.e., a broad representation of internationally experienced auditors and international
management positions) and a geographical cut (i.e., representing 29 countries).
The interviews are conducted one on one (either face to face or over the
telephone) by the author himself, opening up the opportunity to extend and deepen
the data collection. The interviews are conducted in English, which is not the native
language of 22 interviewees. Interviews that are recorded (83%) are fully transcribed
and summarized. Interviews that are not recorded because the interviewees refused to
be recorded (17%) are transcribed immediately after the interview. The transcripts are
analyzed in a chronological order throughout the two-year interview phase to
appreciate the evolving lines of questioning and the incremental process of moving
from one case to the other in analyzing and comparing them. Observational notes are
taken over the two years spent by the author in conducting this study, based on
observations of the author himself and informal interviews (“chats on the side”).
These observations and interactions provide invaluable additional and detailed insights
into the operation of international auditing and complement the information collected
in the interviews. An example of observational notes is included in Appendix 3 for
illustrative purposes.
In line with the grounded theory methodology, the analysis is conducted in the
iterative process of open, axial and selective coding for common themes that emerged
from paragraphs and observational notes. Open coding resulted in the identification
of an initial set of 157 open codes with 342 coding notes connected to original
quotations, finding grounding in the original interviews. Through axial and selecting
coding, these initial codes are further grouped depending on their commonality of
properties or according to identified dimensions (e.g., all open codes related to the
221 Selection of interviewees within a grounded theory setting is a process of iterative analysis and
comparison to achieve theoretical saturation. It therefore does not fit to speak of a response rate, but if
one would like, this thus resulted in a response rate of 92%.
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way auditors working in teams were grouped) and given further meaning and context
by labeling the different subcategories or extremes within a given dimension (e.g.,
teamwork was further refined into communication within the team, involvement of
the audit partner in the team, trust within the team, and working in international
teams).
To preserve reliability and content validity, and to mitigate the effect of personal
bias222, this study includes various safeguards. First of all, the data is collected and
analyzed by the researcher as diligently and as carefully as possible, trying to prevent
subjective personal interference where possible. Secondly, “red flags” were placed in
those areas where the researcher suspected coloring, bias or political correctness by
the interviewees.223 Furthermore, most of the transcripts are submitted to the
interviewees for confirmation. As a confirmatory reliability check, a second
independent researcher re-performed 25% of the open coding process which
confirms the validity of that part of the coding process. The resulting constructs are
further conceptually specified (Bisbe 2007) and thickened (Geertz 1973) by
elaborating on how people within the practice (i.e., the interviewed auditors)
understand and interpret their surroundings and behaviors, and give meaning to them
through in-depth re-review of the interview transcripts. This step of defining the
theoretical properties of the construct that has been inferred from the practice is also
suggested in the grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Hence, the
final measure adopted in this study was to actually tell the story to respondents and
ask them to comment on how well and complete it seems to fit their situation or their
view of international auditing.
4.2.3 Five cross-national cultural dimensions (House et al. 2004)
The empirical findings from the interviews are complemented by a review of the
current academic understanding of cross-national cultural differences and its impact on
behavior in general. I have taken into account how House et al. (2004) theorized these
behaviors to relate to five of their nine cross-cultural dimensions, namely Power
Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Assertiveness, and (Institutional and In-Group)
Collectivism. These five dimensions are determined based on review of the current
academic literature on cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behavior,
both with and without cross-national cultural differences as explanatory variables. This
research, as included in the following sections of this chapter, shows that hierarchy
222 The interplay between the data (i.e. the interviewees or the audit environment in this study) and the
researcher in both gathering and analyzing data, “by its very nature, is not entirely objective as some
researchers might wish us to believe. Interplay, by its very nature, means that a researcher is actively
reacting to and working with data” (Strauss and Corbin 1998). One of the major objectives of grounded
theory is to help the user recognize bias by self-consciously bringing disciplinary and research experience
into the analysis.
223 One technique known, and applied in this study, is “waving the red flag”. One waves the red flag to
recognize when either our own of the respondents’ biases, assumptions, or beliefs are interfering with the
analysis.
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(Power Distance), Uncertainty Avoidance, Assertiveness, and Individualism-
Collectivism are the predominant cultural constructs studied in relation to auditors’






4.3 Analysis of data yielded from interviews, observations, and theory
The overview and analyses of the impact of cross-national cultural differences on the
professional behavior of auditors as included in this section is the outcome of the
grounded theory exploration of interviews with 35 auditors complemented by
personal observations and a review of existing cross-cultural research. For reasons of
clarity and structure (and consistent with, e.g., Suddaby 2006), the resulting findings
and categories are subsequently mapped to, and presented sequentially within, the
theoretical structure of the conceptual framework of Chapter 2. The eight behaviors
of that framework are:
 Judgment and decision-making (which includes ethical judgments and decision-
making, identifying, assessing and responding to audit risks, and judgments related
to probability phrases)
 Skeptical judgments and decisions
 Knowledge sharing and consultation behavior
 Working in fluid audit teams (including engagement partner involvement)
 Communication and negotiation behavior on observations and findings
 Documentation and justification
 Dysfunctional behaviors
 Audit pricing and practice development.
It should be noted, however, that the concepts presented in this grounded theory
actually emerged from the iterative process of constant comparisons of the interview
data, observations, and review of the existing literature as set out in the previous
section.
Each subsection offers a proposition on the expected association between the
behavior of that subsection and cross-national cultural differences, which jointly lead
to the grounded theory as included in § 4.4. Consistent with the confidentiality and
anonymity assured to the participants and the international accounting organization,
no references are made to the participating auditors or the countries they referred to.
Quotes from the interviews are included in “italic” text, while quotes from prior
research are in plain text.
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4.3.1 Judgment and decision-making
Only little research is conducted on the direct effect of culture on auditors’ judgment
and decision-making process (Chanchani and MacGregor 1999: 26). Nevertheless,
“[c]ulture has been argued to influence individual and collective values in different
countries, and, through those values, to influence both professional judgment
generally and audit judgment specifically” (Patel et al. 2002: 3). Auditors observe
cross-national differences in the extent to which they are comfortable with, and are
able to apply, the professional judgment and decision-making process central to the
audit. The interviewed auditors primarily observe differences in:
 Decision-making performance in relation to the audit approach
 Ethical judgments and decision-making
 Identifying and assessing the relevant risks during the audit and deciding on the
adequate response to that assessment
 Judgments related to probability phrases.
4.3.1.1 Decision-making performance
Auditors point to a number of countries where reaching an actual decision is harder
compared to other countries. These countries are generally higher on Power Distance
and Institutional Collectivism and lower on Assertiveness. As one auditor illustrates:
“They gather information but are not making decisions. They feel uncomfortable making decisions
and who has to make the decisions”. Oftentimes, it is only the most senior partner who can
make the decision, as one auditor illustrates as follows:
Where it concerns decision-making, [country X] is very hierarchical. You must go through five or
six different layers to get a decision (…) and it is actually only the most senior partner that is
allowed to take the final decision. [Country Y] is probably the opposite where it is the audit team
that says to the partner what the audit approach is. Basically they make the decision.
Auditors further observe that their colleagues in these countries prefer to defer
responsibility and accountability to others: “They are just not willing to take responsibility in
taking a decision”. Another auditor recognizes, following Hughes et al. (2009), that
people in a collectivist culture are less likely to form or express judgments individually,
independent from the in-group formation of that judgment: “they always come up with
group decisions”. An auditor working in one of such countries illustrates:
A lot of discussion takes place between the two or three partners on the engagement. It takes a lot
of time to reach agreement. (…) Under [a collectivistic] culture the engagement partner still looks
at the senior partner to take a decision. But the senior partner is of the opinion that the
engagement partner should make the final decision. So, part of [this collectivistic] culture is that
oftentimes they look at each other, meaning that no partner takes responsibility.
The Behavior of Assurance Professionals – A Cross-cultural Perspective
102
Poor decision-making performance can impact auditing in terms of effectiveness and
efficiency of the audit process. This is seen in an example an auditor gave in relation
to a country that is high on Institutional Collectivism and Power Distance:
[They are] similar in their risk awareness, but when they identify a risk they have difficulty
identifying how significant one risk is compared to another risk. So, everything becomes a huge
issue. (…) They will have a lot of work done on those risks, even though I would classify the one
risk as a significant risk and the other risk is just a normal audit risk.
Another auditor illustrates how indecisiveness leads to not making the appropriate
choices in the design of an audit and take position. He notes, while referring to the
auditing culture of a country high on Institutional Collectivism, Uncertainty
Avoidance, and Power Distance (and low on Assertiveness): “[In this country] there is no
linkage between controls and substantive test - they do very much substantive testing but do not have
the overview”.
Decision-making performance has not been studied in the auditing context.
Cross-national cultural differences have been theorized to influence decision-making
performance through the following cultural dimensions (based on House et al. 2004):
 Power Distance (negatively): In high Power Distance cultures, subordinates
depend on authority and tend to let the boss decide, without actively discussing
their own point of view. This would lead to low levels of ownership, proactive
individual decision-making, and deference of accountability to authority.
 Assertiveness (positively): Assertiveness is associated with the internal locus of
control and decision-making skills in terms of the ability to rationally discriminate
situational cues and decisively express those decisions in acceptable social
behavior224.
 Institutional Collectivism: Deeply rooted in the collectivistic, Confucian values, is
an emphasis on conformity with one’s environment and the importance of
obligations individuals have within their families and immediate surroundings,
leading to an inclination to maintain harmony by subjugation and respecting
authority. Furthermore, accountability and/or responsibility in collectivistic
cultures are oftentimes easily deferred to others within the group, leading to single
individuals not considering themselves to be accountable (or having to take
individual responsibility)225.
224 Non-assertiveness is associated with more passive behaviour of people who allow themselves to be
dominated by others, who are subservient and tolerant, and who comply with requests or demands of
others even if they themselves do not want to (based on House et al. 2004: 397-398). “In internal cultures
‘playing hardball’ is legitimate to test the resilience of an opponent and, in contrast, softness, persistence,
politeness, and patience are needed to succeed in external cultures” (House et al. 2004: 402).
225 In individualistic cultures, accountability is likely to rest with specific individuals, for both
organizational successes and failures. Accountability in collectivist cultures would be more likely to rest
with groups. In individualistic cultures, there tend to be clear rules and understanding of who is
responsible for which specific task. Within organizations, this is reflected in the paper trail of
documentation and signatures. Clarity of lines of communication and accountability is reduced; however,
in collectivist cultures. In collectivist cultures, responsibility tends to rest with groups rather than with
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In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’
decision-making performance as follows:














– . + – .
‘+’ indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; ‘–‘ indicates an expected
inverse relationship; ‘?’ indicates the direction of the expected relationship is indeterminate;
and ‘.’ indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.1.2 Ethical judgments and decision-making
It is not so much that auditors see that the levels of the individual’s moral
development would differ internationally. Rather, they point to the environmental
factors that influence an auditor’s ethical decision-making, such as the oversight and
enforcement process, litigiousness of the environment, and the level of corruption in a
country. The differences in ethical behavior would arise, when there are a number of
auditors, from differences in “the money worth taking versus the risk of getting caught” and in
the attitude towards rules. As one auditor expresses it eloquently:
I haven’t seen cultural differences [in moral development]. It is more that all over the world there
are people that are dishonest. The world’s population breaks into three groups. The top 10% who
would never do anything wrong ever, and will always try to do the right thing, and will be very
shocked by any suggestion otherwise; the bottom 10% are criminals and are always looking for an
angle, and any possible loop hole they would exploit to steel something; and the middle 80% of the
people will look at pressures of making themselves rich, but what keeps them honest is the risk of
getting caught. The problem then is that in large parts of the world the risk of getting caught is too
low. (…) Another thing is that in developing countries the incentive to commit fraud can be much
bigger as a smaller amount can already be quite big to the individual.
This reasoning is consistent with that of Kimbro, who notes: “Individuals will
consciously or unconsciously consider the moral cost of becoming involved in corrupt
activity. (…) The private morality aspect is related to the value system of the society”
(Kimbro 2002: 332-333). Indeed, some auditors associate ethical behavior or
compliance, above all, with the risk of being found out, i.e., the strength of internal
and external supervision, and as a consequence thereof, litigation risk. As one auditor
states:
individuals. Written documents and signatures would rarely be used (based on House et al. 2004: 457-
458).
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In some countries where litigations against auditors are more real, auditors worry in their daily
practice about whether they are taking risks that would involve potential legal liability. (…) It
affects the judgments that you make and how much risk you are willing to take. If affects how
diligent you are, because it is like anything else, fear is a great motivator. If you do not think you
are ever going to be found out, you may do something less.
In other countries, auditors are more intrinsically inclined to comply, i.e., people’s rule
preference and rule-observant behavior. This seems to be culturally driven. For
example, cultures intolerant of uncertainty (e.g., Germanic and Scandinavian
countries, and also China and Singapore) use law, among other things, to cope with
the inherent uncertainties in life (e.g., Hofstede 2001: 146; House et al. 2004: 609);
“Uncertainty avoidance is not the same as risk avoidance (…) More than an escape
from risk, uncertainty avoidance leads to an escape from ambiguity” (Hofstede 2001:
148). Deviating from the rules by non-compliance leads to increased ambiguity.
Hence, Cohen et al. (1993: 4) note that "the willingness to tolerate the ambiguity of
outcomes when going beyond the rules" (Cohen et al. 1993: 4) is related to a country’s
level of uncertainty avoidance.
This introduced another significant international difference in auditing, although
not necessarily culturally driven. Auditors observe a difference between countries that
prefer to base their judgments and decisions on rules rather than on principles, and
countries that rather have principles than rules to base their professional judgment on.
This orientation basically divides the world of auditing into two parts, as an auditor
illustrates:
The rules-based world operates with principles, but is uncomfortable applying those principles, and
thus there is a rule that tells them how to do it. The principles-based world would rather have
fewer rules and would like his standards to consist of broad but clear principles, and see the part
that appears to be rules as guidance on how to apply those principles in particular circumstances.
A principles-based approach would not work in countries with a litigious environment
or a cultural preference for rules and guidance.226 But auditors observe that this rules-
based approach can result in compliance-driven auditors that focus on the form of
complying with the rule, rather than on the intention and substance behind the rules.
“The pressure can become so severe that auditors fear the risk of not meeting the auditing standards
more than they fear the risk of getting the accounts wrong”, as a case example from practice
showed:
226 Furthermore, many countries (mostly the non-established countries) go through a development
process in which they need to mature from an audit based on local standards to the oftentimes more
rigorous international auditing standards, which would most of the time lead to a rules-based focus. This
change would also lead to new local supervisory authorities staffed with local people who also are not yet
experienced with the international standards. As one auditor explains: “Therefore they all are looking for boxes
they can tick rather than judgments that they can check. (…) We end up with a box-ticking auditing profession checked by
a box ticking inspection body”.
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In one example, we found that the need to serve the regulator is interfering with the need to get the
accounts right. There was a team that found a mistake in the accounts, quite a complicated
mistake when you looked at it in more detail but bluntly obvious in overview. We found that the
team has spent all its time on working on the documentation standards, so they didn’t have time
to look at this properly. The team was really proud of their documentation, but it was only a few
months later that they found the mistake in their work. In conclusion the teams have to spend too
much time on meeting the documentation rules. This is frightening!
Furthermore, a rules-based approach is seen by some auditors as providing a false
sense of ethical behavior:
The nearest I got to dishonesty amazingly came from [a rules-based environment], because they
have a sort of feeling that as long as you comply with the rules, that is all you have to do. (…) In
[this country] the procedure is a proxy for judgment, but almost the procedure is the proxy for
straight dealing as well! (…) They never sit back and ask themselves questions like if the
accounts are transparent, are we misleading people; there is nothing in the rule book that would
force them to answer those questions.
This is in line with Cohen et al. (1993) hypothesis. They expect auditors from high
Uncertainty Avoidance countries to follow the form rather than the substance of a
rule, and that they would “interpret the absence of a rule forbidding the transaction as
a license to accept it. In general, auditors from strong uncertainty avoiding cultures are
more likely to equate “legal” with “ethical responsibilities” (Cohen et al. 1993: 5).
Most of the cross-national research on ethical judgments and decision-making of
auditors is conducted based on Hofstede’s cultural taxonomy. Earlier studies (Cohen
et al. 1995; Tsui 1996; Tsui and Windsor 2001) inferred that Power Distance and
Collectivism would explain higher or lower ethical development of auditors (but their
inferences were contradictory on the direction thereof and have not been tested).
Studies that tested for Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as explanatory variables (Roxas
and Stoneback 1997; Smith and Hume 2005; Arnold et al. 2007; Ge and Thomas
2008) in general found that Power Distance and Collectivism negatively impacted
auditors’ ethical judgments (i.e., recognition) and decision-making. Mixed results were
found on the impact of masculinity on ethical decision-making.
An interesting study, although not within an auditing context, is that of
Parboteeah et al. (2005) because of their use of the GLOBE cultural dimensions of
House et al. (2004) as explanatory variable. They found that ethical decision-making,
among others, is impacted negatively by Assertiveness and positively by Institutional
Collectivism.
Cross-national cultural differences have been theorized to influence auditors’
ethical judgments and decision-making through the following cultural dimensions
(based on House et al. 2004):
 Power Distance (negatively): House et al. (2004) found that higher Power
Distance in societies explains higher levels of corruption. Under such conditions,
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unethical behavior would be “legitimated as a privilege of position” (House et al.
2004: 558).
 Uncertainty Avoidance (positively): People from Uncertainty Avoidance cultures
would have a greater preference for rules to reduce ambiguity and strong values
against breaking rules. They value conformity with the rules, guidelines and
procedures, and discourage deviation from the rules227.
 Assertiveness (negatively): People in non-assertive countries emphasize integrity,
loyalty, and cooperative spirit. People in Assertive cultures are found to behave
more opportunistically and to be more willing to accept (a calculated) risk (House
et al. 2004: 404). Consequently, it affects people’s inclination to observe or bend
the rules.
 Institutional Collectivism (positively): Individuals higher on Institutional
Collectivism are more likely to act out of corporate citizenship and to conform
and cooperate with the organizational structures, measures, and codes of conduct
(rule observance).
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’
ethical decision-making as follows:
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‘+’ indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; ‘–‘ indicates an expected
inverse relationship; ‘?’ indicates the direction of the expected relationship is indeterminate;
and ‘.’ indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.1.3 Identifying and assessing the relevant risks during the audit and
deciding on the adequate response to that assessment
Auditors observe international differences in auditors’ awareness of and tolerance of
risks in the normal course of the audit (i.e., audit risks, significant or not). In some
countries, auditors would generally focus only on the bigger risks, while in other
countries, they see a risk in almost every assertion. An illustrative example relating to
auditors from a country that is explicitly higher on Uncertainty Avoidance and lower
on In-Group and Institutional Collectivism is presented as follows:
227 “Uncertainty avoidance is closely related to the concepts of tight and loose cultures, including such
things as rules and norms that exist in and are enforced by a society. Tight cultures are characterized by
many rules supervising actions, and individuals are expected to conform to standard practices. Deviation
from rules is discouraged” (House et al. 2004: 608). This can also be recognized in Hofstede’s alternative
definition of Uncertainty Avoidance as “rule orientation”.
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[Auditors from this country (country X)] don’t like to make mistakes – [they] would go for
security rather than for risk. This is unlike [auditors from country Y, lower on uncertainty
avoidance] who will go for the challenge. The impact is that [auditors from country X] do a very
thorough and detailed risk analysis and that they rather put reliance on ‘tests of details’ than on
‘controls work’. The focus is on perfectionism rather than on efficiency and profitability. [They]
will ‘kill’ something to death before realizing it doesn’t really make a difference because of the
risks associated.
As another auditor notes about auditors from this country: “They are indeed very
structured. They are talking about detailed steps that they feel that still need to be done, although
others would say that it is not necessary anymore”.
Another auditor, referring to a country that on the contrary is quite low on
Uncertainty Avoidance but high on Assertiveness, Institutional Collectivism and
Power Distance, notes that the risk awareness is lower: “Risk in the [this] environment was
perceived to be one of the most important things. (…) The practice here is less risk prone, or risk
averse. Here, people do not think about risk when they are conducting an audit.”
Where the audit is generally considered to be risk-based and top-down,
differences are seen in the extent to which countries actually consider the audit risks as
their starting point. An example taken from the interviews and related to a country
that is higher on Power Distance and (Institutional) Collectivism and lower on
Uncertainty Avoidance and Assertiveness (i.e., low decision power):
Auditors in [this country] approach an audit bottom-up as opposed to top-down, with a tendency
to migrate to substantive audit work immediately. They have a lack of willingness sometimes to
indulge in a proper controls and risk based audit.
No research has been conducted on cross-national (cultural) differences in auditors’
risk identification, assessment, and response. Cross-national cultural differences have
been theorized to influence auditors’ risk identification, assessment, and response
through the following cultural dimensions (based on House et al. 2004):
 Uncertainty Avoidance (positively): People from Uncertainty Avoidance cultures
would be less risk taking and less tolerant towards ambiguity, i.e., having a lower
risk appetite. However, avoiding uncertainty is not the same as avoiding risks;
rather, it is related to minimizing the (perceived) ambiguity related to taking such
risks (e.g., House et al. 2004: 148)228, for example, by carefully designing the
appropriate response to identified risks.
228 Research shows that Chinese respondents engage in more risky choices than American or other
Western respondents. Risk-choice behaviour is influenced by a positive attitude toward risk or a lower
perception of risks. This perception is differently impacted by the probability of the risk (which is the
dominant factor in Western countries) and the magnitude of the outcome of the risk (which is the
dominant factor in Hong Kong and Taiwan) (based on House et al. 2004: 616).
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 Assertiveness (negatively): People in assertive cultures would be more willing to
accept (a calculated) risk (House et al. 2004: 404), i.e., would be less inclined to
carefully consider and address potential risks.
 Institutional Collectivism (negatively): Accountability and/or responsibility in
collectivist cultures are oftentimes easily deferred to others within the group,
leading to single individuals not considering themselves to be accountable or
having individual responsibility, also not for identifying and addressing potential
risks in the audit.
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’ risk
awareness and response as follows:
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‘+’ indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; ‘–‘ indicates an expected
inverse relationship; ‘?’ indicates the direction of the expected relationship is indeterminate;
and ‘.’ indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.1.4 Judgments related to probability phrases
Auditing and accounting standards comprise words, phrases, and concepts open to
multiple interpretations (“probability phrases”). This means that auditors have to use
their own personal judgment in interpreting and applying these standards. This leads
to interpretation differences already between auditors within the same country in
probability phrases, such as “remote”, “low”, “more likely than not”, or “probable”
(see Chapter 2). It is important to note that Amer et al. (1994) found that auditors
were not aware of such interpretation differences, leading to a risk that auditors do
not seek to clarify potential miscommunications. Nevertheless, the auditors
interviewed in this study generally recognize that their judgments in relation to
probability phrases differ in the interpretation and meaning they attach to them.
Language differences are observed to be specifically an issue in relation to the many
probability phrases in the auditing standards sensitive to translation. As one audit
partner elaborates:
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The big impediment to implementation [of our audit methodology] is language. It is a real big
obstacle for us, because of the need to translate our methodology in to multiple languages. And
even what I call the same language, has different dialects, such as Spanish. That is the thing that
I think amazed me the most as I took on a global role in the firm. (…) They all have their own
dialects and the translation can change the intent of our audit methodology, which is so dependent
on very specific concepts and words that describe those concepts. (…) Like [significant risk]. How
that translates into different languages could give the tone of what a [significant risk] is, you know
something else, maybe not so critical.
Others provide examples of the use of “slang” that leads to issues: “In the materiality
guidance we just issued, we published ‘rules of thumb’. (…) People had no idea what that meant in
other territories when they tried to translate it. Here is an example that somebody might misinterpret
a ‘rule of thumb’ to be ‘absolute guidance’”. As another auditor experienced: “There was
actually one standard where there was a difference and that was the materiality standard. (…) We
did not apply the concept the same way as they did in [another country]. I think there are differences
and inconsistencies still there with the application”.
Besides language, another explanation would be that some countries are more
conservative and risk-averse in their interpretation of probability phrases. As an
internationally experienced auditor notes: “An aspect of the culture [of such a country] is that
they are very risk averse. For example, with materiality, there is a tendency to take the strictest
interpretation possible. It’s by nature that they are quite conservative”. Another auditor points to
cultural differences in auditors’ comfort of dealing with the ambiguity and judgments
related to principles-based regulation, which by definition leaves more room for
interpretation: “In [country X] too, a lot is rules-based, but in a slightly different way. They like
precision and a great clarity in everything that is going on and a good understanding of the auditing
standards. They have a sort of natural discomfort with things that are not clear”.
Cultural Uncertainty Avoidance may indeed explain some of the differences. For
example, Doupnik and Richter (2003), while comparing US CPAs and German-
speaking ‘Wirtschaftsprüfer’, found interpretation differences in uncertainty or
probability expressions, such as “expected”, “probable”, “assurance”, and “seriously
in question”, but were not able to relate this directly to actual cultural differences.229
Differences are further observed in auditors’ strict interpretation of the independence
regulation. For example, Agacer and Doupnik (1991)230 note: “in general, the German
auditors were most likely and the Philippine auditors were least likely to perceive
independence as being impaired” due to independence threats. They have, however,
not associated these differences with cultural differences between these countries.
229 Doupnik and Riccio (2006) tried to do this indirectly through Gray’s (1988) accounting culture
dimensions of Conservatism and Secrecy on differences in judgments on probability expressions of
auditors from Brazil (higher Conservatism and higher Secrecy) and the United States (lower on both) and
found partial support for an effect on these dimensions on auditors’ numerical probability judgments.
230 Agacer and Doupnik (1991) compared auditors’ own perception of the effect of independence threats
(e.g., relative size of audit fees, provision of management advisory services, and family being employed by
the audited client) between auditors from the United States, West Germany and the Philippines.
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Especially in a technical and standard-driven occupation as auditing, the use of
many different nuances of verbs already poses huge challenges for consistent
interpretation and application of the standards. As one auditor notes:
Just take a random exposure draft in the clarity project of the ISAs. They use differentiating
words like shall, should, must and could. And I just think about how many different versions of
verbs there are out there in many different languages. What does that mean? I think the cultural
language differences are probably a huge barrier for us as a very technical business.
Especially with the more conservative interpretations, there are “cultural problems of
taking the rules too seriously and with too much attention for detail”. Some auditors try to
bridge this interpretation gap through very detailed international audit instructions:
“You need very detailed audit instructions to prevent interpretation differences and safeguard due care.
You can’t just leave it to the judgment of all the international teams”.
Several scholars have studied “the structure of meaning” (Bagranoff et al. 1994:
35) in auditing and accounting in a cross-cultural setting. Research has shown cross-
cultural interpretation differences even between countries that are generally
considered in practice to be culturally alike (for example, Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur
(1991) have shown that differences exist between Canadian, American, and UK
auditors in their perceptions of concepts related to materiality, going concern,
objectivity, conservatism, and consistency). Bagranoff et al. (1994) found significant
differences between auditors in North America and Australia with respect to their
interpretation of “extraordinary items”, an important accounting concept. They
conclude “that cross-cultural differences are likely to influence the meaning of
accounting concepts” (Bagranoff et al. 1994: 35). However, the above countries are
relatively culturally alike; hence, culture may not be the most plausible explanatory
variable for these interpretation differences.
The only study that has related judgment differences in probability phrases with
actual cross-national cultural differences is that of Arnold et al. (2001). In a European
setting, they found that auditors’ materiality estimates increased with the level of
Hofstede’s cultural uncertainty avoidance dimension. This would mean that auditors
from countries where people are generally less tolerant of uncertainty (e.g., Germany,
Denmark, and Sweden) tend to conclude on lower materiality levels231 (and hence,
more audit work).
Auditors interviewed in this study as well as prior research clearly indicate that
cross-national differences exist in auditors’ judgments in relation to probability
phrases. But except for a possible effect of Uncertainty Avoidance on auditors taking
a more conservative or strict interpretation of probability phrases, no additional
expectations could reasonably be formulated at this stage (which may mean that
differences in judgments in probability phrases may not be driven by cross-national
231 Refer to footnote [38]. With “materiality” the profession refers to the inherent limitation to audit in
the smallest detail, which also would not be cost-benefit efficient. Therefore, an auditor applies a
“bottom” amount in performing an audit, meaning that misstatements below that bottom amount may
well not be identified and corrected (i.e., the financial statements could still comprise errors, but not
higher than the “materiality”).
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cultural differences). In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to
relate to auditors’ conservatism in probability phrases as follows:
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‘+’ indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; ‘–‘ indicates an expected
inverse relationship; ‘?’ indicates the direction of the expected relationship is indeterminate;
and ‘.’ indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.2 Skeptical judgments and decisions
Under the Anglo-American individualism and equality premise of the auditing
standards and the strong independence-based focus of the Western audit practice,
auditors are expected to pose tough questions to management. “Within the audit
context, this attribute suggests a strong connection between individualism and
independence that results in a greater propensity to ask though questions and rely on
personal judgments” (Hughes et al. 2009: 32). In addition, an auditor points to the
implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley which is “a challenging approach which requires a rigorous
challenging of the client to get a penetrating insight on the way the company runs itself”. However,
“implicitly questioning management’s integrity (…) may be difficult in collectivistic
cultures” (Cohen et al. 1993: 6). An auditor notes:
I think in [a collectivistic culture] and I suppose to a degree in other [countries in this collectivistic
region], it is culturally difficult to challenge people. It is not polite to ask people at a certain level
anything from questions to the support of proof.
Another auditor explains:
Because in [this] culture they pay respect to the senior people and the senior people don’t like the
junior people to ask challenging questions. Especially when [the client] is an old style manager we
can’t challenge him a lot and we have to use our own style to ask the same questions in a soft
manner. (…) When [the client] is quite older than our partner, they are reluctant to answer some
questions.
Yamamura et al. (1996) indeed showed that there are differences between auditors in
countries low on Power Distance and low on Collectivism (in their study, USA) and
auditors in countries high on Power Distance and high on Collectivism (in their study,
Japan) in applying professional skepticism (i.e., posing probing questions to
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management and performing additional audit work to corroborate management’s
representations). Their reasoning is as follows:
The Japanese are highly rank conscious with rank determined by group affiliations
[i.e., power distance]. Superiors are respected and obeyed solely because of their
rank. In the U.S. rank or status is largely based on achievement. (…) For the
Japanese, the center of emphasis is the group [i.e., collectivism]. The maintenance
of group harmony and the avoidance of open confrontation and conflict are
considered most important. In the U.S. the focus of attention is the individual. (...)
In the U.S., relevant information is usually obtained by questioning client staff and
requesting more documentation. When problems arise, U.S. auditors typically
approach employees directly to obtain needed information. Within the Japanese
culture, a direct approach by an auditor, although polite and courteous, could be
viewed as confrontational. It would appear as questioning the judgment or actions
of the employee. Thus, the Japanese behavioral norms suggest that auditors would
avoid direct questioning and other behaviors involving a direct approach. Indirect
means of resolution, such as the examination of documents and the performance
of analytical procedures, would be the preferred alternatives (Yamamura et al.
1996: 349-50).
Although their results did not support the expectation that Power Distance and
Individualism are the explanatory variables, they did find differences between auditors
in their expression of professional skepticism. Cohen et al. (1993) reason that auditors
in the less hierarchical countries (i.e., most of the “Western” countries) are better able
to maintain high ethical standards even under pressure from a superior, given their
more individualistic paradigm. “In contrast, in high power distance countries [e.g.,
many of the Asian and Latin countries, but also Germany and France] a local auditor
may have more difficulty resisting pressures from a powerful and wealthy client”
(Cohen et al. 1993: 8). This is why quite a number of auditors are especially cynical
about the lack of professional skepticism in some countries of the world:
In the whole region [X] the ability to challenge the client and professional skepticism is a huge
question mark. (…) We have questions whether you can ever do a truly effective audit in this
region, because of the lack of skepticism and the ‘bowing’ towards seniority and authority. (…)
So, if you are a junior auditor and you are talking to the general manager of your client, and the
general manager says something, you will always agree because he’s a more senior person. He just
won’t be counted wrong. This is probably more evident in [country X] than anywhere else. (…)
People tend to bow for pressure of their clients. I think it is deeply rooted in the culture of the
region. (…) [Country X] is maybe the most closed society, with different social rules for auditors:
you just don’t question the client.
Another auditor associates this lack of asking challenging questions with the trust that
people culturally have in each other:
Chapter 4 – Loop One: Cross-National Cultural Differences in Auditors’ Professional Behavior – A
Grounded Theory
113
I think our people were asking the easy questions. They were getting the answer back, and they
were not actually pushing to ask: show me, proof it to me, I don’t believe you. They do not
challenge the person that just answered the question. Challenging shows that you do not trust them
and shows that you wanted to push them to answer to questions that they do not feel comfortable
with. That is a real challenge for us, because somehow we have to maintain this idea of skepticism.
But at the same time we have a whole part of the world, where people don’t like to say they don’t
trust other people.
This paradigm of interpersonal trust is consistent with the reasoning of McKinnon
(1984: 25) who points to a belief in original virtue (“the good in people”) rather than
in original sin. This would lead to a lack of apprehensiveness, where auditors do not
try to really get to the bottom of an issue or rather take an answer for what it is. One
auditor simply states: “They over-trust a man, and it’s not in their DNA to question”.
Another auditor has a deeper view on the significance of interpersonal trust:
Traditionally [an auditor from such a country] does not doubt the client’s intentions. Basically
[he/she] thinks the client is ‘a good guy’ and from that point of view [he/she] starts the audit.
This culture is somewhat based on the Buddhist religion. Nowadays we have to change this
assumption because we too have had some business scandals and financial frauds.
In addition, McKinnon (1984), points to an auditor’s ability to have an independent
mindset (a premise of professional skepticism) and links it to Individualism versus
Collectivism. She found that the US concept of audit independence did not fit well
with the interdependent nature of social and business relations in Japan where social
relationships are based on interdependence and group orientation (McKinnon 1984:
23):
In contrast with Western societies, Japanese social relationships are based on group
consciousness (dantai ishiki) rather than individual orientation, on interdependence
rather than independence, and on the maintenance of harmony in interpersonal
and intergroup relationships rather than on confrontation and recourse to public
manifestation and third-party settlement and disruption.
It is in such cultural settings that auditor independence has a different meaning than
intended by the (Western-oriented) international standard setters. For example, where
under the individualistic, Anglo-American independence assumptions “clients should
be treated in the same fashion with no favoritism being shown (…) in a collectivistic
society, preferential treatment is always extended to the in-group” (Cohen et al. 1993:
6). However, auditors observe such “close relationships” ’ to be part of the problem,
for example:
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Because the partner and the CFO are very, very good friends, it can be difficult for the partner to
say ‘no’ (…) [This] environment is derived from friendship, loyalty, close relationships that you
develop. If you have that kind of relationship, how can you maintain auditor independence?
Combined with a strong sense of hierarchy, loyalty (in-group collectivism), and service
orientation, this results in, as one auditor notes, “a structure of ‘power kingdoms’, self-
supporting groups of individuals controlling a client and people portfolio in which staff members don’t
challenge the partner232 and don’t challenge their clients”. To preserve that power, the partner
cannot lose clients or people, “so you need every behavior – good and bad – to keep the client
happy and preserve harmony”. Or as another auditor notes: “This has also to do with the
character of the client-auditor relationship which is based on trust and loyalty. This means: loyalty
both ways. The client doesn't leave the auditor and the auditor doesn't doubt the client’s
representations”.
Patel and Psaros (2000), indeed, found differences in terms of independence
versus interdependence between auditors from the UK, Australia, India, and Malaysia
(the latter two both higher on In-Group than the UK and Australia). Although they
have not directly related these differences to differences in national cultures, they
reason that “the interdependent construal of self in India and Malaysia for attending
to others, fitting in, and maintaining harmonious interdependence with clients, is an
important cognitive self-system which is likely to influence how individuals perceive
notions of independence” (Patel and Psaros 2000: 319). Arnold et al. (1999), however,
were able to show that Hofstede’s Individualism-Collectivism dimension explains
variations in European auditors’ independent states of mind in their client
relationships (and, related to that, an auditor’s decision whether to perform additional
audit tasks under independence constraints – a premise of professional skepticism).
Closely related to hierarchy, loyalty, interdependence, and trusted relationships,
auditors point to the phenomenon of “saving face” (generally associated with the
Asian region). “Saving face” is associated with people having a deep fear of losing
honor and respect, which would result in people not being assertive in taking a stance
and preventing other people from “losing face” (i.e., avoid confrontations and other
people having to say “no”). Auditors experience that “yes” in those cases has two
meanings (“yes” and “yes”, but actually “no”) , and that people give answers to
questions that they expect the other would want to hear (i.e., divertive answering to
avoid confrontation). For example, as one auditor notes:
232 A lack of professional scepticism is also seen in internal settings. For example, a senior-manager with a
background from such a country, who returned to the country points to the issue of age also in internal
setting; “Also age and seniority is an important thing [here]. If you are older than me I need to show respect, and then you
will show respect back. That would not include me asking you probing questions”. Sometimes his assistants were
older than he was himself, which posed initial issues in relation to coaching; “It impacts significantly in the
beginning, because a senior could have done something wrong and I try to coach the senior individual, but this kind of
coaching is not accepted well. Further the reaction that I get is; who are you to tell me what to do!”. He tried to
overcome this issue by not telling people his real age.
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With [clients from such a country] there can be another intention behind the word ‘yes’. In [this
country] ‘yes’ has two meanings: sometimes it means ‘yes’ and sometimes it means ‘no’. For
example, when an auditor asks for documentation about the appropriateness of an account
balance the clients says yes, but actually means that they can not ask for that documentation.
Consequently, auditors see that the Western auditing principle of asking probing
questions would not work in such regions as “in those regions it is difficult to ask questions
to which the client has to answer ‘no’”. Or as another auditor states: “They are not open in their
communication; they tell you one thing, but will do the other”.
Others associate the issue of “saving face” not with bad intentions, but foremost
with the assertiveness of communication styles. It would be more about the
expression than about actual differences in the skeptical attitude:
The big difference is that [people from a less assertive culture] are less confrontational, not less
aggressive. This means that they can be as aggressive in terms of the goals and objectives they want
to reach and of standpoints they want to get across, but that the way they do it is less
confrontational compared to [people from a more assertive culture]. I.e. the go in it less direct, more
from person to person.
An audit area where auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions stand out is in the
one of the fraud discussions with clients. Discussing fraud risks and controls with
clients is being required by the international auditing standards for a number of years
now; the difficulty auditors have with actually applying the fraud standard differs
cross-nationally.
Cross-national cultural differences have been theorized to influence knowledge
sharing through the following cultural dimensions (based on House et al. 2004):
 Power Distance (negatively): Subordinates in higher Power Distance countries
would have less room for independent thought and action, and have learned that
it can be dangerous to question authority and express disagreement.233 In lower
Power Distance cultures, “subordinates approached and critiqued their bosses
[i.e., authority] quite freely” (House et al. 2004: 529).
 Assertiveness (positively): Assertiveness is associated with preferences for strong
expression, articulation, and communication of one’s thoughts, feelings, beliefs,
and rights (House et al. 2004: 164)234. Communication in high-assertive countries
tends to be more direct and unambiguous, leading to people being more
233 House et al. (2004: 527-529) refer to other scholars exploring differences in preferences for power
among different cultures, who included items in their questionnaires concerning “the opportunity for
independent thought and action” and “employees being afraid to express disagreement with their
managers”, and who analyzed that “in a highly stratified society where all powers are concentrated in the
hands of the superior, subordinates learn that it can be dangerous to question a decision of the superior”.
234 It should be noted, however, that as assertiveness is about the accepted ways of expressing one’s
opinion, which is reflected in the other actor as well (e.g., one’s client), it is a sensitive aspect of effective
questioning of other’s positions.
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comfortable with voicing one’s opinion and challenge others’.235 On the other
hand, people in low-assertiveness countries would be more concerned with
“saving face” and harmony through the use of indirect, non-confrontational
language and expression.
 Institutional Collectivism (negatively): Deeply rooted in the collectivistic,
Confucian values, is an emphasis on conformity to one’s environment and the
importance of obligations that individuals have within their families and direct
surroundings,236 leading to an inclination of maintaining harmony by subjugation
and respecting authority. Further, people from collectivistic countries apply an
avoiding, obliging, compromising, and accommodating conflict resolution tactic.
“This results from the desire in collectivists cultures to “save face” and the need
to attend to contextual factors” (House et al. 2004: 452).
In conclusion, cross-national (cultural) differences in auditors’ skeptical judgments and
decisions are mainly related to the auditor’s general ability and competence to stand up
overtly, have an independent opinion, ask tough and probing questions, apply
professional skepticism and challenge the client’s representations. Although auditors
acknowledge that many other factors influence auditors’ skeptical attitude (e.g.,
influence of the authority and enforcement power of the supervisory body, the
interaction with the client, or the business environment and corporate governance
structure), they generally see it “as a cultural thing”. In summary, cross-national cultural
differences are expected to relate to auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions as
follows:
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”+“ indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–“ indicates an
expected inverse relationship;
”?“ indicates the direction of the expected relationship is indeterminate; and ”.“ indicates that
no relationship is expected.
235 In assertive societies people will tend to use “low context” language, being communication styles that
are direct, clear, and explicit, and likely to be more emotionally expressive. In contrast, less assertive
cultures tend to use ’high context”’ language, which is less direct, more ambiguous, and more subtle; “in
such cultures, directions and messages are implied rather than explicitly expressed” (House et al. 2004:
403).
236 House at al. note that this philosophy, although 4,000 years old, is still prevalent in much of Eastern
Asia today: “[I]ndividuals were required to respect their fathers and elder brothers to maintain family
harmony. This prepared the individual to respect the structures of the states, which were needed to
maintain national harmony. National harmony would, in turn, create a world in harmony and peace.
Throughout his writing, Confucius criticized people’s need to be individuals and emphasized the
importance of subjugating personal wants and desires for the greater good of the group” (House et al.
2004: 439).
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4.3.3 Knowledge sharing and consultation behavior
This topic is split into (a) knowledge sharing (in terms of interaction with other
auditors in order to gain and share knowledge) and (b) consultation behavior (through
which knowledge is shared, and also which functions as a quality control mechanism).
4.3.3.1 Knowledge sharing
Audit firms depend heavily on their ability to build and share knowledge. The
effectiveness thereof is higher when this is done cross-border. This leads to the need
to acknowledge cultural differences and raises the question whether people culturally
look differently toward (the social interaction related to) the production, winning, and
sharing of knowledge not only within the country, but also with other people around
the world (e.g., Holden 2002; King 2008; Noorderhaven and Harzing 2009).
Auditors recognize the importance of knowledge and experience to auditors’
ability and competence, and the centrality of knowledge sharing for developing
auditing staff and engagement effectiveness. They mainly observe cross-national
differences to the extent to which auditors are generally willing to share knowledge
within their audit teams or with other auditors. They note that power differences and
hierarchy have a negative impact on knowledge sharing, meaning that knowledge is
kept at the partner level and is not being shared with the rest of the team. An auditor
based in a country high on Power Distance and Institutional Collectivism notes: “In
[this country] we understand that to properly address risks we need to understand the client and its
industry. Until now, that knowledge oftentimes was only in the engagement partner’s mind. (…) Not
a lot of knowledge about the client is normally being shared with the team”. Or as another auditor
puts it in plain English while analyzing why others reasons like that: “I have information,
therefore I’ve got power. Why on earth would I share that with anybody else when that does not help
my status”. In other words, auditors feel that hierarchy has a negative impact on
knowledge sharing, where knowledge is associated with, or seen as, preserving power
or status.
An auditor with extensive international experience makes a distinction in line
with Vera-Munoz et al. (2006) and observes international differences in knowledge
sharing through information technology versus interactions among auditors:
I think to the extent that knowledge sharing is systematic, certain cultures have an amazing
capacity and wish to learn. For example, an auditor from [country X] or [country Y] would
leverage knowledge databases much more extensively than an auditor from [country Z] might. But
then connectivity of people would be less. The reason why people like me have learned so much is
because we worked with people who knew a lot. We learned from their experience which they
shared. We work with people who know a lot and we learn from each other, but that doesn’t
happen to the same degree in other territories.
Countries A and B are both countries higher on Power Distance and in-group
collectivism compared to country C, which is significantly higher on assertiveness
compares with countries A and B. This would mean that auditors from countries
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higher on Power Distance and In-group Collectivism and lower on assertiveness
would be less inclined to interact with other auditors for purposes of knowledge
sharing. This would also comprise the extent to which auditors are inclined to demand
that their colleagues share their knowledge with them, e.g., junior auditors proactively
acquiring knowledge from their superiors.
Cross-national (cultural) differences in knowledge sharing have not been studied
within the context of financial auditing. Cross-national cultural differences have been
theorized to influence knowledge sharing through the following cultural dimensions
(based on House et al. 2004):
 Power Distance (negatively): People in higher Power Distance cultures would be
inclined to protect their power and create barriers for others to develop new skills
for higher positions (House et al. 2004: 527). Information is shared in lower
Power Distance societies and information is localized in high Power Distance
societies.
 Uncertainty Avoidance (positively): People from uncertainty avoiding cultures
would be more concerned with a need for effective communication and
coordination, including a willingness to invest in the availability, seeking and
sharing of information and knowledge.
 Institutional Collectivism (negatively): Accountability and/or responsibility in
collectivistic cultures is oftentimes easily deferred to others within the group,
leading to single individuals not considering themselves having to take
responsibility and initiative or to be accountable for the distribution of
knowledge.
 In-Group Collectivism (indeterminate): Priority and trust is given to the in-group
(as opposed to the out-group) for which personal sacrifices are made to fulfill
their group obligations. This may lead to an inclination to tightly control
information and power within the in-group i.e., less knowledge sharing with other
auditors (i.e., the larger out-group) when more emphasis is on the smaller in-
group (House et al. 2004: 182, 186, 458).
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’
knowledge sharing as follows:
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“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.




Where consultation within the auditing context “has been virtually ignored by the
academic literature” (Trotman 2005: 82), in practice, auditors experience cross-
national differences in the extent to which auditors are intrinsically inclined to consult
with colleagues or subject matter experts when in doubt or in defect.
Auditors associate a culture of hierarchy, loyalty, and respect for authority with a
lack of consultation behavior. As one auditor comments when referring to a region
that is higher on power distance and collectivism:
It counts for the whole region. Consulting culture is not very strong. (…) The engagement partner
doesn’t want anyone else to question him and the person in the question position, for example the
quality review partner, will feel uncomfortable about questioning. As a result it doesn’t happen.
Auditors think that this lack of consultation would also be motivated by the extent to
which discussing an issue with a colleague or consultation with, for instance, the
accounting organization’s central technical office, would be perceived to be a
weakness or be seen as a sign of strength. Where one auditor with extensive
experience in a country lower on collectivism and higher on Assertiveness and
Performance Orientation clearly observed during a secondment in a country higher on
Power Distance and Institutional Collectivism notes: “it might be even considered a sign of
weakness or incapability for you to ask me whether you were thinking the right way. You might not
do that because you would think that it is a sign of weakness”. On the other hand, another
auditor, while referring to auditors in a country high on Institutional Collectivism,
notes that an inclination to defer responsibility and accountability to authority leads to
a strong consultation culture: “[Auditors in such a country] are very conservative in their
approach. There is a good culture of consulting, nobody makes decisions on their own”.237 In such
cultures auditors appreciate the adagio: “the biggest mistake you can make, is the mistake you
make on your own”.
Cross-national differences in auditors’ consultation behavior have not been
studied within the auditing context. Such differences have been theorized to influence
consultation behavior through the following cultural dimensions (based on House et
al. 2004):
 Power Distance (negative): House et al. (2004) found that “managers in
collectivist, high Power Distance countries (…) showed an aversion to using
subordinates as a source of guidance” (House et al. 2004: 203).
 Uncertainty Avoidance (positive): People from Uncertainty Avoidance cultures
reduce risk for the individual decision-maker associated with “a stronger
preference for group decisions and consultative management” (House et al. 2004:
237 Furthermore, Triandis posits (1994: 43): “In collectivist cultures, consultation is used very widely,
decisions are often taken by consensus, and responsibility for these decisions is shared”.
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612)238. They will be more likely to seek feedbacks, second opinions, and
consultations from a variety of sources (among which are experts who are beyond
uncertainty), especially when that is instrumental for achieving one’s goals.
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’
consultation behavior as follows:
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“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.4 Working in fluid teams (engagement partner involvement)
A distinguishing feature of audit teams is that they are fluid, meaning that the
composition of teams differs per audit engagement. If not specifically addressed by
the audit engagement partner and manager, this fluid character can hamper team
effectiveness (see § 2.9.5). This is exacerbated in multi-national audit teams. Members of
culturally diverse teams entail many differences among its members (e.g., language,
cultures, interpersonal styles, etc.). Its members initially express higher levels of
mistrust, resulting from cross-cultural misinterpretation rather than actual dislike.239
With audit teams being fluid, this initial phase is especially relevant. Furthermore,
research indicates that culture impacts the ability of people to adapt in fluid teams
(Harrison et al. 2000).240 Mistrust stands in the way of developing sufficient trust in
team members to delegate or share responsibilities241 (Adler 2002: 142). To date,
238 “In organizations that function in high uncertainty avoiding cultures the decision-making is likely to be
more formalized and analytical. In low uncertainty avoiding cultures, decision-making is likely to be based
more on intuition than formal analysis” (House et al. 2004: 6).
239 This mistrust can be illustrated through how Indian people, for example, look down when
acknowledging authority. Behavior many European and North American managers misinterpret as
signalling a lack of trustworthiness (Adler 2002).
240 Harrison et al. (2000) studied cultural factors that may influence employee adaptation to fluid work
groups in Taiwan and Australia. They found that Taiwanese managers (reflecting a culture of Collectivism
and Power Distance, based on Hofstede’s taxonomy) have more difficulty adapting to working in
different teams and working under different leaders.
241 In the initial stage, team members need to develop relationships and build trust (Adler 2002: 151).
Team members from more task-oriented cultures (such as Germany, Switzerland and the US) spend
relatively little time getting to know each other. Members from more relationship-oriented cultures (such
as Latin America, Middle East, and southern Europe) generally spend considerably more time getting to
know their team mates. Problems arise, for example, when task-oriented people become impatient to get
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unfortunately, the impact of cross-national cultural differences has not been studied
within the auditing context.
While the fluid character of audit team does not seem to pose many problems in
most countries, a number of countries stand out from the interviews, which are
specifically higher on Power Distance and Institutional Collectivism and lower on
Assertiveness. The most notable cross-national difference auditors observe in
teamwork is engagement partner involvement on the audit teams. Auditors observe
clear differences between countries in the extent to which the engagement partner and
manager are involved (e.g., the audit partner directing the audit in relative detail and
proactively sharing his or her knowledge of the client with the audit team, versus a
partner in an ivory tower with formal, high-level or limited involvement only). As an
auditor notes, who was sent for a secondment to a country high on Power Distance
and Performance Orientation and low on Uncertainty Avoidance: “[a]nother point of the
business environment here in [such a country] is that partner involvement is quite low. I do not know
what it is, but for some reasons partners seem to be less involved”. Another auditor from a
country almost on the opposite ends on these three cultural scales actually takes pride
in his partnership for its openness: “We have a much more open climate [here]. (…) Of course,
also [here] there are strong hierarchical structures, but I think we are closer and more open to staff
than those three countries”.
Auditors associate the level of partner involvement to cultural traits of hierarchy
(Power Distance). A senior audit manager who was born in a typically high Power
Distance country but educated in a country significantly lower on Power Distance,
who recently returned to the country where he was born, points to the poor learning
and coaching environment due to this hierarchy:
Now that I am working in [this country again], it is a very different environment. [This]
environment is derived from an age perspective, a seniority perspective and hierarchy in an
organization. Which I find to be good at times, but not so good at the majority of times. For
example, coaching is not a part of an audit engagement. For a younger guy it is very difficult to
ask a question to a manager or a partner – that is not promoted in this culture and it is rarely
done. I find that to be a little awkward and difficult because while working in a team
communicating with the manager and partner and with everybody on the team is very important.
You shouldn’t have to shy away from asking questions, as in the audit environment you just need
to be able to ask a lot of questions.
Another auditor has similar experiences, where he notes: “[People from such a hierarchical
culture] feel not confident when they think different as the teacher or the boss. (…) When the
engagement partner asks a question to the senior or junior staff, generally they don’t respond back to
the engagement partner, they just listen what the engagement partner orders them to do”. This
results in differences in coaching and in having a robust dialogue, i.e., the extent to
which audit partners or senior team members in general are willing to share
down to business; their more relationship-oriented colleagues feel rushed and distrustful of their more
hurried team members.
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knowledge, are open to questions, provide feedback, and invest time in helping juniors
to deepen their knowledge of a certain topic or object of audit. A partner in a global
management role confirms through his experience that in countries with generally
more hierarchy, coaching does not work automatically, where people say that partners
are not going to coach intermediate staff. He notes:
In [a hierarchical culture] I see a reticence of senior people to provide coaching and transparency in
thinking and planning to lower level staff. This is also seen in other [countries in the region] –
there is a real challenge in getting senior people to take real responsibility for on the job
development and adopt a culture that believes real legacy isn’t what you know alone, but how
effective you are at passing your knowledge on to others.
Auditors furthermore indicate that this hierarchy and lack of engagement partner
involvement leads to education and development problems of new managers. As an
audit senior manager notes:
I can tell you that the country that I went to go as manager, in my role I had to have discussions
directly with the partner. But I could see that the managers from that office who were with me
discussing the issue were not comfortable to have the discussion with the partner. I could see a big
gap – a big space between the managers and the partner. It may well be that this was due to
hierarchical differences in that country. (…) But I can not believe that with this space, much
discussion about work would take place. No knowledge sharing, coaching and discussion in two
way process.
Cross-national cultural differences have been theorized to influence engagement
partner involvement through the following cultural dimensions (based on House et al.
2004):
 Power Distance (negatively): Leaders from higher Power Distance cultures are
shown to participate less in team work (House et al. 2004: 61).
 Institutional Collectivism (positively): Collectivism is positively related to team
cooperation and an emphasis on cooperative team processes, which is, in turn,
related to team performance (House et al. 2004: 457).
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to audit
engagement partner involvement (as the relevant specification of working in fluid
audit team) as follows:
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“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.5 Communication and negotiation behavior
The significance of communication and interaction between the auditor and his/her
client mainly surfaces in the process of discussion of audit observations and findings
and the negotiation process of audit adjustments. Underlying that process is the
trusted auditor-client relationship as the basis of openness and transparency of the
client towards the auditor (audit information) on the one hand, and the loyalty and
attachment in relation to the business relationship on the other.
Many of the international differences that auditors observe in practice circle
around this “trust and attachment dilemma” and power asymmetry (leading to limited
access to the client and higher inclinations to acceding to the client’s preferred
position). Auditors observe distinct differences between countries where a trust-based
relationship is more important than in other countries. On the one hand, such trust-
based relationships would be needed to gain full access and openness of the client
towards the auditor. For example, an auditor from a country that is high on Power
Distance and (In-Group) Collectivism notes:
In [such countries] interaction with other people is oftentimes not that direct, but first focused on
relational aspects and building trust in relationships. (…) In an audit environment this would
mean that relationships with clients in [this region] are closer and more interpersonal. To be able
to do an efficient and effective audit in [this region] you first need to have a trusted relationship
with your client and other people at the client. Without this close relationship clients would be less
open, and it would not be as easy to get the information that you would need.
Another auditor from a country low on Assertiveness and higher on Power Distance
and (Institutional) Collectivism notes:
The relationship of an auditor with a [client from such a country] is a very close relationship, a
kind of friendship. (…) In real life in we may have closer relationships with clients than in other
countries. In [this country] such a close relationship is necessary to deal with the client. (…) To
build a strong and trusted relationship with your client, it would take you at least three years. So,
in the first years, an auditor has to do a lot of extra work to overcome this gap.
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How this impacts the communication and negotiation process of auditing illustrates
the following example. Although this auditor was himself from the country, he
experienced that strong and longstanding relationships are needed for full access to
clients in his country:
I was a new engagement partner on a […] client and experienced trouble communicating with this
client. It was not that I was not allowed to communicate with the client, but it was more because
the senior partner on the engagement had a very long and good relationship with that client.
Thus, auditors observe that such cultural traits as Power Distance and collectivism
impede having genuine access to the appropriate levels at the client. As a globally
operating auditor notes:
In most Western countries you would be playing at the CEO, CFO and board level. (…)
[Country X] is probably the furthest behind, because they have a culture of not dealing at the
highest level of a company, but are very beholden to lower management, and do not tend to stand
up overtly to their clients. (…) You have to try to find a way to make nice.
Or as another auditor experienced when working in a high collectivistic and high
Power Distance country:
The auditor doesn't have access to the supervisory board, not even at the biggest clients. And that
is a real problem, because the supervisory board actually is in charge and makes the decision - it's
not management that is in charge. (…) I.e., you just can not have the discussion with the real
decision makers, so you can not ask the challenging questions.
Furthermore, these cultural traits lead to avoidance of confrontation and the use of
indirect communication styles, as already seen with auditors’ professional skepticism.
One auditor notes:
In [such a culture] everything is indirect. So saying ‘no’ is quite difficult. In [this culture] it is
always ‘yes’, but it may well be that they just could not say ‘no’, although it is not going to work
anyways. (…) The relationship is very important [here]. There is a strong level of loyalty.
Compared with countries lower on Power Distance and collectivism, this leads to
differences in the way auditors interact with their clients’ boards. In more “Western”
countries, people rather “tend to want to get everything out on the table, talk about it and resolve
it. In other countries they tend to resolve differences otherwise, either in private or resolve it behind the
scenes”.
Patel et al. (2002), who explained differences in auditor-client conflict resolution
(or negotiation), found that Australian auditors (lower on Power Distance and
Institutional Collectivism) are less likely to resolve audit conflicts by acceding (i.e.,
giving in) to clients than are Indian or Chinese and Malaysian auditors (higher on both
cultural dimensions). Patel et al. explain this through:
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the greater concern of people in Indian and Chinese Malaysian cultures with the
maintenance of harmonious interpersonal relationships and the avoidance of
conflict, the greater importance of hierarchical and status relationships in
influencing interpersonal interactions and behavior, [and] judgments of ethical and
unethical behavior [being] contextual rather than universal242 (Patel et al. 2002: 11-
12).
Lin and Fraser (2008), in studying cultural differences in auditors’ negotiation process,
confirmed these findings. They inferred that “auditors in low power distance and high
individualism cultures [in their study, the UK] to be more resistant to client pressure
than their peers in cultures characterized by high power distance and low
individualism [in their study, China]” (Lin and Fraser 2008: 162).243 McKinnon (1984)
concurs by reasoning that auditors in high Power Distance cultures may be less likely
to question senior client personnel, more willing to acquiesce to the pressures of a
powerful client and less willing to question the financial results developed by clients.
How such trusted auditor-client relationships in some cultures can turn to
become an audit risk can be seen though the following “local deal” example based on
an auditor’s experience:
In [country X] I sense that there is a little bit of a ‘local deal’ going on. The management and the
local auditor are quite close together. They are quite remote from what is happening in the centre
[group head quarters]. So, there is a little bit of mutual protection going on: I don’t get you into
trouble, if you don’t bring me into any trouble. That is what I mean by weak auditing in [country
X] for example. (…) So, our firm in [country X] now is in the dog house because they were just
a little bit too friendly about the issues and they did not push hard enough.
Another auditor recognizes this. “The other thing in [country X] is that people are not clear
with the position of the head office. If the subsidiary has a problem they (…) try to deal with the issue
from a local perspective and not from a group perspective”. A manager from the [country X’s]
region explains it to be a real trust dilemma: “It’s really a friendly relationship, and open
relationship. They tell you everything when they trust you”.
These observations are consistent with prior research. Individualism has been
related to communication and reporting of audit findings. Under the individualistic,
Anglo-American premise of the auditing standards, auditors are expected to report to
242 Meaning that “people in these societies are more concerned with acting appropriately in the context,
where the context includes considerations such as the relativities of the people involved, including
hierarchical and power relativities, and relativities of family, friendship, and caste relativities” as opposed
to “the emphasis on the individual and his/her independence [meaning that] judgments of ethical and
unethical behavior (…) are likely to be based on the individual’s own perceptions of what is right or
wrong, and, hence, less likely to be affected by what others may think or consider acceptable or
unacceptable behavior” (Patel et al. 2002: 11-12).
243 “Auditors in collectivist societies may view the direct denial of client management demands as
confrontational and the maintenance of close relationships with clients as particularly important” (Lin
and Fraser 2008: 168).
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management and the audit committee, for example, internal control weaknesses.
However,
the international auditor from a collectivist culture may find it both insulting and
presumptuous to report to the audit committee on weaknesses in the client’s
internal control system. This is very private for the firm and not the responsibility
of an outsider to embarrass management with such information (Cohen et al. 1993:
6).
The (In-Group) collectivistic cultures centre around a principle of trust restricted to
insiders (McKinnon 1984: 24; House et al. 2004: 458). Where protection of the
interests of “society at large” is central to the individualistic auditing standards, the
collectivist perspective is focused on protecting the in-group, even at the expense of
the needs of the individual.
Cross-national cultural differences have been theorized to influence auditors’
communication and negotiation behavior through the following cultural dimensions
(based on House et al. 2004):
 Power Distance (negatively): People in higher Power Distance countries would
have learned that it can be dangerous to question authority and express
disagreement. In lower Power Distance cultures, “subordinates approached and
critiqued their bosses [i.e., authority] quite freely” (House et al. 2004: 529).
 Assertiveness (positively): Assertiveness is associated with internal locus of
control (“playing hardball”), to stand up overtly against a client and disagree, and
the ability to decisively express opposing opinions and decisions in acceptable
social behavior244.
 Institutional Collectivism (negatively): People from collectivistic countries apply
an avoidant, obliging, compromising, and accommodating conflict resolution
tactic. In contrast, people in individualistic countries tend to prefer direct and
solution-oriented resolution tactics.
 In-group Collectivism (indeterminate): Priority and trust is given to the in-group
(as opposed to the out-group) for which personal sacrifices are made to fulfill
their group obligations, leading to openness and transparency in trusted
relationships. On the other hand, there is a fairly low level of trust among those
who are not part of their in-group (i.e., family or close friends), which lead to an
inclination to tightly control information, secrets, and power within the in-group
244 Non-assertiveness is associated with more passive behaviour of people who allow themselves to be
dominated by others, who are subservient and tolerant, and who comply with request or demands of
others even if they themselves do not want to (based on House et al. 2004: 397-398). “In internal cultures
‘playing hardball’ is legitimate to test the resilience of an opponent and, in contrast, softness, persistence,
politeness, and patience are needed to succeed in external cultures” (House et al. 2004: 402).
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(House et al. 2004: 182, 186, 458).245 Problems and issues are rather solved within
the in-group.
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’
communication and negotiation behavior as follows:
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“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.6 Documentation and justification
Auditors document and justify their judgments and decisions as part of their
accountability to others. For a large part, auditors observe that documentation
differences arise from differences in the litigiousness of the environment or the
maturity and strength of the supervisory body,. One auditor notes how pressure from
the supervisor can lead to a focus on documentation, similar to pressure on
compliance and rule observance: “They all are looking for boxes they can tick rather than
judgments that they can check”.
But auditors also experience cross-national differences in auditors’ general skills
and discipline in documenting their audit procedures, irrespective of the accounting
organization’s or local documentation requirements. Differences observed relate, for
example, to differences among auditors feeling generally comfortable or not with
recording work performed and evidence obtained in writing: “Actually documenting is a
different thing. It goes back to the same issues of hierarchy, loyalty, respect for authority. The staff will
only communicate something in writing when they are absolutely forced to. They just don’t like it”.
An auditor in a country that is high on (institutional) Collectivism and Power Distance
and lower on Assertiveness and Uncertainty Avoidance relates this reluctance of
documentation to the culture of his country:
Documentation used to be a problem in [such a country], both with staff and with partners. For
example, when reviewing the staff’s work, they can answer all questions, but it is not in the file.
[Here] people are not so used to record things in writing. (…) [This country’s] way of doing
business is based on trust and close relationships. Many times a business starts without a contract.
245 People from countries that value In-group Collectivism and Uncertainty Avoidance as well, such as
China, are expected to give even higher levels of importance to interpersonal trust, which results in a lack
of trust outside the family or in-group (based on House et al. 2004: 613).
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(…) They base their business on the trusted relationship with their client – they trust each other.
If you come into trouble, you just renegotiate with your client. Working on a contract is still very
difficult [here].246 That is also why the documentation of evidence is difficult.
Interestingly, another auditor, reflecting on his experience in a country also high on
Power Distance and lower on Uncertainty Avoidance and Assertiveness, notes the
contradictory documentation and justification behavior with his audit staff:
There is a temptation to over-engineer, which goes back to their attitude towards rules and orders:
I can’t be criticized if I just type and type and type, and when someone asks the question “have
you done this?”, I can answer with “yes”, although I can’t see the wood from the trees. It looks
impressive but I’m still not sure what has been done as I have to read through 16 pages of what
you could have done in one. That’s an aspect of the culture over here.
So far, however, no research has been done on cross-national (cultural) differences in
documentation and justification behavior of auditors. Cross-national cultural
differences have been theorized to influence auditors’ documentation and justification
behavior through the following cultural dimensions (based on House et al. 2004):
 Uncertainty Avoidance (positively): People in Uncertainty Avoidance countries
would keep meticulous records, the writing and filing of memos and reports, as an
uncertainty-avoiding ritual.
 Institutional Collectivism (negatively): Accountability and-/or responsibility in
collectivistic cultures is oftentimes easily deferred to others within the group,
leading to single individuals not considering themselves to be accountable or
having to justify through documentation.
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’
documentation and justification behavior as follows:
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“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.
246 This trust-based way of working also impacts auditing procedures as such, as this auditor illustrates:
“For example, one client had an issue on sales recognition. The auditor has to check on certain criteria to recognize the sale.
Our audit approach requires evidence that we have seen the contract between the client and their customer. But the client does
not have a sales contract”.




Auditors that I have spoken with in the early stages of the interview phase did not
mention the issue of dysfunctional behavior at all. Also, while proactively asking about
dysfunctional behaviors towards the end of some of the later interviews, the concept
of dysfunctional behaviors was still not recognized (“It is so against every professional
standard that exists!”) or was not perceived to differ internationally (“I have no indications
to expect that dysfunctional behaviors, where there would be dysfunctional behaviors, occur more in one
country than in the other”). Rather, interviewees believed dysfunctional behaviors to occur
globally and not to be culture-driven or to differ cross-culturally. As one auditor notes:
“I expect it to be pretty much the same everywhere. I have not seen much difference around the world.
It happens in [country X], and I’m sure it happens in [country Y] too. It is more the practice of an
individual trying to get the audit done”.
Prior research shows that cultural differences would exist in dysfunctional
behaviors such as under-reporting of billable time or underperformance on the audit
(e.g., performing less audit procedures that professionally required). Cohen et al.
(1993, 1995) theorized the association of Hofstede’s cultural dimension of
Individualism-Collectivism and Power Distance to dysfunctional behavior:
When higher power distance and collectivist characteristics describe the culture,
subordinates will be likely to bend to the demands of their superiors (Cohen et al.
1993: 8). (…) For example, pressure on a subordinate to cover up a supervisor’s
illegal action (such as accepting bribes) might be evaluated differently by Japanese
than Americans because of cultural influences. While the American [low on
Hofstede’s collectivism dimension] may interpret this pressure as coercion, a
Japanese [high on Hofstede’s collectivism dimension] may participate more
willingly in a cover-up to protect the reputation of the group, and such a cover-up
might not be perceived as unethical (Cohen et al. 1995: 44).
This may lead to audit staff cutting corners or under-reporting time to complete the
audit within budget. Cohen et al. (1993: 9) furthermore hypothesized that future
orientation impacts dysfunctional behavior (auditors cutting corners) due to a short-
term focus on billable hours and budgets.
Arnold et al. (2002) have successfully associated Hofstede’s Individualism
construct with European auditors’ propensity to prematurely sign off audit steps
(higher propensity with higher Individualism). That is to say, higher Individualism
would lead to more dysfunctional behavior in terms of underperforming audit tasks.
Cross-national cultural differences have been theorized to influence auditors’
dysfunctional behaviors through the following cultural dimensions (based on House et
al. 2004):
 Uncertainty Avoidance (negatively): People from Uncertainty Avoidance cultures
would have strong values against breaking rules. They value conformity to the
rules, guidelines and procedures, and discourage deviation from the rules.
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 Assertiveness (positively): People in non-assertive countries emphasize integrity,
loyalty, and cooperative spirit. People in assertive cultures are found to behave
more opportunistically, which also affects people’s inclination to bend the rules.
 Institutional Collectivism (negatively): Individuals higher on Institutional
Collectivism are more likely to conform and cooperate with the organizational
structures, measures, and codes of conduct.
 In-Group Collectivism (indeterminate): higher Individualism has been associated
with social loafing and shirking (i.e., behavior that diverges from the interests of
the team as a whole). However, research also shows that people in collectivistic
societies make distinctions between the in-group and the out-group, where
individuals apply less social loafing if they are working with in-group members as
compared to working with out-group members (based on House et al. 2004: 456).
In in-group collectivistic countries “the rules are subject to constant
reinterpretation depending on the particular facts” (House et al. 2004: 186).
In summary, cross-national cultural differences are expected to relate to auditors’
dysfunctional behavior as follows:













+ – + – ?
“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.3.8 Audit pricing and practice development
Auditors do observe differences between countries in practice development, audit
pricing and reputation management, but do not perceive that these differences are
directly driven by culture. Rather, auditors point to differences in the local audit and
business environment that lead to differences, such as:
 The size and nature of the audit practice and client base. For example, small
business environments with a limited number of potential clients, or a practice
comprising a large number of smaller clients, and the competitiveness of the
market;
 The public regard for the audit profession. This would impact the effectiveness of
the audit, as one auditor explains: “They always said in [country X] for example, auditors
had a great deal more respect than anywhere in the world. They were considered to be of a higher
social status, and hence, might stand up to clients more. (…) In [country Y] they are obviously
not very highly regarded, which obviously impacts how effective you can be as auditor”;
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 Enforcement (“It are the regulators that very much determine the structure of the auditing
profession”) and the litigiousness of the environment. “We have a very litigious society in
[country X]. My personal feeling is that this is way over the top. You have people suing other
people because they spill a cup of hot coffee over their lap. That is the famous McDonald’s case
over here, of the woman who spills a cup of coffee on her lap, sues and collects money, because the
coffee is too hot”;
 The business environment, including the capital markets and dominant corporate
governance structures, for example: “Large state owned enterprises have a very different
view on the world and a different belief on how the auditor should treat them”
 The educational level of audit staff: “The level of education of auditors differs a lot around
the world. [Our firm’s] global audit training does narrow this difference to a certain extent, but
not enough for a global client’s group auditor to rely on a consistent level of audit execution
around the world”;
 The state of technological development, in relation to the structure of the audit,
for example. “We definitely have territories that are behind in implementing [the standard
audit methodology] because they are behind in technology. (…) How can they keep up with the
latest changes in the standards? They would probably not be using the lasts version of [audit
guidance and templates], which have the latest references to the ISAs”.
That no cultural differences are perceived in practice development and audit pricing
may well be due to money being considered to be of universal value — a human
incentive that auditors perceive to apply universally, and that which impacts the
behavior of auditors universally too. This is a phenomenon that auditors find to be
present everywhere and within each individual. It is perceived as being one of the
basics in human nature, a true driver of the bad side in a person when the opportunity
and incentives present themselves (e.g., greed). As one auditor cynically said: “Money
makes the world go round”. Or another: “In our firm economics drive behavior”. And auditors
note that these pressures are mirrored in auditors’ clients as well.
Although some notable cross-country (structural contingency) comparison
research was done with respect to audit pricing (e.g., Choi et al. 2008), to date no
scholars have taken a cultural anthropological perspective. The same goes for practice
development and management, except for the study of Cohen et al. (1993). They
hypothesized (but did not test) that auditors in countries that are culturally short-term
orientated247 focus more on (short-term) billable hours and financial results248.
Regarding reputation and status of the audit firm and the profession, some research
found cross-country differences in the maturity or recognition of the audit profession
(see § 4.1), but no scholars have studied cross-national cultural differences impacting
the reputation of auditing.
247 Such as Russia, Morocco, and many of the Latin American and Latin European countries.
248 Cohen et al. (1993) expect that short-term orientation may lead to “the local office of the firm to cut
back on employee training and development, all of which will be detrimental in the long term (…) [and]
could lead auditors to be overly aggressive in soliciting clients in order to support a socially desirable
lifestyle” (Cohen et al. 1993: 9).
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Also, cross-cultural research in general has not studied how cross-national
cultural differences would influence practice development, audit pricing, and
management reputation. Consequently, no propositions are presented in relation to
culture and practice development.













. . . . .
“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.
4.4 Conclusion: a grounded theory on cross-national cultural difference in
auditors’ behavior
The question central to this chapter was:
Is auditors’ professional behavior expected to be affected by cross-national cultural
differences, and, if yes, how is it expected to be affected?
Based on the analysis of the interviews, observational notes, and review of prior
research, the following grounded theory-based propositions on the association
between cross-national differences in the professional behavior of auditors and cross-
national cultural differences are formulated in the answer to this question:
 Cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behavior are affected by cross-
national cultural differences.
 Auditors’ professional behaviors that are most severely affected by cross-national
cultural differences are: skeptical judgment and decision-making, risk assessment
and response, judgments related to probability phrases, knowledge sharing and
consultation, and engagement partner involvement.
 Auditors’ professional behavior is predominantly negatively affected by cross-
national cultural dimensions of Power Distance, Institutional Collectivism, and
In-group Collectivism. This means, for example, that auditors in high Power
Distance cultures are expected to be less likely to share knowledge and consult.
 Auditors’ professional behavior is predominantly positively affected by cross-
national cultural dimensions of Uncertainty avoidance and Assertiveness. This
means, for example, that auditors in cultures that are characterized by high
Uncertainty Avoidance are more likely to share knowledge and consult.
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This proposition is detailed as follows:
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and negotiation
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. . . . .
“+” indicates an expected positive relationship between the variables; “–” indicates an
expected inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates that no relationship is expected.
The cultural practices are related to (see Chapter 3 of this thesis) Power Distance (PD),
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), Assertiveness (ASS), Institutional Collectivism (Inst.C), and In-
group Collectivism (Gr.C) (House et al. 2004).
Table 2 – A grounded theory on the impact of cross-national cultural differences on auditors’ professional
behavior
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5. Loop Two: Culture in the Audit File – A Validation of
Cross-National Cultural Differences in Auditors’
Professional Behavior
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, a grounded theory is proposed on the association between the
professional behavior of auditors and differences in the cross-national cultural
practices of Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Assertiveness, and (Institutional
and In-group) Collectivism. In this chapter, this theory is partly validated through rank
order analysis of 29 country-level observations on five behavioral factors measured
through 1,070 audit engagement questionnaires (comprising over 100 questions) of an
annual process performance improvement project of an international accounting
organization (hereinafter: the questionnaire) submitted throughout its network of
affiliated accounting organizations.249 The five factors of auditors’ professional
behaviors that were uncovered in the questionnaire and used in this validation are:
 Knowledge sharing within the audit engagement team
 Documentation and justification
 Risk awareness and response (part of judgment and decision-making)
 Skeptical judgments and decisions
 Engagement partner involvement (part of working in fluid teams).
Rank order correlation analysis250 is conducted on these 29 country-level questionnaire
scores to validate the grounded theory formulated in Chapter 4. This is done for each
of the five behavioral factors with each of the five national-cultural dimensions
mentioned above. Having gained access to these empirical data, a unique opportunity
unfolds for studying the actual behavioral practices of auditors in a cross-cultural
setting. This can be illustrated as follows:
249 These observations and behavioral factors were uncovered through factor analysis from an original
data set of 1,939 questionnaire observations on more than 100 questions submitted to 114 countries, the
data on which is reduced to a limited number of meaningful scales and observations. See § 5.2.1.
250 Rank order correlation analysis, although a relatively basic method of quantitative analysis, is
considered to be the most appropriate analysis method for this study given the relatively limited number
of observations on a country-level (29) compared with the 1,070 questionnaire-level items. The 1,070
engagement level scores have to be analyzed at the country level in order to be able to compare those
scores consistently with cross-national cultural dimensions. Rank order analysis provides an indication of
relationships, rather than actual explanation of relationships (see § 5.3.1).
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This chapter is structured as follows. The research strategy and methodology is set out
in § 5.2, including the data management measures, factor analysis, and multi-level
validation applied to the dependent variable (the questionnaire data) and limitations.
The actual rank order correlation analysis and the interpretation of the results is










External / environmental factors
Professional behaviors
Figure 4 – Focus of Chapter 5: Validation of cross-national cultural differences in auditors’ professional
behavior
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5.2 Research strategy and methodology
5.2.1 The dependent variable: auditors’ professional behavior
As part of an annual process performance improvement project, an international
accounting organization submitted a questionnaire to a cross-section of their
international assurance practice. The questionnaires cover financial statement audits
performed on financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2005. Access to
the results of the questionnaires was obtained after having received permission from
the international accounting organization and after several meetings and presentations
with a number of key players in the organization. Confidentiality and anonymity were
assured to the international accounting organization.251
The 2005 audit engagement questionnaire consists of 13 primary questions that
cover the main steps of a financial statement audit (i.e., from planning to completion)
comprising a total of approximately 100 secondary questions that cover the detailed
audit steps underlying each of the main steps. These steps include, for example, audit
process, technical applications, legal requirements, and behavioral practices. All
secondary questions underlying each of the 13 primary questions had to be answered
“yes” or “no” based on review of the audit engagement file, resulting in an
automatically calculated overall score on the primary question. In addition, a number
of descriptive questions had to be answered, of which the size of the audit
engagement in number of hours and the time spent on the audit engagement in
number of hours by the audit engagement leader and audit engagement manager were
the most important (and subsequently included in analysis).
In total, the international accounting organization submitted 1,939 questionnaires
to 114 countries of its network of affiliated accounting organizations. The size and
nature of the sample of questionnaires submitted per country reflects the size and
nature (e.g., industry sectors, listed versus privately owned clients) of the audit practice
in each country. The questionnaires were filled out for the selected number of
251 The confidentiality terms agreed upon between the international accounting organization and the
author to gain access to the questionnaire data comprising:
 Anonymity of the international accounting organization
 Generalizations of how the questionnaire is described in this thesis and of the wording used to
describe in this thesis the questions included in the questionnaire (i.e., the description of the
questions is generalized to reflect generally accepted auditing principles as referred to in the
International Standards on Auditing in order to prevent any references to terms specific to the
international accounting organization)
 Anonymity of the individual countries included in the study (i.e., the countries to which the
questionnaires were submitted)
 No reference to absolute scores or questionnaire data on an overall or on an individual country or
question level (i.e., only the variance per question of the 29 countries in aggregate relative to the
variance of the 29 countries in aggregate on the cultural dimensions is reflected in this thesis).
These confidentiality terms do not affect the validity or relevance of the research and findings in relation
to the research question at hand. For example, it is the variance in the questionnaire scores of the
countries, not the absolute scores per country, that is the relevant variable for the research question.
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financial audit engagements by reviewers independent of the audit teams, based on
review of the audit engagement files. The reviewers were experienced financial
auditors and they went through a four-hour training designed by the central project
team. The results of a questionnaire were to be discussed and cleared for accuracy
with the audit engagement partner before completion of the questionnaire. The main
objective of the process was to evaluate the performance of each country as a whole,
not the performance of individual audit teams or audit partners. The process was
designed so that the results could not be traced back to individual teams, clients, or
partners and the outcome of the process had no consequences for monetary rewards.
Consequently, audit teams, including the engagement partners, had no direct incentive
to inflate or manipulate results. A cross-country validation was performed on a
selection of engagements and the results of the questionnaires per country, the
validation being led by the central project team for the larger countries. Opportunities
for countries to inflate results were thus limited as well.
Not all of these 1,939 questionnaires could be used. Several data management
procedures are conducted on the master data. Firstly, countries for which less than 20
questionnaires were filled out were considered not viable for further analysis at a
country level. As a result, 466 questionnaires from 74 countries are omitted from
further analysis (i.e., the smaller countries with 6.3 observations on an average),
leading to 1,473 questionnaires from 40 countries. Secondly, the questions in the
questionnaire were analyzed for missing data. A number of questions were only to be
answered for a small sub-sample depending on qualifying questions, leading to
significant numbers of missing data. These questions were omitted. For two questions
for which only a very limited number of observations were missing non-randomly,
mean substitution was applied to estimate the missing observations (in line with
Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). Lastly, the data was analyzed for reliability (e.g., from the
cross-country review process led by the central project team it was known that a
number of questions were scored unreliably due to, for example, interpretation issues
of the original questions) and for relevance to this study (e.g., some questions related
to IT processes). Where secondary questions were omitted, the automatically
calculated overall score on the related primary question is recalculated to reflect these
data management measures. This has resulted in a cleaned up data set of 24 questions
answered for 1,473 audit engagements in 40 countries.
5.2.2 Factor analysis on the dependent variable
Factor analysis was conducted on these remaining 24 questions of the 1,473
questionnaires (N = 1,473) from 40 countries to further reduce the data from the
questionnaires and uncover a limited number of meaningful scales measuring auditors’
professional behavior. The outcome thereof is included in table 3 on pages 140 to
143. Explanatory factor analysis (maximum likelihood) was conducted with oblique
rotation (Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization252) using SPSS. In addition to the data
252 Oblique rotation was applied based on the expectation that the factors would not be uncorrelated
(which would be needed for orthogonal rotation). That some factors are not uncorrelated was later
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management measures described above (which includes missing values analysis), the
data were furthermore analyzed for singularity (i.e., redundancy253) and
multicollinearity (i.e., very high correlation). Binary data are multiplied with 100 to
have both binary and continuous variables in a consistent range254. The factor analysis
results in five factors with an Eigen value above one, which number is being
confirmed by analysis of the scree plot. These factors are further analyzed for factor
loadings below 0.32 (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007) and high cross-loadings. Questions
four and eight (see table 3) remained to be included despite the low factor loadings
given the content- wise belonging in combination with strong validity and reliability of
the respective factors (see below). Question 14 remained to be included in factor 5
(“fraud awareness”) despite a high cross-loading with factor one for the same reason.
Factor 2 (“preliminary analytical procedures”) comprises only two questions, but
remains to be a separate factor given the high internal correlation and its low
correlation relative to the other factors (see table 4 in footnote 252 for the factor
correlation matrix). This resulted in five factors derived from 17 questions that are
included for further analysis (i.e., another seven questions were omitted for further
analysis as these were not part of any factor).
The five factors are evaluated for internal consistency of the scales based on
Cronbach’s alphas calculations (Cortina 1993; Pallant 2007; Tabachnik and Fidell
2007). The Cronback alpha coefficients for the five factors, as included in table 3 on
pages 140 to 143, are 0.66, 0.89, 0.56, 0.61, and 0.72 respectively. Questionnaire scores
were recalculated to factor scores for further analysis at the factor level. This
recalculation was done unweighted to reflect as much as possible the original
confirmed through the following factor correlation matrix which shows that mainly factors 1, 4 and 5 are
correlated (although the correlation is still not significant):
Factors
Factors 1 2 3 4 5
1. Knowledge sharing within the audit
engagement team 1.0000
2. Preliminary analytical procedures
(having an objective expectation) 0.0965 1.0000
3. Review by the audit engagement
partner (documentation and justification) 0.1101 0.0836 1.0000
4. Risk awareness (risk analysis and
response) 0.2793 0.1145 0.1838 1.0000
5. Fraud awareness (professional
skepticism) 0.4395 0.1580 0.2210 0.2638 1.0000
Table 4 - Factor correlation matrix
253 Two or more variables being singular means that one or more variables are redundant because such
variables are a combination of two or more other variables. For example, in the questionnaire primary
questions are a summary of (sometimes only a limited number of) secondary questions, which means that
either the primary question or the corresponding secondary question(s) is/are redundant.
254 The underlying questions had to be answered “yes” or “no” (leading to binary data), resulting in an
automatically calculated overall score on the primary question (leading to continuous data).
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Table 3 (panel A) - Outcome of factor analysis on 2005 improvement program results
Factor analysis with oblique rotation (oblimin with Kaiser Normallization) and reliability
(Cronbach's alphas)





1 During the planning phase of the audit did the audit engagement
team (including the audit engagement partner) share their
understanding of the audited entity and its environment and internal
controls?
0,84
2 During the planning phase of the audit did the audit engagement
team (including the audit engagement partner) share their
knowledge of and discuss the significant risks of material
misstatement of the financial statements?
0,71
3 Did the audit engagement team hold an audit planning meeting
prior to the start of audit field work?
0,34
4 Did the audit engagement team document their understanding of
the audited entity and its environment and internal controls during
the planning phase of the audit?
0,25
5 Were preliminary analytical procedures carried out as part of
assessing the risk of material misstatements of the financial
statements of the audited entity in the planning phase of the
assurance engagement in accordance with ISA 315.10?
0,04
6 As part of preliminary analytical procedures, is there evidence in the
audit file that the audit engagement team developed upfront
independent expectations about plausible relationships that are
reasonably expected to exist?
0,02-
7 Did the audit engagement partner document to be satisfied, through
review of the audit documentation and discussion with the audit
engagement team, that the audit strategy and the planned scope,
timing and extent of the audit to be performed is appropriate prior
to the start of the audit field work?
0,03
8 Did the audit engagement partner document to have reviewed the
significant audit matters resulting from the audit prior to issuance of
the auditor's report?
0,03
9 Did the audit engagement partner document to be satisfied, through
review of the audit documentation and discussion with the audit
engagement team, that sufficient appropriate audit evidence has
been obtained to support the conclusions reached and for the
auditor's report to be issued?
0,01-
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0,01 0,00- 0,03- 0,03
0,00- 0,04 0,11 0,00-
0,04 0,03 0,01 0,12
0,11 0,02- 0,12 0,07
0,82 0,03 0,02 0,01-
0,96 0,01- 0,01- 0,01
0,06 0,49 0,09 0,11
0,02 0,29 0,06 0,08
0,01- 0,86 0,03- 0,03-
The Behavior of Assurance Professionals – A Cross-cultural Perspective
142
Table 3 (panel B) - Outcome of factor analysis on 2005 improvement program results
Factor analysis with oblique rotation (oblimin with Kaiser Normallization) and reliability
(Cronbach's alphas)






10 Identification, assessment, documentation, and response to significant
risks of material misstatement of the financial statements: did the audit
engagement team document identified (significant) risks of material
misstatement of the financial statements?
0,02
11 Identification, assessment, documentation, and response to significant
risks of material misstatement of the financial statements: did the audit
engagement team make inquiries of management and others within the
entity to identify (significant) risks of material misstatement of the
financial statements and management's response thereto (including
implementation of controls)?
0,00
12 Identification, assessment, documentation, and response to significant
risks of material misstatement of the financial statements: did the audit
engagement partner participate in forming the responses to identified
(significant) risks of material misstatement of the financial statements?
0,14
13 Identification, assessment, documentation, and response to significant
risks of material misstatement of the financial statements: is there
evidence in the audit engagement file that they were addressed through
further auditing procedures?
0,00
14 During the planning phase of the audit did the audit engagement team
(including the audit engagement partner) share their knowledge of fraud
risks at the audited entity?
0,36
15 Did the audit engagement team discuss the susceptibility of the entity's
financial statements to material misstatements due to fraud?
0,05
16 Did the audit engagement team enquire management and others within
the entity regarding the risks of material misstatement due to fraud or
error?
0,05-
17 Did the audit engagement team identify and assessed the risks of
material misstatement due to fraud, and developed and documented
their responses to identified risks?
0,07-
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) SPSS 0,66
Proportion of variance explained 38,1%
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0,00- 0,02- 0,54 0,12-
0,01- 0,03- 0,55 0,06
0,03 0,10 0,37 0,15
0,01 0,03 0,62 0,02
0,02- 0,01- 0,02 0,47
0,01 0,01 0,02- 0,78
0,03 0,07 0,06 0,52
0,03 0,05 0,15 0,52
0,89 0,56 0,62 0,72
27,3% 13,9% 11,8% 8,9%
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questionnaire scoring255. The labels of the factors that were uncovered from the
questionnaire data can be illustrated as follows:
 Factor 1: Knowledge sharing within the audit engagement team
All questions included in this factor deal with audit engagement team coming
together (question 3) for actual sharing (questions 1 and 2), discussion (question
2), and documentation (question 4) of a certain understanding of the audited
client. Knowledge sharing here means the informal and formal interaction with
other auditors with the purpose to share and discuss knowledge (i.e., not the
technical IT knowledge sharing or reward systems impact as per Vera-Munoz et
al. 2006)256;
 Factor 2: Preliminary analytical procedures (or having an objective expectation)
Although conducting preliminary analytical procedures is a required step in the
ISAs (question 5), in the questionnaire it rather reflects an auditor’s ability to have
and discuss with their clients an upfront independent expectation (question 6).
Having an upfront independent expectation contradicts the auditor just observing
and absorbing what the client “tells” the auditor, i.e., having a healthy amount of
professional skepticism;
 Factor 3: Documentation and justification (documentation of review by the audit engagement
partner)
All three questions (7, 8 and 9) are related to the documentation of a number of
minimum required steps in relation to review of the audit by the audit engagement
partner. This documentation by the audit engagement partner is the absolute
minimum required formal sign-off steps by the engagement partner based on the
International Standards on Auditing257;
 Factor 4: Risk awareness and response
The four questions comprising factor 4 cover the same category of audit steps
related to identification, assessment, documentation, and response to significant
risks of material misstatement of financial statements. Within this category, these
questions cover the documentation of identified risks (question 10), the inquiry of
the client to identify risks (question 11), the evaluation by the audit partner of the
identified risks (question 12) and the audit response and work performed on
identified risks (question 13). In other words, these questions relate to the audit
255 The objective of factor analysis for this study is to group and reduce data, not to manipulate data
scores.
256 Although this knowledge sharing for risk analysis is part of the planning phase of the audit as defined
in the ISAs, the timeliness of the knowledge sharing is not considered to be the denominator of this
factor because timeliness of certain audit steps is relevant throughout the ISAs.
257 It should be noted that this could also pose a risk of other variables interrelating with the questions’
scores, for example the external supervision on compliance with the auditing standards (i.e., it is not
culture correlating with the score, but pressure from external supervision on compliance).
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team’s risk analysis and response or the central auditor’s behavior of being aware
of the risks.
 Factor 5: Professional skepticism (through fraud awareness)
The questions of factor 5 are related to almost the whole process of fraud
procedures in a financial statement audit. Discussing and addressing fraud risk are
generally considered to reflect an auditor’s ability to pose challenging questions to
their client (also refer to § 4.3.2). In other words, this factor is related to
skepticism judgments and decision-making, also because these questions cover the
auditor having discussions (within the team and with the client) and the team's
steps in acquiring additional audit response and evidence (which is part of
professional skepticism too, based on its definition).258
A sixth variable: engagement partner involvement (part of working in fluid
teams)
A sixth variable that is uncovered and included in further analysis is the engagement
partner involvement. This variable is expressed as a percentage of the number of
engagement partner hours relative to the total audit engagement hours as registered
for each questionnaire. Of the 40 countries included in the analysis, the registration of
engagement hours was significantly incomplete for one country, resulting in the
omission of that country in the further analysis for this variable only (i.e., 39 countries
included in analysis for the sixth variable). This sixth variable is not significantly
correlated to any of the other five factors, as follows from the following correlation
matrix:
Factors
Factors 1 2 3 4 5
Engagement partner involvement 0.0502 0.0554 0.0668 0.0323 0.0240
Table 5 - Factor correlation matrix with engagement partner involvement
5.2.3 Multi-level assessment of the dependent variable
In order to be able to analyze the data at a country level consistently with cross-
national cultural dimensions, the individual level questionnaire scores were aggregated
and recalculated to the country level (Hofstede et al. 1993; House et al. 2004: 99),
leading to 40 country level observations for the first five factors and 39 for
engagement partner involvement.
258 Although the high cross-loading of question 14 with factor 1 can be explained by the knowledge
sharing part of the question, given the specific subject of the sharing (fraud risks instead of general
understanding as in factor 1), the higher loading with factor 5 is considered to be acceptable.
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Multi-level assessment
The two requirements for meaningful and valid aggregation of data to the country
level are:
 A high level of agreement of respondents within a country to reflect the extent to
which a country score is actually representative for the respondents of that
country (homogeneity of within-country responses).
 A high variation between the countries to reflect the extent to which country
scores are actually different from one another (heterogeneity of between-country
scores).
The Rwg index was used to evaluate the within-country agreement for the first five
factors (James 1984, 1993; Castro 2002; Koene 2002), the index of which should be
higher than 0.70 for “a good amount of agreement” (George 1990; Koene 2002). The
Rwg index is used for “a finite set of sequentially ordered, countable categories”
(James 1984: 87). The data used to measure engagement partner involvement are not
such data. Therefore, the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (Castro 2002, hereinafter:
ICC) is used to evaluate the within-country agreement for the sixth variable. “ICCs are
used when one is interested in the relationship among variables of a common class
[and] the amount of variance in individual level responses that can be explained by
group level properties” (Castro 2002: 70). More specifically the ICC(2) was used,
which coefficient reflects the extent to which group means are reliable and
differentiated from each other. The ICC(2), calculated to be 0.7738 (adjusted for
differences between countries in sample sizes), is high enough to support the valid
aggregation of data to the country level.
An ANOVA test was applied (comparing within- and between-country variance)
to assess the between-country variance. The between-country variance (ANOVA) and
within-country agreement (Rwg and ICC(2)) scores are included in Table 6 on page
147.
All factors show a good amount of within-country agreement (the mean Rwg
scores for the first five factors and ICC(2) for the sixth variable). However, based on
the ANOVA test, factor 2 (“preliminary analytical procedures”) does not show a
significant between-country variance (next to the lowest within-country agreement,
although good enough). It was concluded that factor 2 could not be analyzed validly at
a country level and is, therefore, omitted for further country-level analysis. This is
consistent with, for example, Hughes et al. (2009) who found no significant cross-
cultural variation in how auditors conduct analytical procedures.
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1. Knowledge sharing within the audit team 5.5094*** 0.93 -
2. Preliminary analytical procedures 0.6022*** 0.73 -
3. Sign-off by the engagement leader
(compliance)
11.3258*** 0.80 -
4. Risk awareness (risk analysis and response) 7.8741*** 0.93 -
5. Fraud awareness (professional skepticism) 12.1444*** 0.88 -
6. Engagement partner involvement 4.9200*** - 0.7738
ª The F score reflects the between country variance (ANOVA test comparing within- and between
country variance)
ªª An Rwg score of 0,70 is indicated as a "good amount of agreement" (George, 1990, p.110)
* P < 0.10
** P < 0.05
*** P < 0.01
Table 6 - ANOVA and within-group agreement scores (mean Rwg(j), N=40 for the first five
factors; ICC(2) for the sixth variable, N=39)
In summary, the five auditors’ behaviors that I was able to include in this validation
are:
 Knowledge sharing within the audit engagement team
 Documentation and justification (of review by the audit engagement partner)
 Risk awareness and response
 Professional skepticism (through fraud awareness)
 Engagement partner involvement.
5.2.4 The independent variable: cross-national cultural differences
The primary independent variables for the research question at hand are the cultural
practices of Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Assertiveness, and (Institutional
and In-Group) collectivism as per House et al. (2004) as described in Chapter 3 of this
thesis. As no cultural dimensions are available for all 40 countries as per House et al.
(2004), or not in a comparable categorization259, a further 11 countries with 403
questionnaires (i.e., some of the larger countries with almost 37 observations on
average) had to be omitted. This resulted in a final set of 29 countries with 1,070
questionnaires for which both questionnaire data and cultural practice data are
available and which are subsequently included in analysis (28 countries for the sixth
259 For example, House et al. (2004) split up some countries into two cultural regions, for which no
separate questionnaire data are available, such as East and West Germany, China and Hong Kong, and
Switzerland (French and German speaking).
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variable). The resulting reconciliation between the original master data and the





Master questionnaire data 114 1,939
Omitted:
- countries with less than 20 individual measurements 74 466
- countries for which no cultural dimensions are available as
per House et al. 2004 11 403
Questionnaire data included in analysis 29 1,070
Table 7. Reconciliation of questionnaire data included in analysis
5.3 The association between culture and auditors’ behavior
5.3.1 Rank order correlation analysis
The association between auditors’ professional behaviors (the questionnaire factor
scores) and national cultural dimensions was tested based on rank order correlation
analysis. Rank order correlation analysis, although a relatively basic method of
quantitative analysis, is considered to be the most appropriate analysis method for this
study given the relatively limited number of observations at a country-level (29)
compared with the 1,070 questionnaire-level items. Rank order analysis provides an
indication of relationships, rather than actual explanation of relationships (e.g., as in
regression analysis). The level of agreement of the country scores for the 29 countries
was evaluated in the manner described above. No significant differences were noted
compared with the analysis for the 40 countries. The countries were ranked based on
their factor score on each of the questionnaire variables and compared with the
countries’ rank on each of the national cultural dimensions. Ties in ranks were
resolved (averages were taken).
The strength of the correlation was evaluated using Pearson’s correlation
coefficient (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007)260. Correlation coefficients above 0.50 are
considered strong, and between 0.30 and 0.49 medium. Coefficients below 0.30 are
not included. Table 8 below shows the results of the rank ordering (details are
included in Appendix 5).
260 Given the existence of tied ranks the classical Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used, as opposed
to Spearman’s rho rank correlation coefficient which can only be used when there are no tied ranks.
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Table 8 - Rank Ordering of 2005 questionnaire factor scores with cultural practices
(House 2004)
Significant Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.3 (medium) included (above 0.5 considered strong);
N = 29 for the first 4 factors; N = 28 for 'Engagement partner involvement'
Cultural Practices (House 2004)****
Questionnaire factors PD UA Ass. Inst. C Gr. C
- Knowledge sharing within the
audit engagement team
0.358* -0.316* 0.310 -0.554*** 0.443**
- Review by the audit engagement
partner (documentation and
justification)
-0.090 -0.030 0.179 0.083 -0.106
- Risk response (incl. risk awareness
and analysis)
0.145 -0.127 0.160 -0.504*** 0.060
- Fraud awareness (professional
skepticism)
0.078 -0.089 0.266 -0.411** 0.136
- Engagement partner involvement -0.587*** 0.392** -0.168 0.107 -0.673***
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**** The cultural practices are related to Power Distance (PD), Uncertainty Avoidance (UA),
Assertiveness (ASS), Institutional Collectivism (Inst.C), and In-Group Collectivism (Gr.C) (see
Chapter 3 of this thesis).
5.3.2 The overall effect of cross-national cultural differences
The rank order correlation analysis clearly indicates that auditors’ professional
behavior is affected by cross-national cultural differences, as was expected based on
the grounded theory analysis of Chapter 4. Except for documentation and justification
behavior, all the behavioral factors show significant correlations with the cultural
practices of House et al. (2004). Especially, knowledge sharing and engagement leader
involvement are indicated to be affected by cultural differences. In other words, the
question whether or not auditors’ professional behavior is affected by cross-national
cultural differences should be answered positively.
The answer to the subsequent question of how precisely these behaviors are
affected by cultural differences in detail is less clear. The associations between the
behaviors and a number of the cultural practices that were expected based on the
propositions formulated in Chapter 4 are not found or relations are found in
directions that are opposite to this expectation. On the one hand, this is related to the
complex interaction between behavior and culture (which is not a simple or one-
dimensional matter of cause-and-effect) and, on the other, to the inherent limitations
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of the research instrument used (refer to § 6.3 on limitations of this study). The results
of the rank order analysis per behavioral factor are discussed in detail in the
subsections below.
In line with my expectations, the cultural practices that seem to have the most
significant impact on auditors’ professional behavior are Institutional Collectivism, In-
Group Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance261. Although this
analysis was limited to the five factors concealed in and uncovered from the
questionnaire data, this is largely consistent with the grounded theory on the impact of
cultural practices on the professional behavior of auditors in general. However, contrary
to my expectation, this validation does not show a clear picture on the direction of the impact of Power
Distance and In-Group Collectivism.
No indications were found for an effect of assertiveness practices on the
behavior of auditors. This is counter-intuitive as assertiveness was expected to
positively relate to the majority of the professional behaviors of auditors in general,
including the five behavioral factors included in the rank order correlation analysis.
However, this is less counter-intuitive on the other hand as assertiveness is essentially
about expression and communication styles, rather than about actions.
5.3.3 Knowledge sharing
The association between auditors’ knowledge sharing and cross-national cultural
differences found in this validation in comparison with the expectation is illustrated as
follows:













– + + – ?
Rank order
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“+” indicates an (expected) positive relationship between the variables; ”–“ indicates a
(expected) inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates no relationship is found (expected).
The association between knowledge sharing and culture that is confirmed is that with
institutional collectivism. This is explained as accountability and personal initiative to
share knowledge is easily deferred to others within the group in institutional
collectivistic countries. Furthermore, the hierarchical component of institutional
261 To validate the choice made in § 4.2.3 in the five cultural dimensions of Power Distance, Uncertainty
Avoidance, Assertiveness, Institutional Collectivism, and In-Group Collectivism as per House et al.
(2004), the behavioural traits were also analyzed for relations with the other cultural practices of Future
Orientation, Performance Orientation, Humane Orientation, and Gender Egalitarianism as per House et
al. (2004). Consistent with my expectations, no significant results were found.
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collectivism related to respect for authority and preservation of power results in less
interactive knowledge sharing within the audit teams in countries higher on
institutional collectivism.
The direction of the expected relationship between knowledge sharing and in-
group collectivism was undetermined depending on the (smaller or larger) boundaries
of the in-group. As this factor is related to knowledge sharing within the audit team,
and given the positive relation found, it is inferred that the audit team generally (at
least) coincides with the boundaries of the in-group. With an emphasis on
collaboration, cohesiveness and harmony within the in-group (i.e., the audit team), a
positive relationship between in-group collectivistic practices and knowledge sharing
within the audit team seems to be reasonable. Furthermore, in-group collectivism
seems to be the dominant force over institutional collectivism in terms of its positive
effect on knowledge sharing. This seems to indicate that the family-integrity level of
the collectivism dimension is more valued than the non-kin and non-personal-driven
components of the structural inducements and rewards coming from an institutional
collectivistic perspective.
The negative correlation found between knowledge sharing and Uncertainty
Avoidance is opposite to my expectation and may be counter-intuitive given the
strong preferences for group decisions, information seeking and consultations within
high uncertainty avoiding cultures. On the other hand, Uncertainty Avoidance is also
related to a strong preference for structure, procedures and regulations, and
conforming to those to reduce ambiguity as deviation inflicts increased ambiguity and
uncertainty. Consequently, auditors from high uncertainty avoiding countries may take
less initiative to proactively step forward and share knowledge (as that would lead to
ambiguity and the risk of being wrong about the knowledge one wishes to share) and
show more rigid behavior conforming to the dominant norms. Secondly, Uncertainty
Avoidance is also related to a preference for job security which may result in auditors
being inclined to protect their knowledge as a power base or expert position, and thus
preserving that job security.
The positive correlation found between knowledge sharing and Power Distance
practices is also opposite to my expectation. An explanation for this direction is not
easy to find given the rather strong expectation that power would be assigned to
knowledge in higher Power Distance countries, i.e., knowledge is not shared but
localized. Expert power is one of the different sources or forms of power that are
distinguished (House et al. 2004: 514), which would be based on one’s expert
supremacy over another person. From this perspective, this positive relationship could
be explained to mean that auditors in higher Power Distance countries are inclined to
proactively show their expertise and knowledge supremacy as a confirmation of their
position as experts (and, thus, power).
Contrary to my expectation, no association is found between knowledge sharing
and assertiveness (reference made to § 5.3.2).
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5.3.4 Documentation and justification
The association between auditors’ documentation and justification behavior and cross-
national cultural differences found in this validation in comparison with the
expectation is illustrated as follows:
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“+” indicates an (expected) positive relationship between the variables; “–“ indicates a
(expected) inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates no relationship is found (expected).
Contrary to my expectations, no association at all was found between cultural
practices and documentation and justification behavior.
This is especially counter-intuitive for Uncertainty Avoidance and, to a certain extent,
also Assertiveness, cultural practices given their expected effect keeping meticulous
records and writing memos as uncertainty-avoiding rituals. On the other hand, as seen
in § 4.3.6, auditors also associate documentation and justification behavior foremost
with the litigiousness of the environment and the maturity and strength of the
supervisory body,
i.e., the strength of internal and external supervision and litigation risk. Auditors
furthermore observe an effect from accounting and auditing regulation and standards
being rules-based versus principles-based on auditors being more or less rules-
orientated. Although these aspects are found to indirectly affect auditing (§ 1.2), it may
well be that documentation and justification behavior is not directly driven by cultural
practices, but rather more by structural contingencies such as regulation, supervision
and litigation risk.
Such a conclusion would be supported by an observation in relation to a country
that is lower on Uncertainty Avoidance and Institutional Collectivism, and
Performance Orientation, and higher on Assertiveness. Based on the grounded theory,
expectation documentation and justification behavior would be expected to be less in
this country. However, in an international quality review on the documented audit
work (not being part of this study), the audit practice in this country was among the
top 3 internationally. Explanation within the international accounting organization was
that the supervisory body was so strict, mostly in terms of height of the potential
penalties (which were among the highest compared with many other countries), that it
would dominate compliance in terms of adhering to the audit documentation
standards.
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5.3.5 Risk awareness and response
The association between auditors’ risk awareness and response and cross-national
cultural differences found in this validation in comparison with the expectation is
illustrated as follows:
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“+” indicates an (expected) positive relationship between the variables; “–“indicates a
(expected) inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.”’ indicates no relationship is found (expected).
The association between risk awareness and response and culture that is confirmed is
that with institutional collectivism. This can be explained through individuals in higher
institutional collectivistic cultures not being inclined to take accountability for
appropriate risk mitigation which is deferred to others within the collective (i.e.,
authority). This negative association is furthermore consistent with observations
related to auditors in some countries higher on institutional collectivism being less
able to clearly distinguish significant from other audit risk, to decide on an effective
and efficient response on that assessment and, as a consequence, do too much work
due to a poor response (i.e., no appropriate response on too many risks that are
considered significant, but are in fact not significant).
That no association is found between risk awareness and response and
Uncertainty Avoidance and Assertiveness practices is specifically counter-intuitive.
Auditors from cultures higher on Uncertainty Avoidance and lower on Assertiveness
were expected to more carefully consider their response to identified risks to reduce
uncertainty around those risks. This is not confirmed through this validation, for
which no reasonable explanation was found at this stage.
5.3.6 Professional skepticism
The association between auditors’ skeptical judgments and decision-making and cross-
national cultural differences found in this validation in comparison with the
expectation is illustrated as follows:
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“+” indicates an (expected) positive relationship between the variables; “–“ indicates a
(expected) inverse relationship; “?” indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates no relationship is found (expected).
The (negative) association between institutional collectivistic practices and auditors’
professional skepticism is confirmed. This is consistent with the grounded theory
proposition in terms of conformity to one’s environment, maintaining harmony
through subjugation and respecting authority, and avoiding and compromising
conflict resolution style (“saving face”). However, Institutional Collectivism in
combination with In-Group Collectivism, Power Distance and Assertiveness was
specifically expected to affect auditors’ professional skepticism through loyalty,
respect of authority, and expressing one’s views and opinions. Although based on the
grounded theory analysis I would agree with the interviewed auditors that differences
in professional skepticism is “a cultural thing”, this is not confirmed through this
validation. This would, nevertheless, also be consistent with the view of the
interviewed auditors who acknowledge that many other factors influence auditors’
skeptical attitude, such as the strength of the supervisory body, the interaction with
the audited client, or the business environment and corporate governance structure.
5.3.7 Engagement partner involvement
The association between audit engagement partner involvement and cross-national
cultural differences found in this validation in comparison with the expectation is
illustrated as follows:
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(expected) inverse relationship; “?" indicates the direction of the expected relationship is
indeterminate; and “.” indicates no relationship is found (expected).
The association between engagement partner involvement and cultural practices of
Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance is confirmed. This can be explained
through engagement partners participating more in team work (in countries lower on
Power Distance) and engagement partners having a greater need to reduce uncertainty
and ambiguity and, consequently, have a natural inclination to have a greater
involvement in the audit (in countries higher on Uncertainty Avoidance).
The expected positive association between engagement partner involvement and
institutional collectivism is not confirmed. Instead a negative association was found
with In-Group Collectivism. This negative association, meaning that engagement
partners in collectivistic cultures would be less involved in the audit, can be explained
through engagement partner counting and relying more on the paternalistic
mechanisms within in-group and the loyalty, conformation, and trust of its members
towards the goals of the collective and the leader of the in-group (i.e., the engagement
partner).
5.4 Summary and conclusion
In the previous chapter, a grounded theory was proposed on the association between
cross-national differences in the professional behavior of auditors and differences in
cross-national cultural practices of Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance,
Assertiveness, and (Institutional and In-Group Collectivism). In this chapter, this
theory is partly validated through rank order analysis of country-level observations on
five behavioral factors measured through 1,070 audit engagement questionnaires
(comprising over 100 questions) of an annual process performance improvement
project of an international accounting organization submitted throughout its network
of affiliated accounting organizations. The five factors of auditors’ professional
behaviors that were uncovered in the questionnaire and used in this validation are:
 Knowledge sharing
 Documentation and justification
 Risk awareness and response
 Skeptical judgments and decisions
 Engagement partner involvement.
Rank order correlation analysis262 is conducted on these 29 country-level questionnaire
scores to validate the grounded theory formulated in Chapter 4. This is done for each
262 Rank order correlation analysis, although a relatively basic method of quantitative analysis, is
considered to be the most appropriate analysis method for this study, given the relatively limited number
of observations at a country-level (29) compared with the 1,070 questionnaire-level items. The 1,070
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of the five behavioral factors with the national-cultural dimensions of Power Distance,
Uncertainty Avoidance, Assertiveness, and (Institutional and In-Group) Collectivism
of House et al. (2004). Having access to these empirical data unfolds a unique
opportunity to study the actual behavioral practices of auditors in a cross-cultural
setting. The rank order correlation analysis clearly indicates that auditors’
professional behavior is affected by cross-national cultural differences, as was
expected based on the grounded theory analysis of Chapter 4. In other words, the
question whether or not auditors’ professional behavior is affected by cross-national
cultural differences should be answered positively. How precisely these behaviors are affected
by cultural differences in detail is less clear. The expected associations between the behaviors
and a number of the cultural practices are not found or relations are found in
directions that are opposite to my expectations. Conclusions drawn from the rank
order analysis are:
 Cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behavior are affected by cross-
national cultural differences.
 The cultural practices that have the most significant impact on auditors’
professional behavior are Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Power
Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance (largely consistent with the grounded theory).
 Behaviors that are most severely affected by differences in cross-national cultural
practices are knowledge sharing and engagement partner involvement.
engagement level scores have to be analyzed at the country level to be able to compare those scores
consistently with cross-national cultural dimensions. Rank order analysis provides an indication of
relationships rather than actual explanation of relationships (see § 5.3.1).
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6. The Behavior of Assurance Professionals: Bound and
Blinded by Culture
Research findings reported in this thesis illustrate that actual behavior of people
cannot simply be controlled by (more) rules and structures. Instead, it turns out that
the consistent and effective application of rules (i.e., people behaving consistently with
the expected behaviors reflected through those rules) is heavily dependent on the
personal and subjective interpretation by the professionals applying those rules. As
shown in this thesis, such interpretation is driven considerably by cross-national
cultural differences. By showing that cross-national cultural differences influence the
professional behavior of auditors across borders, this thesis illustrates how the local
environment and culture drive professional behavior and lead to differences in the
interpretation and application of rules and standards.
On a broader level I would like to conclude with a call for better recognition of
behavioral drivers in the work of professionals and gatekeepers. There is the need for
a paradigm shift: from the homo economicus to the recognition of the emotional
dimensions and the “animal spirits” – the recognition of the hidden values and beliefs,
and human psychological and cognitive drivers and limitations in organizational
management. In other words, this thesis is a call for more behaviorally-informed
measures of management and control. This is not only relevant in relation to
governance, risk management, and compliance. It is all the more important for
strategy execution and brand management, because it is through the behavior of its
people that a company’s core values are reflected in its organizational performance
and trust. We need to incorporate more realistic visions of human behavior in
management tools and have to acknowledge the limitations of thus far much assumed
rationality of human behavior. This need is also recognized in Harvard Business
Review’s “Top 10 trends you have to watch in shaping the business landscape”
(Beinhocker et al. 2009).
Before setting out my recommendations to the assurance profession and to
business in general in § 6.2, a summary of this study and its conclusions are included
in § 6.1. The limitations of this study are covered in § 6.3, followed in § 6.4 by
suggestions for future research for both the assurance profession and business in
general, as well as for social-psychological, organizational behavior and cross-cultural
researchers.
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6.1 Summary and conclusion: the association between culture and
behavior in assurance
This thesis provides a more profound and empirically grounded analysis and
understanding of the globalization and functioning of multinational audits. It provides
an in-depth understanding of the effect of cross-national cultural differences on the
professional behavior of auditors. With that, this thesis illustrates that behavioral
drivers, such as one’s cultural programming, determine personal behavior and
subjective application of (global) standards, rules, and procedures that reflect what
behavior is expected. This continues to be of increasing importance for international
accounting firms and cross-cultural auditing research given the ongoing globalization.
Global audit firms and the international standard setters tend to be culture-bound and
culture-blind (§ 1.3). In response, this thesis provides an international perspective to
better understand what it means to be an auditing professional in different countries
or institutional sites. This analysis and understanding is based on the following
research question that was central to this thesis:
Is auditors’ professional behavior affected by cross-national cultural
differences, and, if so, how?
Against this background, the following research questions were covered:
 What is professional behavior in general and that of auditors in particular, what
drives professional behavior, and how does culture play a role in this context?
 What are cross-national cultural differences and how do these affect behavior in
general?
 How do auditors’ professional behaviors differ across national borders?
 How can cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behavior be
explained by cross-national cultural differences?
For the first two research questions, a literature review approach was taken. This
resulted in the theoretical foundation for a multi-method “two-loop” empirical
research strategy conducted to answer the third and fourth research question, as
follows:
 Loop One: In the first empirical “loop”, a grounded theory approach is taken to
explore which auditors’ behaviors differ cross-nationally and how these
differences are expected to be explained by cross-national (cultural) differences.
Based on open-structured interviews with 35 internationally experienced senior
auditors, complemented by observational notes taken by the author and literature
review of the current academic understanding of cross-national (cultural)
differences in auditors’ professional behavior, propositions are formulated as part
of a grounded theory on how cross-national cultural differences are expected to
impact the professional behavior of auditors internationally.
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 Loop Two: In the second empirical “loop”, the grounded theory propositions of
“Loop One” are partly validated through rank order analysis of five behavioral
factors measured through 1,070 audit engagement questionnaires from 29
countries of an annual process performance improvement project of an
international accounting organization.
Having access to the views of auditors themselves through interviews and
observations and to empirical data directly from the audit practice (i.e., the
questionnaire results) provided unique and valuable sources for this study. Being
based on grounded theory and a validation in part thereof, this study is the first to
explore the cross-national differences impacting the auditing profession in general and
auditors’ professional behavior in particular in a comprehensive and empirically
grounded and contextualized fashion.
Based on this thesis’ study of definitions and fundamental theories of professional
behavior (such as Parsons and Shils 1951; Cyert and March 1963; Ajzen 1991), the
definition of professional behavior used in this study is based on the notion that
professional behavior is:
 driven by one’s human nature and personal needs, motivations, ethics, and
psychological cognitions and limitations;
 guided and controlled by internalized values and beliefs that are shaped by
personalized interpretations of national, professional, and organizational cultures,
conventions, and norms;
 conditioned by the external constraints and situational contingencies from
discretional interactions with external actors and the profession’s immediate
business environment;
 leading to “actions”, being the actual professional behaviors visible to the outside
world, and a certain “end result” or performance.
Based on this definition and the behavioral conceptualizations covered in Chapter 2,
professional behavior is visualized in the context of its drivers in the following
proposed conceptual framework of drivers of professional behavior (a detailed
overview is included in Appendix 1):
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Through this conceptual framework it is suggested that professional behavior is driven
by:
 Psychological and cognitive factors (e.g., “animal spirits”, self-interest and
motivation; moral reasoning; and bounded rationality)
 National cultural variables (as illustrated in this thesis)
 Factors in the context of the profession (e.g., the effect of rules versus principles-
based standards; public accountability; and aggravators increasing professional
workplace stress and, consequently, deviant behavior)
 Factors in the context of the organization (e.g., a firm’s management controls; a
firm’s socialization and acculturation intentions; and the business of assurance and
the cost-quality dilemma)
 Variables in the context of an auditor’s interaction with its environment (e.g.,
communication and negotiation with the client; public trust and reputation; and










Figure 1 – The effect of national culture in the context of the drivers of professional behavior
National culture
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The professional behaviors of auditors identified in this study, which were the basis
for the empirical phases of this study, are the following:
 Judgment and decision-making
 Skeptical judgments and decisions
 Knowledge sharing and consultation behavior
 Working in fluid teams (engagement partner involvement)
 Communication and negotiation behavior on observations and findings
 Documentation and justification
 Dysfunctional behaviors
 Audit pricing and practice development.
These behaviors are studied in relation to culture, which is defined in this study as
follows (taken from House et al. 2004: 15):
Culture is defined as shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and
interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common
experiences of members of collectives that are transmitted across
generation.
National cultures manifest both in practices and values. This study focused on the
cultural practices as independent variables reflecting national cultures. The behaviors
of auditors are set off against five dimensions of nation cultural practices as per House
et al. (2004). These cultural practices are (House et al. 2004):
 Power Distance: The degree to which members of an organization or society
expect and agree that power should be stratified and concentrated at higher levels
of an organization or government.
 Uncertainty Avoidance: The extent to which members of an organization or
society strive to avoid uncertainty of future events by relying on established social
norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices.
 Assertiveness: The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are
assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships.
 Institutional Collectivism: The degree to which organizational and societal
institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources
and collective action.
 In-Group Collectivism: The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty,
and cohesiveness in their organizations or families.
The focus of this thesis in relation to the conceptual framework of professional
behavior is visualized as follows:
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Based on the grounded theory approach of interviews, observations, and literature
review in “Loop One”, it was expected that:
 Cross-national differences in auditors’ professional behavior are affected by cross-
national cultural differences.
 Auditors’ professional behaviors that are most severely affected by cross-national
cultural differences are: skeptical judgment and decision-making, risk assessment
and response, judgments related to probability phrases, knowledge sharing and
consultation, and engagement partner involvement.
 Auditors’ professional behavior is predominantly negatively affected by cross-
national cultural dimensions of Power Distance, Institutional Collectivism, and
In-Group Collectivism.
 Auditors’ professional behavior is predominantly positively affected by cross-
national cultural dimensions of Uncertainty Avoidance and Assertiveness.
These propositions are detailed in the conclusion of Chapter 4.
In “Loop Two”, these expectations are validated in part through rank order
analysis of five behavioral factors originated from a total of 1,070 audit engagement
questionnaires from 29 countries. The results thereof clearly indicate that auditors’










External / environmental factors
Professional behaviors
Figure 3 – Focus of this thesis: cross-national cultural differences in auditors’ professional behavior
National culture
- Judgment and decision-making
- Skeptical judgments and decision
- Knowledge sharing and consultation
- Working in fluid teams
- Communication and negotiation
- Documentation and justification
- Dysfunctional behavior
- Audit pricing and practice development
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the answer to the first half of the central question should be answered positively: Yes,
the professional behavior of auditors is affected by cross-national cultural differences.
How precisely these behaviors are affected by cultural differences in detail is less
clear. The expected associations between the behaviors and a number of the cultural
practices are not found or relations are found in directions that are opposite to my
expectations. On the one hand, this may be related to the complex interaction
between behavior and culture, which is not a simple or one-dimensional matter of
cause-and-effect. On the other, this may be due to the inherent limitations of the
research instrument used (§ 6.3). The conclusions drawn from the rank order analysis,
in answer to the central question of this thesis, are:
 Yes, auditors’ professional behavior is affected by cross-national cultural
differences.
 The cultural practices that have the most significant impact on auditors’
professional behavior are Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism,
Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance (largely consistent with the grounded
theory).
 Behaviors that are most severely affected by differences in cross-national cultural
practices are knowledge sharing and engagement partner involvement.
These findings are detailed in Chapter 5.
6.2 Implications and recommendations
What do these findings mean for the assurance profession? And what can
professionals and organizations in general learn from them?
6.2.1 To the assurance profession
The assurance profession’s International Standards on Auditing and Code of Ethics,
as well as the assurance firm’s global audit methodologies and systems of
coordination, are designed to assure the provision of assurance services at the highest
possible level of audit quality throughout the world. This study, however, shows that it
cannot be simply assumed that auditors around the world will interpret and apply the
global standards consistently. The local interpretation and application of these
standards is significantly affected by the national culture of the professionals applying
those standards.
This study – as well as prior research – underlines that the international auditing
standards are culture-bound and culture-blind. A central recommendation to the
profession (i.e., audit practitioners, the international audit firms, international
standard-setters, and professional educational bodies) is to acknowledge the effect of
cross-national cultural differences. As one of the auditors who was interviewed as part
of this study notes:
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We have a one-size-fits-all audit approach, which is based on a rules-based environment
with even more rules than in the [International Standards on Auditing] itself. What we
need to do is recognize that different approaches work in different parts of the world, or at
least different emphasize works in different parts of the world. We need to acknowledge
the cultural differences.
Or as another interviewed auditor says: “The audit profession is trying to ‘force’ a
Westernized, global audit approach onto the Eastern region, but the two don’t necessarily fit that
well”. Other auditors embrace the principles behind the global standards, but
experience a lack of appreciation in the rules-based standards for the local differences
in applying these principles.263 This study provides a mirror reflecting those cultural
factors that the profession could take into consideration to achieve the highest
possible audit quality and consistent interpretation of the auditing standards.
To the international audit firms
This thesis also challenges the assumption of “One Firm” made by the global audit
firms. Despite their globally embraced organizational cultures, national cultural
differences still affect local behavior significantly. That is, national cultural differences
still “shine through” distinctively (§ 3.4.2), which also affects a firm’s embedding in
the local environment and marketplace. One of the auditors interviewed in this study
indeed questions the global strategy and operating model of the Big 4 firms:
We are dealing with vast cultural differences in terms of challenging,
acceptance, questioning. (…) I think we can’t resolve it without changing
an entire culture. And the auditing profession is not going to do that. You
have to accept that you can’t change the culture of a country. And,
therefore, is one global strategy correct?
Alternatively, a globally communicated strategy may focus on a limited set of core
corporate values which are then executed locally with genuine appreciation for the
local interpretation and practices. Inherently, core values are sensitive to subjective
and personal interpretation too. Research has shown that it is possible to design a set
of global corporate values in such a way that they are perceived and received similarly
across borders (e.g., Nimwegen 2002). But the way that global management adapts
them to local cultures and condition determines their success or failure.
263 As one auditor, who was interviewed as part of this study, notes: “The big difference with the [Western]
environment is that the [Non-Western people] are less confrontational, not less aggressive. This means that they can be as
aggressive in terms of the goals and objectives they want to reach and of standpoints they want to get across, but that the way
they do it is less confrontational compared to [the Western approach]. I.e., they go in it less direct, more from person to
person. These differences should be known more and room should be allowed to operate with these differences. (…) The
weakness of the current Auditing and Accounting standards is that these different approaches can not be taken into account.
You are forced to follow the standard, and there is no room for local interpretation or appreciation for local specificities. (…)
[We] embrace the global principles behind the global standards and audit approach, but experience a lack of appreciation for
the local differences in applying the principles or the way to approach the principle”.
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Local cultural determinants that should be taken into account in terms of local
operations are mainly Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Power
Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance (and, to a lesser extent, Assertiveness). These
cultural differences affect the professional behavior of auditors in multiple ways (e.g.,
engagement partner involvement, knowledge sharing, and auditors’ ability to pose a
challenging question), as well as the behavior of management of the audited
companies (e.g., openness in communication, respect for authority, etc.). Other, more
contextual and institutional differences that could be taken into account are
differences in the size and nature of the local audit practice, client base, and capital
market, the nature of the legal environment (e.g., rules- or principles-based), the public
regard for and maturity of the auditing profession, the accounting standards, the
nature and strength of oversight on the profession, the level of corruption, and the
litigiousness of the business environment. As one of the interviewees stated; “The
biggest risk is that we try to implement a global thing in a local environment without thinking about
the local specificities”. Yes, one can standardize globally, but full standardization that is
blind for cultural differences is not sustainable. One needs to take the local
specificities into consideration. Also McDonalds, for example, knows how to
standardize its production processes without losing an eye for the local preferences in
its menu offering. Taking these cultural and contextual factors into account enables
execution of a global strategy closely connected to the local markets, clients,
employees, and other stakeholders.
To audit professionals and multinational audit teams
Multinational companies and their stakeholders expect consistency of assurance
quality throughout the world. Multinational headquarters management expect their
group operations throughout the world to go through a consistently rigorous audit
process based on international standards. International Standard on Auditing 600
“Special Considerations – Audits of Group Financial Statements (Including the Work
of Component Auditors)” covers the requirements in relation to multinational group
audits. The group engagement partner is responsible for the direction, supervision and
performance of the group audit engagement as a whole (ISA 600 § 11). He or she
cannot defer responsibility to local auditors, yet, needs to rely on their judgments
within local cultural settings. Hence, the group engagement team needs to assure that
all the local audits anywhere in the world are performed at a consistent level of quality
in accordance with international standards. This thesis shows that cross-national
cultural differences impact the behavior of auditors throughout a group audit
engagement. Internationally operating audit practitioners should, thus, take the effect
of culture and other international differences into account in directing multinational
audits. This means that audit teams should explicitly manage their international audit
team and pay specific attention to their communication with local teams. Building an
international audit team in essence is nothing different from working in local teams,
but the challenge is that these international teams are geographically spread, are
virtually connected, and are an ensemble of many different cultural influences. The
group audit team plays a vital role in building such a strong multinational team in
which knowledge sharing and open communication are central. This means that they
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should try to bridge cultural differences by investing time and effort in building
relationships through communication with and visits to the local audit teams, being
available for and responsive to the local audit teams, and facilitate meetings for the
local auditors in the group to meet each other. Furthermore, group audit team should
be as explicit and unambiguous as possible in their written communication (e.g., audit
instructions and periodic updates) leaving as little room as possible for doubt on what
is expected from the local auditor. Lastly, audit practitioners should take into account
how local cultures could affect the business and control environments of local
subsidiaries of their multinational clients (e.g., their accounting practices, the strength
of internal control, the level of corruption in a country, or in clients’ intentional tax
evasion or non-compliance). Joining meetings with local management may be a good
opportunity for group auditors to assess any effects thereof on the audit. Ultimately,
group auditors will have to become comfortable with the interpretations and
conclusions of their local colleagues that are embedded in and fluent in the local
cultural context.
To auditing standard setters and educators
In the process of standard-setting, cross-national differences are oftentimes
underexposed. Given the number of differences between countries found to impact
auditors’ behavior across borders, the auditing profession should be aware that the
local interpretation and application of international auditing standards, whether they
are rules- or principles-based, may differ from how it was intended by the
international standard-setters, although locally applied in good faith. Prior research
suggests that education focused on explaining the meaning intended in the various
standards within the specific national cultural context mitigates the (impact of)
application differences between countries (e.g., Welton and Davis 1990; Patel and
Psaros 2000: 311). One of the answers could be to adapt local training to local
specificities. For example, as one auditor suggests who was interviewed as part of this
study: “The impact on training is that we need to cover how to deal with the issues of ‘saving face’
and ‘dominance’ in terms of hierarchy. (…) I would love to hear a bunch of managers from [country
X] discussing on how they would deal with ‘face’ when they address difficult accounting questions”.
Following the conceptual framework of professional behavior, as presented in §
2.5 of this thesis, a next recommendation is to create further awareness of the
behavioral drivers and enrich auditing education with behavioral aspects, both those
reflected in the client (e.g., incentives, motives, negotiation tactics) and those reflected
in the behavior or auditors themselves (such as inherent biases, peer pressure,
performance appraisals). Areas of behavioral aspects where educators could enrich
their programs for novice auditors are: how visceral traits (or “animal spirits” such as
greed) drive behavior (§ 2.5.2.1); how moral reasoning and seductions affect judgment
and decision-making (§ 2.5.2.2); how creativity and emotional intelligence stimulate
quality, innovation, and business (e.g., Shanteau and Peters 1989: 1; Hood and Koberg
1991: 19; Al-Beraidi and Rickards 2003: 7); the limiting effect of bounded rationalities,
especially unconscious bias (e.g., Smith and Kida 1991; Bazerman et al. 2002, also
refer to § 2.5.2.3; Moore et al. 2006); the effect of workplace stress (§ 2.5.4.2) and
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audit firm socialization and (peer) pressures (§ 2.5.5); and negotiation tactics and
behavior (e.g., Brown and Johnstone 2004; Adair and Brett 2005; Metcalf et al. 2007).
6.2.2 Broader reflections on the future of assurance – a window of
opportunity
Losing touch with the behavioral and cultural aspects of and its role in the social
system has done the assurance profession no good. The recent loss of self-regulation
of the auditing profession (Chapter 2), in my opinion, demarcates a new lowest point
of public trust in and the professional development of auditing and assurance. But at
the same time, the profession is at the brink of regeneration if it dares to choose to.
The assurance profession is at its lowest point of public trust in that the
profession let itself be pushed into the corner of commoditization due to its profit
paradigm of the business of auditing, fear and lack of self-esteem, and an
overemphasis and cramp on technical quality, risk management, and compliance. An
illustration of the sad state of affairs is that the auditing profession generally has
become a price-fighter, instead of a valued “trusted advisor”. The latest offer of
CFO.com for a customized audit fee benchmark report is the most tangible example
of the focus on price only, not value. But also widespread “low-balling” indicates a
universal depression within the profession. These are symptoms of the decrease in
relevance and added value, both to clients as to society at large. The profession’s role
in the credit crunch, for example, was one of collective absence and not daring to raise
the flag as a profession on systemic risks. Auditors should not only look at financial
reporting compliance, but also at such matters as the general health of the
organization, the sustainability of the business model, organizational behavior and
business conduct, and systemic risks in an industry or economy as whole. On the
other hand, all the regulations that supervisory and regulatory bodies spread out over
the profession do not allow for much room to maneuver. The full structuring and
automation of the Big 4 audit approaches, although resulting in a more efficient audit,
may only have added to the mechanization and hollowing of the financial audit
impairing its effectiveness and relevance (with auditors staring at laptop screens rather
than exploring the factory floor and talking with the client in a genuine effort to
understand the business).
Litigiousness of the environment and risk management seems to be one of the
main factors stopping auditors in fulfilling their wider role. Auditors have become
compliant slaves, rather than masters of the rules. The increased litigation risk and
financial disasters of the early 21st century not only initially lead to an explosion of
new and even stricter rules and regulatory pressure. In many parts of the world, these
lead to a shift to a more rules-based environment in which, as one of the interviewed
auditors stated, “auditors use their strict rules and hide for safety and security behind them, as they
then at least complied with the rules”. One could say that it appears that auditors fear the
risk of not meeting the auditing standards more than they fear the risk of getting the
accounts wrong. This raises the question who or what the auditors have to serve: the
society at large, their clients, their clients’ shareholders or the regulator? In fact, a
couple of auditors who were interviewed as part of this study have put it even
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stronger: they see themselves “as agents of their own internal risk management departments and
technical offices”, in the office’s strive to fearfully prevent every risk of being indicted.
Principles-based auditors generally disapprove of this approach as it leads to sticking
to the rules, “ticking-the-box” behavior, auditors only just going through the motions
of what is prescribed, and hence “not looking at the whole picture and knowing that it is all
about understanding the client and about what is really going on”. A cramp the auditing
profession should come out of.
The desire to reduce the rules and regulations and re-establish the room to
maneuver is increasing. However, opinions differ strongly on how to realize this. As a
starting point, there is a role to be played by the professional and oversight bodies
(such as the IFAC) in creating a healthier audit environment. They should, for
example, step in to put a hold to the “low-balling” practices that so significantly
smother every investment and genuine effort of the profession to increase the
relevance and added value of the assurance profession. The firms themselves seem
not to be capable of taking such steps. They also worry about their own skin. In that
case, any innovation and creativity is difficult to expect. The focus should be on
adding value to clients and society first, rather than adding value to the firm and
individual auditors and not the other way around. The assurance profession needs to
earn back society’s trust that the profession devotes its intellectual capital and
expertise to serve the public, “above and beyond material incentives” (Larson 1977:
X). Auditors should cease to see the profession as a business case only and regenerate
their role as social-trustees to reconfirm their social significance and relevance. Than
society will happily grant the fruitful rewards for auditors’ unique and responsible
roles in society and capital markets.
Luckily, the world is changing rapidly. The assurance profession has great
opportunities of becoming relevant again in this new world and regenerate itself. The
assurance profession may need to rethink and rebuild a number of their core values in
their professional culture and institutions. Being proud again of being an auditor may
be a good start. The upside of the recent corporate and financial crises is that people
again recognize that auditing matters. This also raises expectations of the profession to
explore opportunities for diversification in adjacent areas. Stakeholders and
shareholders, for example, expect companies to provide transparency in how they
have run their businesses and used their resources, not only their financial resources
(i.e., capital) but increasingly also their intangible or non-financial resources that are
strategically significant, such as their people, their brand and reputation, and the
natural resources. What do they stand for, what are their corporate values in doing
business? To what extent were they true to those values? Or is it just “window-
dressing”? What have they achieved with respect to all value drivers? Corporate
reporting on all matters of value, not just financial, in a more coherent and aligned
manner is a development that cannot be stopped or neglected (e.g., Eccles and Krzus
2010). Companies are expected to become “naked” through their corporate reporting,
providing reliable and relevant insights into their organizational behavior and business
conduct. It is the assurance profession that is in an excellent position to step up and
lead the way for companies to this next level of corporate reporting. This includes
guiding the development of standards and improvement of corporate measurement,
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information, and control systems. This also includes finding answers to the question
that to what extent assurance would desire to enhance the credibility and quality of
such integrated corporate reporting and find ways to provide this assurance. Also
here, the impact of cross-national cultural differences on the business and control
environment of companies plays a significant role. Of course, the question of legal
liability and litigation is a serious issue and a real risk. An answer to the question of
risk should also be found, but should not stop the profession from taking the
initiative.
It may thus well be a good time for revival of the assurance framework or another
form of broadening the auditing profession’s scope of being a “relevant trusted
advisor”. Not only for their clients, but may be, more importantly, also for society at
large. Auditing, “[t]he pioneer profession of opening up new areas of practice”
(Larson 1977: 204) needs to take a proactive approach, both academia and practice, to
regain relevance, added value, and self-direction. Some structural measures and
fundamental reform may be needed to overcome the assurance crisis. Measures that
may hurt at first, but that are build on a strong belief of its central role in society. This
may well result in the regeneration of auditor relevance and the opportunity to come
out of the corner of overemphasis on technical quality, compliance, and superficial
“ticking-the-box” behavior, and to stop the intellectual drain of the profession. In
other words, there is also a chance for the profession to regain its position as “best
place to work” for a new generation of future auditors. At the end of the day this will
lead to a more sustainable position and performance of the assurance profession as a
whole.
6.2.3 To management and business in general
Following the call for recognition of the “animal spirits” at the start of this concluding
chapter, this thesis is an illustration that true behavior of people cannot simply be
controlled by (more) rules and structures. Instead, behavior is driven by many
psychological, cultural, contextual, and environmental factors – among which are
cross-national cultural differences. For example, cross-national cultural differences
play a significant role in aspects such as: workplace behaviors (e.g., Hofstede 1980,
2001); preferred leadership styles (e.g., House et al. 2004); the global interpretation of
carefully nurtured corporate values (e.g., Nimwegen 2002); executive management
decision-making (e.g., Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007); appreciation of
reward systems (e.g., Gelfand et al. 2007); corruption and ethical reasoning (e.g.,
Kimbro 2002); how markets operate (e.g., Barley and Kunda 2004); learning styles
(e.g., Joy and Kolb 2009); and international team coordination and effectiveness (e.g.,
Maznevski 1994; DiStefano and Maznevski 2000). The essence of my
recommendation to business in relation to the impact of cross-national cultural
differences is similar to that of the auditing profession: take cross-national (cultural)
differences into consideration in the local executing of global strategies.
Management simply cannot be effective without taking the cultural contexts and
societal coherences into consideration. Furthermore, business could try to learn from
and leverage on different cultural perspectives. “Western society” tends to respond to
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the current trust crisis by introducing even more rules and procedures – something
that has proved ineffective when looking at the last decade alone. To rebuild trust, we
may want to look out for different perspectives on societal and corporate life. Not to
the “Western”, individualistic cultures that are considered the drivers of economic
wealth and wrongfully have been ascribed universal validity, also through management
literature. Rather, we could learn from the way things are done in the more
collectivistic cultures that are traditionally based on interpersonal trust and the base
assumption of “the good in people”. For example, from the “BRIC” countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China) that are seen as emerging countries (in the “Western”,
economic sense that is). Just a bit more of this paradigm may already help people to
learn to trust again. The societal shift of individualization and hardening-up of
“Western” society in terms of the litigiousness of the business environment may
indeed have become too brutal for health reasons. The real art is then to find ways to
foster and uphold the collectivistic values of interpersonal trust also with increased
well-being and economic wealth.
Yet currently, corporate management has an inclination and irresistible need to
control the behavior of their people to safeguard performance (technical, service, and
perceived performance, or image and brand perception). Because it is through their
behavior that people reflect a firm’s core values. If behavior is not in line with these
corporate values and strategy, a company most likely will not meet its internal
objectives and the external expectations stakeholders have. Of course, rules create
clarity. But too much rules result in loss of individual and personal responsibility
(people hiding behind the rules). Innate human drivers and cognitive biases should
not be ignored in designing corporate codes, procedures, and standards. There are
only so many formal measures an organization can take to suppress innate human
drivers and biases to prevent risks, failures, and conflicts. It would be prohibitively
costly to try to reduce such risks to zero. In other words, more and more rules do not
effectively drive and control the right behaviors. Rules are nothing more than a formal
documentation of generally expected and accepted behaviors that are furthermore
subject to societal change. Simply “saying” what behavior is expected through
issuance of rules does not suffice. Corporate management should seriously consider
reducing rules and formal structures of control in favor of more behaviorally-
informed measures and soft controls.
Put in a broader perspective, corporate management should rather focus on
building and fostering a strong values-based organizational culture. An organizational
culture around a limited set of core corporate values based on an organization’s
strategy, desired market and brand positioning, value drivers, and governance
objectives. An organization’s culture, if interwoven well into the organization, can
drive its value creation through the reflection of corporate values in the behavior of its
people. And organizational culture can function to govern behavior in terms of
corporate control at the same time. For example, Alvesson and Robertson (2006)
point to strategic and symbolic mechanisms to construct an “elite identity” around a
set of core corporate values as a strong control mechanism. Such a strong
organizational culture facilitates the promotion of self-discipline to accomplish high
standards of performance, the attraction and retention of professionals that fit with
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the organization, and the securing of an image that clients are prepared to engage
with, if chosen well. Such an approach can also be recognized in the work of Schein
(2004) and Taylor (2005). But most importantly, a strong organizational culture in
which the corporate values are truly lived drives the right behaviors and enables
sustainable corporate performance. Such an organizational culture is not about what is
said, but about what is actually done and what corporate citizens observe to be really
valued in the organization. These observations are based on the behaviors of their
leadership, management, and colleagues, on the decisions taken, choices made, and
other symbols, and on the organizational systems and structures implemented.
A central recommendation to the business practice, therefore, is to explore and
determine how organizational culture, behaviors and behavioral drivers as such can be
measured and steered upon, and how they relate to corporate performance. This may
well be a basis for companies to be able to manage, control, and incentivize the
appropriate organizational behavior (e.g., Burney 2009). Furthermore, this may
provide for a basis for increased transparency over organizational behavior and
business conduct through integrated (and non-financial) corporate reporting.
Corporate reporting in a more coherent and aligned manner allows companies’
management to take credit for its management efforts, to strengthen societal and
organizational trust, and to build the corporate brand and reputation (e.g., in line with
the concept of companies becoming “naked” – with that, creating value for all
stakeholders of the company. Lastly, this may provide avenues to pursue a response
along the lines of the increasing expectation of society, regulators, and other
stakeholders around transparency in and assessment of organizational culture and
behavior (as those expectations are expressed by many governance bodies, such as the
G20, OECD, US Treasury, UK’s Turner Review, and the EU’s Larosière review). If
society, regulators, and other stakeholders want to measure culture to assess and
manage the ways in which companies fulfill their public responsibilities, three
fundamental issues need to be considered: the definition of culture and behavior
covered, evaluation of measurement criteria, and the selection of measurement
methods and tools. Especially in a cross-cultural setting, establishing such standards
may prove to be a challenge. Furthermore, the desired extent and level of assurance
over such cultural and behavioral measurements should be considered and is an
important public policy question. It is subsequently up to the assurance profession to
determine how this assurance could be provided, taking into account the legal
liabilities related to that (e.g., Free et al. 2009) – a challenge which, I trust, the
assurance profession will embrace wholeheartedly and fearlessly.
6.3 Limitations of this study
As with any other study, this study has a number of limitations. Having gained access
to the views of auditors themselves through interviews and observations, and to
empirical data directly from the audit practice (i.e., the questionnaire results) provides
unique and valuable sources for this study. Confidentiality and anonymity were
assured to all participants and to the international accounting organization as a
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whole.264 This anonymity does not hinder the validity or relevance of the research,
analyses, and findings in relation to the research question at hand.
This study focuses on a single occupation at one international accounting
organization. Based on the analysis of the interaction between national cultures, and
organizational and occupational cultures set out in Chapter 3, it is asserted that both
organizational and occupational cultures do not (significantly) eliminate the effect of
national cultures on the professional behavior of auditors. Research shows that local
organizational and occupational cultures reflect the societal cultures of the countries in
which they are embedded, and that these cultures, therefore, find their way to
contribute to the shaping of actual behavior even if it is guided by the internationally
imposed standards and regulations.
Grounded theory, as applied in Chapter 4, by nature has a number of limitations.
Personal bias is the most important threat recognized in grounded theory, in two
major aspects of analysis: the data gathered by the researcher (e.g., interviews,
observational notes, etc.) and the interaction between the researcher and the data.265
As illustrated in § 4.2.2, this study includes various safeguards to preserve the
reliability and content validity, and to mitigate the effect of personal bias. Most
importantly, as a confirmatory reliability check, a second independent researcher re-
performed 25% of the open coding process and confirmed the validity of that part of
the coding process.
The questionnaire instrument, as applied in Chapter 5, was not specifically
designed for purposes of this study. But, having gained access to it unfolds a unique
opportunity of studying the actual behavioral practices of auditors. This means that
results of an existing questionnaire instrument were used to uncover the maximum
meaningful data and information concealed in it. The most significant limitation
thereof is that only those behavioral factors could be yielded that were covered in the
questionnaires. Consequently, it does not cover the entire range of auditors’
professional behaviors as included in the grounded theory. Secondly, with the
questionnaire instruments being designed and implemented by a project team
predominantly comprising “Westerners” (people from the US, the UK, Germany, and
the Netherlands) in a “Western”-oriented accounting organization, it may inherently
suffer from the same Western ethnocentric bias as the International Standards on
Auditing on which the questions are based.266
264 These confidentiality terms are further detailed in §§ 4.2.2 and 5.2.1.
265 The interplay between the data (i.e., the interviewees or the audit environment in this study) and the
researcher in both gathering and analysing data, “by its very nature, is not entirely objective as some
researchers might wish us to believe. Interplay, by its very nature, means that a researcher is actively
reacting to and working with data.” Strauss and Corbin265 continue by stating, “We believe that although
a researcher can try to be as objective as possible, in a practical sense, this is not entirely possible.” One
of the major objects of the grounded theory, thus, is to help the user recognise bias by self-consciously
bringing disciplinary and research experience into the analysis.
266 On the other hand, the fact that the questionnaire instrument was not designed as part of this study
can be considered a strength because answering the questions related to auditing were thus not influenced
by a cultural perspective, hence, measuring the pure auditor behaviors. The questionnaires were generally
filled out by reviewers originated from the country under review. This also means that culturally different
interpretations on the side of the audit team are not interfered through a reviewer’s interpretation, or
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As explained in § 5.3.2, the answer in detail as to the question of how precisely
auditors’ professional behaviors are affected by cultural differences is less clear. This
leads me to place a number of remarks that call for careful interpretation of the
results. First of all, not finding many of the expected effects is illustrative for the
complex interaction between behavior and culture, which is not a simple or one-
dimensional matter of cause and effect.267 Secondly, it illustrates the vulnerability of
doing cross-cultural research and the importance of adhering to a number of basic
sanitary, methodology rules in designing a cross-cultural research instrument to assure
content validity (such as content equivalence and construct validity268). In this case, for
example, a limitation is that the actual occurrence of the cultural values and practices
of House et al. (2004) within the sample of this study could not be validated. But,
thirdly, not finding effects on all cultural practices also illustrates the importance to
study cross-national cultural differences in the context of a certain profession, industry,
or behavioral trait, rather than assuming general applicability of cross-national cultural
differences as such.
This study focuses on a number of behavioral differences in the audit process. It
neither focuses on all behaviors in the audit process, nor on the outcome of the audit
process (e.g., an audit opinion based on audit procedures in accordance with the
auditing standards). It should be acknowledged that multiple combinations of inputs
in auditors’ decision-making may well lead to the same outcome (or not necessarily
lead to a different outcome), which is the outcome of a complex mix of audit
procedures and behaviors. I emphasize that this study, thus, cannot and does not say
or evidence anything about the outcome of that audit process.
6.4 Mind the gap: much is yet unknown (avenues for future research)
The behavioral study of accountants is alive, rich, and highly relevant in light of a
profound and practical insight into the individual behavior of auditors directly, and
that of professionals and other knowledge workers in general. That is relevant too for
professional, regulatory and educational purposes.
Cross-national cultural research in professional behavior
Some significant efforts have been made to study cross-national differences in
auditors’ professional behavior (with or without cross-national cultural differences as
even that cultural traits are enhanced, meaning that cultural values reflected in the questionnaire scores
are pure.
267 Many other (confounding) factors may come into play that could not be taken into account in this
study but which confuse any direct effect of culture on behavior (e.g., the structural contingencies that
impact behavior directly, such as the business environment, the strength of the supervisory body, or
litigation risk).
268 For example, professional skepticism measured in this study had to necessarily focus on one aspect of
the construct, the fraud perspective, which may not validly cover the full spectrum of the behavioral trait.
Other constructs may require further “unzipping”, such working in fluid audit teams versus engagement
partner involvement.
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explanatory variable) in the areas of auditors’ (ethical) judgment and decision-making,
professional skepticism, communication and negotiation, and dysfunctional behaviors. Nevertheless,
the number and robustness of studies on cross-national differences in auditors’
behavior are still relatively limited, especially studies that have included cross-national
cultural differences as explanatory variable. This study made a contribution to the
further understanding. To date, auditors’ behaviors have not (yet) been studied in a
structured way specifically within a cross-cultural auditing context in the areas of
knowledge sharing, consultation behavior, audit team cooperation, documentation and justification,
and practice development, audit pricing, and reputation management.
As a recommendation for future cross-cultural auditing research, scholars could
take a number of methodological notions into consideration (partly based on notions
of other scholars, e.g., Cohen et al. 1996; Harrison and McKinnon 1999; Patel et al.
2002; Patel 2004). Cross-cultural studies that have identified differences across
national borders should focus on explaining the differences by cross-national cultural
differences or what it is about culture that caused the claimed effect, rather than
treating culture as a “catch all” black box. Furthermore, such studies should consider
also applying the cultural dimensions of House et al. (2004) next to those of Hofstede
(also many more recent studies have not yet applied House et al. (2004), e.g., those of
Arnold et al. (2007) and Ge and Thomas (2008)). Next, when studying cross-national
cultural differences in auditing the relevance and existence of those differences should
be validated in the specific auditing environment and sample (instead of simply
assumed the cross-cultural differences to apply to their sample or study without
further investigation) and as much cultural dimensions and as much countries as
possible should be taken into consideration explaining the differences. Some final
methodological recommendations can be made in relation to content equivalence in
the auditing constructs (e.g., appropriate and valid vignettes), addressing level of
analysis issues, and acknowledging and addressing the (in general) Western cultural
biases in the research instruments and findings.
As illustrated in § 6.3, the grounded theory formulated in Chapter 4 could only
partly be validated in Chapter 5 due to the inherent limitation of the questionnaire
instrument used. An important avenue for future research is to continue the empirical
validation of the grounded theory proposed in this study. Furthermore, the
sophistication of the empirical analysis in this study (rank order analysis, following
multi-level adjustments of individual questionnaires to country-level observations)
could be improved through other ways of multi-level analysis that have not been
widely applied so far in the field of cross-cultural management sciences (e.g., multi-
level structural equation modeling).
Furthermore, focus and research efforts should be directed towards cross-
cultural differences in the behavioral drivers of professionals in general. For instance,
it would be interesting to explore the impact of cross-national cultural differences on
the psychological and cognitive drivers of professionals’ behavior, which are generally
considered to be universal traits. There is some evidence that personality traits such as
personal motivation and locus of control (or self-efficacy) are universal features
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(Smith and Bond 1998; Gelfand et al. 2007).269 Instead, there are the societal rules for
acting on and expression of that trait (e.g., emotional expression, introvert versus
extrovert communication, manifestations of self-efficacy, etc.) that are culture-specific
(Triandis 1994: 35; Smith and Bond 1998: 74, 84). Future research may focus on those
(universal) drivers of professional behavior.
On the other hand, research has also shown that factors that drive such
expressions and motives in organizational behavior vary across cultures, such as the
need for achievement and human motivation (e.g., Gelfand et al. 2007; Tsui et al.
2007).270 This would mainly be due to the lifelong interaction of people with their
local environment which shapes person-typical behavior (e.g., Berry et al. 2002: 86).
With the local environments differing across cultures, the drivers (and the meanings
and antecedents) of such person-typical behavior would likely differ across cultures. A
relevant area for future research would be to explore the impact of cross-national
cultural differences in a number of such drivers on the behavior, such as
accountability (e.g., Ahrens 1996; Gelfand et al. 2004), motivation (e.g., Adler 2002),
need for achievement (e.g., Sagie et al. 1996), locus of control (e.g., Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner 1997), reward (e.g., Gelfand et al. 2007), and organizational
commitment (e.g., Meyer et al. 2002; Gelade et al. 2008).
Professional behavior in general
In this thesis, a conceptual framework of professional behavior is presented, within
which the focus of this study is put in context. This conceptual framework is based on
existing theories and prior research. The association between cross-national cultural
differences and professional behavior has been empirically studied as part of this
thesis, but the other components and interactions have not. Future research may
focus on further refinement of the framework and establishing its empirical validity
(e.g., the causal and/or contextual relationships between behaviors and its drivers).
This would add to the much-desired better understanding of behavioral drivers in a
professional or organizational work context (as illustrated in the introduction of this
thesis). Empirical research into the behaviors and behavioral drivers of professionals
would benefit from better cooperation between corporate firms and academics to
conduct research directly within daily practice (which subsequently adds to the
practical application of such knowledge). Both parties may need to overcome some
269 Smith and Bond (1998: 93), for example, summarize: “There are gender differences that transcend
cultures. We can all decode certain facial expressions. Personality traits do cluster in similar ways. Humans
are all capable of both aggression and pro-social behavior. Dimensions of organizational structure are
relatively invariant”.
270 Gelfand et al. (2007: 482), while synthesizing prior research, note, for example, that intrinsic motives
for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are important for well-being across cultures. Nevertheless,
some have argued that achievement motivation is stronger in individualistic (e.g., Germany, the UK, the
US, the Netherlands) than in collectivistic cultures (e.g., China, Indonesia, Philippines, Albania), as the
meaning and antecedents of such motivation varies across cultures. Culture also affects performance and
learning motivational orientations. In Confucian philosophy, there is an emphasis on the need to perfect
oneself, and, as a result, in the Chinese culture, learning appears more fundamental than achievement per
se. Learning and performance orientation were highly correlated and both were associated with
performance among Hong Kong students, whereas they were more distinct among American students.
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issues with respect to mutual trust and practical application of the research. This thesis
may count as a good example of how that may work, and proof that it does work.
If behavioral research in accounting, and more specifically the behavioral study of
accountants, is about applying research from the field of psychology and sociology, a
call for more psychological (or psycho-analysis) and sociological involvement in this
field of research would be justified when looking at the current (limited) depth of our
understanding in the factors related to personality and cognitive psychology. Areas
wherein to extend behavioral research efforts could be: the role of “personnel
concepts” in the control of an audit firm (e.g., Alvesson 2004: 147; Almer et al. 2005;
Pierce and Sweeney 2005: 340), the effect of deadline pressure on auditors’ behavior
(e.g., Nelson and Tan 2005: 54), and the benefits of diversity in an audit context (e.g.,
Johnson et al. 2008).
Following the central recommendation to business in relation to value creation in
§ 6.2.2, a subsequent though somewhat overwhelming area of future research is to
explore and determine how organizational culture, behaviors and behavioral drivers as
such can be measured and steered upon, how they relate to corporate performance,
how they can be reported upon internally and externally, and how they could be linked
to appropriate structures of management and control, including reward. Three
fundamental issues need to be considered: the definition of culture and behaviors
covered, evaluation of measurement criteria, and the selection of measurement
methods and tools. Especially in a cross-cultural setting, establishing such standards
may prove to be a challenge. Furthermore, the desired extent and level of assurance
over such cultural and behavioral measurements should be considered and is an
important question for the profession to answer in discussion with the society at large.
A related area for future research for the auditing profession is to explore how and
what level of assurance could be provided on these components, taking into account
the legal liabilities related to that (e.g., Free et al. 2009).
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Appendix 1 – Conceptual Framework of Auditors’
Professional Behavior
Factors influencing professional behavior Auditors' professional behavior







National culture Behavioral factors
Judgment and decision making
Skeptical judgments and decisions
Knowledge sharing and consultations
Working in fluid teams
Corruption and level of societal ethics Communication and negotiation of observations
Documentation and justification
Dysfunctional behaviors
Contextual factors Practice development, pricing, and reputation
Profess ional context
Professional commitment and autonomy
Professional code of ethics
Standards and legislation
Accountability, oversight and enforcement
Education, knowledge, ability, and experience and confidence
Nature, ambiguity, and complexity of the task and environment
Profession related workplace stress
Organizational context
Organizational image, identity and socialization
Auditor-firm employment relationship
Management control
Audit approach, quality controls, and risk management
Between-auditor interaction and accountability
Size and nature of the firm and its business portfolio
External / environmental factors
Client interactions
Society at large and public trust
Litigiousness of the business environment
Competition and fee pressures
National cultural dimensions (as per House et al. 2004): power distance,
assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism,
performance orientation, future orientation, human orientation, and gender
egalitarianism (covered in Chapter 3)
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Appendix 2 – Illustration of interview questions posed to
interviewees
 Please tell me something about yourself and your firm / office /
environment.
 In your international experience, what differences in behavior did you run
into in general (while working with auditors from different countries)?
 Referring to the differences you just pointed out, how did you deal with
them?
 Drawing upon your experience, what kinds of different behaviors do you
notice in working with colleagues from different countries?
 Referring to the differences we just discussed, please rank the three most
important differences for me on a scale of 1 to 3.
 Looking at yourself, what behaviors are specifically … / specific to your
country?
 To what extent is your own behavior different from that of your colleagues
who have the same cultural background?
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Appendix 3 – Details of the interview population
Descriptive statistics of the interview population Number %
Number of invitations sent 38
Number of invitations not responded to 3 8%
Response rate 92%
Number of formal interviews conducted 35 100%
Number of internationally operating auditors 27 77%
Number of expatriates 24 69%
Number of (internal) standard-setters 12 34%
Number of members of international management 9 26%
Number of countries covered through the interviews 29 88%
Number of interviewees who are national practice leaders 5 14%
Number of interviewees who are international practice leaders 10 29%
Number of interviewees who are partners 25 71%
Number of interviewees who are managers 10 29%
Number of interviewees with less than 10 years practice experience 1 3%
Number of interviewees with 10 to 19 years practice experience 12 34%
Number of interviewees with 20 to 29 years practice experience 13 37%
Number of interviewees with more than 30 years practice experience 9 26%
Number of face-to-face interviews 9 26%
Number of interviews through teleconference calls 26 74%
Number of interviewees personally met and introduced 23 66%
Number of tape-recorded interviews 29 83%
Average time per interview (estimated) 1h15
Interviews in English with non-native speakers 22 63%
Interviews in English with native speakers 11 31%
Number of informal interviews ('chats on the side') 7 20%
Further demographic details are available from the author upon request.
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Appendix 4 – Illustrative example of observational notes
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Appendix 5 – Details of rank ordering of questionnaire factor
scores with cultural practices
Questionnaire factor: Knowledge sharing within the audit engagement team
Significant Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.3 (medium) included (above 0.5 considered
strong); N = 29
Cultural Practices (House 2004)****
Country rank PD UA Ass. Inst. C Gr. C
1 14 14 2 20 4
2 5,5 19 3 25 14
3 4 26 10,5 27 3
4 7 15,5 23 15,5 2
5 15 12 18,5 11 8
6,5 10 23 15 28 17
6,5 2 20 26 21 5
8,5 8,5 21 25 24 12
8,5 11 28 5 22 10
10 27 18 8 13,5 18
11 17,5 13 18,5 8,5 16
12 23 15,5 1 19 22
13 1 24 9 29 12
14 28 7 6 13,5 26
15 25 9 16 15,5 21
16 13 10 14 23 20
17 24 1 29 1 28
18 20 2 12 4 6
19 17,5 8 13 18 24
20 29 3 22 6 29
21 8,5 22 17 7 1
22 3 27 4 2 9
23 12 25 10,5 26 15
24 5,5 29 24 12 7
25 19 17 27 3 19
26 26 11 7 17 23
27 16 5 20 10 12
28 21,5 6 28 5 27
29 21,5 4 21 8,5 25
Pearson correlation
coefficient 0.358* -0.316* 0.310 -0.554*** 0.443**
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**** The cultural practices are related to Power Distance (PD), Uncertainty
Avoidance (UA), Assertiveness (ASS), Institutional Collectivism (Inst.C), and In-
Group Collectivism (Gr.C) (see Chapter 3 of this thesis).
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Appendix 5 (continued)
Questionnaire factor: Review by the audit engagement partner
Significant Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.3 (medium) included (above 0.5 considered
strong); N = 29
Cultural Practices (House 2004)****
Country rank PD UA Ass. Inst. C Gr. C
1 3 27 4 2 9
2 23 15,5 1 19 22
3,5 26 11 7 17 23
3,5 24 1 29 1 28
5 25 9 16 15,5 21
6 7 15,5 23 15,5 2
7 14 14 2 20 4
8 11 28 5 22 10
9,5 17,5 13 18,5 8,5 16
9,5 21,5 6 28 5 27
11 10 23 15 28 17
12 17,5 8 13 18 24
13 4 26 10,5 27 3
14 8,5 21 25 24 12
15 20 2 12 4 6
16 19 17 27 3 19
17 5,5 29 24 12 7
18 1 24 9 29 12
19 28 7 6 13,5 26
20 5,5 19 3 25 14
21,5 29 3 22 6 29
21,5 2 20 26 21 5
23 27 18 8 13,5 18
24 21,5 4 21 8,5 25
25 15 12 18,5 11 8
26 13 10 14 23 20
27 8,5 22 17 7 1
28 12 25 10,5 26 15
29 16 5 20 10 12
Pearson correlation
coefficient -0.090 -0.030 0.179 0.083 -0.106
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**** The cultural practices are related to Power Distance (PD), Uncertainty
Avoidance (UA), Assertiveness (ASS), Institutional Collectivism (Inst.C), and In-




Questionnaire factor: Risk response (incl. risk awareness and analysis)
Significant Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.3 (medium) included (above 0.5 considered
strong); N = 29
Cultural Practices (House 2004)****
Country rank PD UA Ass. Inst. C Gr. C
1 8,5 21 25 24 12
2 17,5 13 18,5 8,5 16
3 13 10 14 23 20
4 10 23 15 28 17
5 14 14 2 20 4
6 25 9 16 15,5 21
7 23 15,5 1 19 22
8 11 28 5 22 10
9 7 15,5 23 15,5 2
10 5,5 19 3 25 14
11 24 1 29 1 28
12,5 1 24 9 29 12
12,5 4 26 10,5 27 3
14 28 7 6 13,5 26
15 20 2 12 4 6
16 2 20 26 21 5
17 27 18 8 13,5 18
18 17,5 8 13 18 24
19 5,5 29 24 12 7
20 12 25 10,5 26 15
21 29 3 22 6 29
22 21,5 6 28 5 27
23 15 12 18,5 11 8
24 19 17 27 3 19
25 3 27 4 2 9
26 21,5 4 21 8,5 25
27 16 5 20 10 12
28 8,5 22 17 7 1
29 26 11 7 17 23
Pearson correlation
coefficient 0.145 -0.127 0.160 -0.504*** 0.060
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**** The cultural practices are related to Power Distance (PD), Uncertainty
Avoidance (UA), Assertiveness (ASS), Institutional Collectivism (Inst.C),
and In-Group Collectivism (Gr.C) (see Chapter 3 of this thesis).
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Appendix 5 (continued)
Questionnaire factor: Fraud awareness (professional skepticism)
Significant Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.3 (medium) included (above 0.5 considered
strong); N = 29
Cultural Practices (House 2004)****
Country rank PD UA Ass. Inst. C Gr. C
1 8,5 21 25 24 12
2 14 14 2 20 4
3 23 15,5 1 19 22
4 25 9 16 15,5 21
5 7 15,5 23 15,5 2
6 11 28 5 22 10
7 4 26 10,5 27 3
8 10 23 15 28 17
9 20 2 12 4 6
10 29 3 22 6 29
11,5 13 10 14 23 20
11,5 17,5 13 18,5 8,5 16
13 5,5 19 3 25 14
14 17,5 8 13 18 24
15 28 7 6 13,5 26
16 2 20 26 21 5
17 24 1 29 1 28
18 1 24 9 29 12
19 3 27 4 2 9
20 27 18 8 13,5 18
21 12 25 10,5 26 15
22 21,5 6 28 5 27
23 19 17 27 3 19
24 8,5 22 17 7 1
25 15 12 18,5 11 8
26 5,5 29 24 12 7
27 26 11 7 17 23
28 16 5 20 10 12
29 21,5 4 21 8,5 25
Pearson correlation
coefficient 0.078 -0.089 0.266 -0.411** 0.136
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**** The cultural practices are related to Power Distance (PD), Uncertainty
Avoidance (UA), Assertiveness (ASS), Institutional Collectivism (Inst.C), and




Questionnaire factor: Engagement partner involvement
Significant Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.3 (medium) included (above 0.5 considered
strong); N = 28 for this questionnaire factor
Cultural Practices (House 2004)****
Country rank PD UA Ass.
Inst.
C Gr. C
1 24 1 28 1 27
2 28 3 21 6 28
3 21,5 4 20 8,5 24
4 7 14,5 22 15,5 2
5 26 17 7 13,5 18
6 19 16 26 3 19
7 25 9 15 15,5 21
8 27 7 6 13,5 25
9 13 10 13 22 20
10 21,5 6 27 5 26
11,5 12 24 9,5 25 15
11,5 11 27 5 21 10
13 23 14,5 1 18 22
14 5,5 18 3 24 14
15 17,5 8 12 17 23
16 10 22 14 27 17
17 4 25 9,5 26 3
18 17,5 12 17,5 8,5 16
19 8,5 20 24 23 12
20 1 23 8 28 12
21 8,5 21 16 7 1
22 14 13 2 19 4
23 2 19 25 20 5
24 20 2 11 4 6
25 16 5 19 10 12
26 3 26 4 2 9
27 15 11 17,5 11 8
28 5,5 28 23 12 7
Pearson correlation
coefficient -0.587*** 0.392** -0.168 0.107 -0.673***
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**** The cultural practices are related to Power Distance (PD), Uncertainty
Avoidance (UA), Assertiveness (ASS), Institutional Collectivism (Inst.C), and
In-Group Collectivism (Gr.C) (see Chapter 3 of this thesis).
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Samenvatting: Cultuurverschillen in het Gedrag van
Accountants (Dutch summary)
Inleiding
Het gedrag van mensen is moeilijk te verklaren, laat staan volledig te voorspellen.
Toch worden krampachtige pogingen gedaan om het gedrag van werknemers en
professionals zo volledig mogelijk te begrijpen en te beheersen door middel van regels,
procedures en andere richtlijnen. Dit proefschrift illustreert dat het gedrag van mensen
niet simpelweg gestuurd en gecontroleerd kan worden door (meer van) zulke
beheersingsmaatregelen. De effectieve toepassing van regels en codes (lees: het gedrag
van mensen in overeenstemming met het gedrag dat over het algemeen geaccepteerd
en verwacht wordt zoals dat in die regels is vastgelegd) is sterk afhankelijk van de
persoonlijke en subjectieve interpretatie van dergelijke regels. Die interpretatie wordt
gedreven door een complex samenspel van psychologische, contextuele en
omgevingsfactoren (zie bijvoorbeeld Parsons en Shils 1951; Ajzen 1991; Elster 2007),
waaronder internationale cultuurverschillen (zie onder meer Hofstede 1980; 2001 en
House et al. 2004).
Deze studie toont dit aan door bestudering van de praktijk van professionals in
een sterk gereguleerde beroepsgroep die onlangs haar zelfregulering heeft verloren
doordat hun gedrag niet voldeed aan de verwachtingen van het maatschappelijk
verkeer, ondanks het bestaan van een omvangrijke set van uitgebreide regels en
normen: de internationale praktijk van controlerend accountants. Ik bestudeer hun
praktijk in relatie tot één van de belangrijkste factoren die effect hebben op verschillen
in gedrag: internationale cultuurverschillen. Dit is het effect dat de beroepsgroep juist
probeert te voorkomen door middel van één set van wereldwijde regels en
standaarden (bijvoorbeeld de ‘International Standards on Auditing’ van de IFAC,
hierna: de ISA’s).271 Eerder onderzoek toont aan dat deze culturele verschillen een
duidelijk invloed hebben op het gedrag van accountants. Accountants zijn daarnaast
ook een interessant studieobject in het licht van het algemene begrip van het gedrag
van professionals en werknemers in andere kennisintensieve beroepen.
Professionalisering speelt een steeds belangrijker rol in management en
kennisintensieve bedrijven (zie bijvoorbeeld Alvesson 2004; Greenwood et al. 2005;
Khurana 2008; Anderson 2009).
Met andere woorden, de focus van dit proefschrift is de invloed van internationale
cultuurverschillen op het professionele gedrag van accountants. Met dit onderzoek
draagt dit proefschrift niet alleen bij aan een beter inzicht in de internationalisering
van het accountantsberoep en het effect van cultuur op het gedrag van professionals
271 De doelstelling van de IFAC (International Federation of Accountants) is, onder andere, "versterking
van de wereldwijde accountantsberoepsgroep (...) door de uitvaardiging en het bevorderen van de
naleving van hoge kwaliteit professionele normen" en "de bevordering van het leveren van kwalitatief
hoogwaardige diensten door alle leden van de wereldwijde accountantsberoepsgroep "(vrij vertaald van
IFAC 2009: 4-5).
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in de context van een specifiek beroep. Het laat daarnaast zien dat gedrag en de
toepassing van regels sterk beïnvloed wordt door de persoonlijke en subjectieve
interpretatie van degene die deze regels toepast. Onderzoek naar het effect van
internationale cultuurverschillen op het gedrag van accountants is temeer van belang
in relatie tot het streven van de wereldwijde accountantsorganisaties (in het algemeen
aangeduid als de “Big 4”) naar een zo hoog mogelijke kwaliteit wereldwijd (zie
bijvoorbeeld Cooper et al. 1998 en Mennicken 2008). Deze wereldwijde firma’s
worden geconfronteerd met een veelheid aan internationale verschillen die een indirect
effect hebben op het beroep (zoals verschillen in wet- en regelgeving,
verslaggevingsystemen en -praktijken, structuur van de kapitaalmarkt, corruptie, et
cetera).
Doel, vragen en opzet van dit onderzoek
De focus van dit onderzoek is het directe effect van internationale cultuurverschillen op
het professioneel gedrag van accountants. Uit studies van bijvoorbeeld Barret et al.
(2005) en Arnold et al. (2009) blijkt dat accountants internationaal aanzienlijk
verschillen in de wijze waarop ze hun beroep uitoefenen. Ondanks dat ‘International
Standards on Auditing’ dit effect juist proberen te voorkomen, zijn deze standaarden
cultuurgebonden en cultuurblind omdat ze vooral vanuit ‘Westers’ perspectief zijn
geschreven.272 Dat leidt tot multi-interpreteerbare richtlijnen waar verschillen in
culturele waarden alle ruimte hebben. Het zijn, onder andere, deze internationale
cultuurverschillen die leiden tot verschillen in het gedrag van accountants in de
toepassing van regels en standaarden. Men kan daarom niet simpelweg aannemen dat
accountants wereldwijd de regels consistent interpreteren en in praktijk brengen.
Het is om deze redenen dat onderzoekers op het gebied van accountantscontrole
het belang benadrukken van internationaal onderzoek om beter te begrijpen wat de
impact is van internationale cultuurverschillen op het professionele gedrag van
accountants in verschillende landen en institutionele omgevingen (zie bijvoorbeeld
DeFond en Francis 2005: 8 en Humphrey 2008: 185). Waar we al wel veel weten van
individuele componenten van het gedrag van accountants en van internationale
cultuurverschillen als zodanig, weten we echter nog relatief weinig over de interactie
tussen die twee: de invloed van internationale cultuurverschillen op het professionele gedrag van
accountants. Met andere woorden, ons wetenschappelijk begrip hierover is verre van
compleet of gestructureerd. De centrale vraag in dit proefschrift is derhalve:
Wordt het professioneel gedrag van accountants beïnvloed door
internationale cultuurverschillen, en zo ja, hoe?
272 De ‘International Standards on Auditing’ zijn cultuurgebonden omdat ze hun oorsprong vinden in met
name de ‘Westerse’ culturele waarden en cultuurblind omdat de standaards geen rekening houden met
cultuurverschillen in de interpretatie en toepassing van de standaards.
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Tegen deze achtergrond staan de volgende deelvragen centraal:
 Wat wordt verstaan onder professioneel gedrag in het algemeen en van
accountants in het bijzonder, en hoe wordt dat gedrag verklaard?
 Wat zijn internationale cultuurverschillen en hoe beïnvloeden die het gedrag in het
algemeen?
 In hoeverre en hoe verschilt het gedrag van accountants over de landsgrenzen?
 In hoeverre kunnen verschillen in gedrag van accountants over de landsgrenzen
verklaard worden door internationale cultuurverschillen?
De eerste twee vragen zijn beantwoord door middel van literatuuronderzoek. Dit
heeft geleid tot een conceptueel raamwerk van gedrag van accountants in hoofdstuk 2
en een overzicht van internationale cultuurverschillen in hoofdstuk 3.
Gegeven de beperkte kennis van international gedrag van accountants, is een
empirische onderzoeksstrategie in 2 fases toegepast voor de beantwoording van de
derde en vierde onderzoeksvraag. Dit heeft als volgt plaatsgehad:
 Fase 1: in de eerste fase is een ‘grounded theory’ aanpak toegepast om te
verkennen hoe het gedrag van accountants verschilt over de landsgrenzen en hoe
internationale cultuurverschillen verwacht worden deze verschillen in gedrag te
verklaren. Gebaseerd op open-gestructureerde interviews met 35 internationaal
ervaren senior accountants uit de internationale praktijk, aangevuld met
observaties van de auteur zelf en literatuuronderzoek naar internationale
verschillen in het gedrag van accountants, zijn er hypotheses geformuleerd als
onderdeel van een ‘grounded theory’ over de interactie tussen internationale
cultuurverschillen en het gedrag van accountants.
 Fase 2: in de tweede fase is deze ‘grounded theory’ gedeeltelijk gevalideerd door
middel van ‘rank order’ analyse van vijf gedragingen van accountants die zijn
getest door middel van 1.070 questionnaires gericht op de toepassing van de
controlestandaarden in controleopdrachten in 29 landen van een internationale
accountantsorganisatie.
De rechtstreekse toegang tot de ervaringen en praktijk van accountants zelf (zowel via
de interviews als op basis van de hierboven genoemde questionnaires) is een unieke en
zeer waardevolle bron voor deze studie gebleken. Gebaseerd op een ‘grounded theory’
die deels gevalideerd is, is dit de eerste studie die het effect van internationale
cultuurverschillen op het gedrag van professionals in het algemeen en op die van
accountants in het bijzonder op een gestructureerde en empirische wijze in kaart
brengt.
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Resultaten en conclusies
Op basis van de definities en fundamentele theorieën van professioneel gedrag (zoals
die van Parsons en Shils 1951; Cyert en March 1963; en Ajzen 1991) is de definitie van
professioneel gedrag in deze studie gebaseerd op de notie dat dit gedrag:
 gedreven wordt door de menselijke natuur en de persoonlijke behoeften,
motivaties, ethiek en psychologisch kenvermogen en beperkingen;
 geleid en gecontroleerd wordt door geïnternaliseerde waarden en overtuigingen
die worden gevormd door persoonlijke interpretaties van nationale, professionele
en organisatorische culturele normen en waarden;
 geconditioneerd wordt door externe verwachtingen en situationele interacties met
andere actoren en de onmiddellijke omgeving van de professional;
 wat leidt tot ‘acties’, waardoor het werkelijke professionele gedrag zichtbaar wordt
voor de buitenwereld, en tot een zekere presentatie of een resultaat.
Op basis van deze definitie en de fundamentele theorieën van professioneel gedrag
zoals behandeld in hoofdstuk 2, kan professioneel gedrag als volgt worden
weergegeven in de kaders van de drijfveren van dat gedrag (een gedetailleerd overzicht
is opgenomen in appendix 1):
Dit conceptueel kader geeft weer dat het professioneel gedrag gestuurd wordt door:
 Psychologische en cognitieve factoren (zoals instinctieve impulsen, eigenbelang en
motivatie, morele oordeelsvorming en begrensde rationaliteit);










Figuur 1 – Het effect van nationale cultuur in de context van de drijfveren van professioneel gedrag
Nationale cultuur
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 Professionele factoren vanuit de beroepsgroep (bijvoorbeeld het effect van regels
versus principiële beginselen, de publieke verantwoording en toezicht op de
beroepsgroep);
 Factoren in de context van de organisatie (bijvoorbeeld het management binnen
een bedrijf, de interne beheersingsmaatregelen, de socialisatie en acculturatie
binnen een organisatie en bedrijfsdoelstellingen); en
 Variabelen in het kader van interactie met de omgeving (bijvoorbeeld
communicatie en onderhandelingen met de cliënt, vertrouwen van het
maatschappelijk verkeer in het beroep en de juridische omgeving).
Het volgende professionele gedragingen van accountants zijn geïdentificeerd in het
kader van het empirisch onderzoek van deze studie:
 Professionele oordeelsvorming
 Het hebben van een kritische grondhouding
 Kennisdelen en consultatiegedrag
 Het werken in flexibele team (inclusief de betrokkenheid van de partner die
eindverantwoordelijkheid heeft op de opdracht)
 Communicatie en onderhandeling met de gecontroleerde over controle-
bevindingen
 Documentatie en verantwoording
 Disfunctioneel gedrag
 Prijsstelling van de controle en praktijkontwikkeling
Deze gedragingen zijn bestudeerd in relatie tot de volgende definitie van nationale
cultuur (gebaseerd op en vrij vertaald van House et al. 2004: 15):
Cultuur is het geheel van gedeelde motieven, waarden, overtuigingen, identiteit en
de betekenissen van belangrijke gebeurtenissen die voortvloeien uit
gemeenschappelijke ervaringen en belevingen van de leden van de groep zoals die
overgedragen worden van generatie op generatie.
Nationale culturen manifesteren zich zowel in waarden (‘values’) als gebruiken
(‘practices’). Dit onderzoek heeft zich gericht op de culturele gebruiken als
onafhankelijke variabele in het verklaren van verschillen in gedrag van accountants.
Deze verschillen in gedrag zijn afgezet tegen de volgende vijf van de acht culturele
dimensies van House et al. (2004: 15, vrij vertaald):
 Hiërarchie (of afstand van de macht): de mate waarin leden van een organisatie of
de samenleving verwachten en ermee instemmen dat de macht ongelijk is verdeeld
en is geconcentreerd op de hogere niveaus van een organisatie;
 Onzekerheidsvermijding: de mate waarin leden van een organisatie of de
samenleving ernaar streven om de onzekerheid van toekomstige gebeurtenissen te
vermijden door gebruikmaking van vooraf vastgelegde sociale normen, rituelen en
bureaucratische praktijken;
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 Assertiviteit: de mate waarin individuen in organisaties en in de samenleving
assertief, confronterend, en agressief mogen zijn in sociale interacties;
 Institutioneel collectivisme: de mate waarin organisatorische en maatschappelijke
institutionele praktijken collectieve verdeling van de middelen en collectieve actie
aanmoedigen en belonen;
 Groepscollectivisme: de mate waarin individuen trots, loyaliteit, en de
verbindingen in hun organisatie of familie benadrukken.
De focus van dit proefschrift in het kader van professioneel gedrag kan als volgt
worden weergegeven:
Op basis van de ‘grounded theory’ die in fase 1 (hoofdstuk 4) is geformuleerd op basis
van de interviews, observaties en literatuur studie, waren de volgende verwachtingen
geformuleerd over de interactie tussen internationale cultuurverschillen op het gedrag
van accountants:
 Internationale verschillen in het gedrag van accountants worden naar verwachting
inderdaad beïnvloed door internationale cultuurverschillen;
 Gedrag van accountants dat naar verwachting het meest beïnvloed wordt door
internationale cultuurverschillen is: het hebben van een kritische grondhouding,
















- Kennis delen en consultatie
- Werken in flexibele teams
- Communicatie en onderhandeling
- Documentatie en verantwoording
- Disfunctioneel gedrag
- Prijsstelling en praktijkontwikkeling
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kennisdelen en consultatiegedrag en de betrokkenheid van de ‘audit partner’
tijdens de controle;
 Het gedrag van accountants wordt naar verwachting met name in negatieve zin
beïnvloed door Hiërarchy, Institutioneel Collectivisme en Groepscollectivisme;
 Het gedrag van accountants wordt naar verwachting met name in positieve zin
beïnvloed door Onzekerheidsvermijding en Assertiviteit.
In fase 2 zijn deze verwachtingen gedeeltelijk gevalideerd door middel van ‘rank order’
analyse van vijf gedragingen van accountants die zijn getest door middel van 1.070
questionnaires gericht op de toepassing van de controlestandaarden in controle
opdrachten in 29 landen van een internationale accountantsorganisatie. De resultaten
daarvan tonen duidelijk aan dat het professioneel gedrag van accountants inderdaad
wordt beïnvloed door internationale cultuurverschillen. Het antwoord op de centrale
onderzoeksvraag wordt als volgt beantwoord:
 Ja, het professioneel gedrag van accountants wordt beïnvloed door internationale
cultuurverschillen;
 De culturele gebruiken die de grootste invloed hebben op het professioneel
gedrag van accountants zijn Institutioneel Collectivisme, Groepscollectivisme,
Hiërarchie en Onzekerheidsvermijding. Dit is grotendeels in lijn met de
geformuleerde verwachting op basis van de ‘grounded theory’;
 Gedrag van accountants dat het meest wordt beïnvloed door internationale
cultuurverschillen zijn het delen van kennis en de betrokkenheid van de partner
tijdens een controleopdracht.
Dit proefschrift illustreert dat de internationale accountantspraktijk niet simpelweg
kan veronderstellen dat de wereldwijd ingevoerde regels, codes en richtlijnen op een
consistente wijze worden geïnterpreteerd en toegepast in de lokale omgeving waar een
accountantscontrole wordt uitgevoerd. Deze interpretatie en toepassing wordt in
belangrijke mate beïnvloed door de culturele ‘programmering’ van de lokale
accountants. Eén van de aanbevelingen aan de accountantsberoepsgroep is om het
effect van internationale cultuurverschillen te onderkennen in de opstelling van
standaarden en richtlijnen. Internationale accountantsfirma’s zouden dit effect ook
moeten onderkennen in de wijze waarop ze de internationale praktijk aansturen.
Immers, ondanks dat een (wellicht) sterke wereldwijde organisatiecultuur bestaat,
heeft onderzoek aangetoond dat lokale culturele verschillen het gedrag van hun
accountants nog steeds belangrijk beïnvloed. Culturele dimensies die hierin vooral
onderkent zouden moeten worden zijn Institutioneel Collectivisme,
Groepscollectivisme, Hiërarchie en Onzekerheidsvermijding (en in mindere mate
Assertiviteit). Accountants werkzaam op multinationale controleopdrachten dienen
rekening te houden met de invloed van cultuur op het gedrag van hun internationale
collega’s die werkzaam zijn in de lokale controles. Hun multinationale cliënten hebben
immers de verwachting dat zij wereldwijd op een consistente wijze worden
gecontroleerd. Deze verwachting is wellicht gerechtvaardigd op basis van
controlestandaard 600 inzake de aansturing van internationale controleopdrachten. De
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groepsaccountant heeft uiteindelijk ongedeelde verantwoordelijkheid voor alle
controlewerkzaamheden die wereldwijd zijn uitgevoerd op de jaarrekening van die
multinationals. Daarmee dient hij of zij te steunen op de oordeelsvorming van zijn of
haar lokale collega’s, en dus rekening te houden met het mogelijke effect van
cultuurverschillen op die oordeelsvorming. Bovendien worden hun multinationale
cliënten in hun lokale operaties (en daarmee de algehele controleomgeving) beïnvloed
door diezelfde cultuurverschillen.
De rechtstreekse toegang tot de ervaringen en praktijk van accountants zelf
(zowel via de interviews als op basis van de hierboven genoemde questionnaires) is
een unieke en zeer waardevolle bron voor deze studie gebleken. De twee belangrijkste
beperkingen in het onderzoek betreffen de toegepaste methodologie en het
onderzoeksinstrument. Een inherente beperking van de ‘grounded theory’
methodologie in fase 1 is dat de subjectieve interpretatie van de onderzoeker zelf
inherent invloed heeft op de resultaten. Een aantal maatregelen is genomen om dit
effect zoveel mogelijk te voorkomen, waaronder een tweede onderzoeker die een
kwart van de codering en analyse van de interview resultaten zelfstandig heeft
uitgevoerd, wat vervolgens vergeleken is met de uitkomsten van de onderzoeker zelf.
Een tweede beperking betreft de questionnaire die als onderzoeksinstrument is
toegepast in fase 2 van dit onderzoek. Deze questionnaire is niet specifiek voor dit
onderzoek ontworpen waardoor niet alle geïdentificeerde gedragingen konden worden
onderzocht. De toegang tot de resultaten van de questionnaires heeft echter
geresulteerd in een unieke dataset rijk aan informatie die relevant is in het kader van de
centrale onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift.
